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Preface
Many of the e¤ects that drive the new information economy were there in
the old industrial economy you just have to know where to look.1
In the following we present three models that use applied oligopoly theory to re-
search market behavior in network industries. The rst two chapters focus on rms
compatibility decisions in the new information economy as exemplied by the software
industry. Chapter 1 derives the equilibrium compatibility regime when asymmetric
rms compete within an oligopolistic structure. Chapter 2 compares the performance
of standards that are established through market competition against those established
through cooperative agreements. In Chapter 3 we investigate a network industry which
is part of the old industrial economy. By using the example of the railroad industry,
we discuss which industry structure and regulatory environment provide the best in-
centives for infrastructure investments. Before introducing the chapters in more detail,
we briey discuss below what these industries from the old and new economies have
in common. In doing so, this preface specically focuses on the implications of these
common elements for market structure, rm strategy and government policy.
Many industries in the old industrial economy are characterized by strong economies
of scale in production i.e. on the supply-side. This applies particularly for network
utilities which rely on a physical network infrastructure to provide their services to
consumers. These infrastructures involve large, xed investment costs and thus render
utilities the most commonly cited example for natural monopolies. Because of the
tendency towards monopolistic structures, these "classical" network industries, such
as rail, electricity, gas, telecoms and water are closely monitored by both regulatory
agencies as well as competition authorities. Regulatory scrutiny appears to be espe-
cially important when recalling that the e¢ cient supply of these services is essential as
an input to numerous production processes.
1Farrell, Shapiro and Varian (2004), page 12.
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New information industries typically also exhibit high xed and low marginal costs
of production. Let us consider the product development and production process in the
software industry as an example. A software rm incurs large, up-front investments
to develop new software; however, the marginal costs of actually producing and dis-
tributing the product tend to zero. Information industries are therefore also subject
to economies of scale on the supply-side. However, in addition, these industries also
feature demand-side economies of scale that economists usually refer to as network ef-
fects or network externalities. A product exhibits network e¤ects if demand or more
precisely the consumerswillingness to pay depends on how many other consumers
also purchase the good. Unlike in old industrial economies, the consumers decisively
drive market behavior through the formation of virtual networks on the demand-side.
Supply- and demand-side economies of scale in information industries strengthen the
tendencies towards monopolization compared to those under network utilities. Thus,
control through regulation and competition authorities is indispensable in information
markets, especially as their importance is growing rapidly.
This dissertation deals with networks physical as well as virtual. In the presence
of physical networks each rm must incur large xed costs; hence, larger rms (i.e.
those producing more output) have smaller average costs. In the presence of virtual
networks larger rms have higher average revenues and demand as their buyers enjoy
network e¤ects. In both cases, one rm may be able to drive its competitors out of
the market because of these scale economies on the supply- and demand-side. These
characteristics will be a dominant feature throughout the three chapters which are
discussed next.
The rst chapter analyzes the compatibility decisions which rms face in an infor-
mation economy. To reap the benets from network e¤ects fully either consumers need
to coordinate on buying the same product or products need to be compatible, i.e. in-
teroperability between goods must be established. In reality, however, one can observe
that rms deliberately impede interoperability. To understand why rms deny compat-
ibility the existing literature has studied stylized environments where either only two
rms decide on compatibility or a dominant rm faces multiple, symmetric rivals. Our
model goes one step further in explaining how asymmetries in market shares, which are
ubiquitous in information industries, a¤ect rmscompatibility choices. It shows that
the presence of multiple, asymmetric rms which decide upon compatibility with each
rival in turn, leads to equilibrium compatibility regimes which have not been considered
in the literature thus far.
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When determining their preferred compatibility alliance, rms trade o¤ two e¤ects.
On the one hand, compatibility expands the network base of their customers which
directly increases the demand for their products. On the other hand, it also implies
that a larger rm loses the advantage as to its network size relative to its rivals. A
larger rm thus always has weaker incentives to agree to compatibility. For this rea-
son, a three-rm oligopoly will, in equilibrium, involve less than full compatibility if
asymmetries in rmsmarket shares exist. In particular, we show that when rms can
decide upon compatibility with each rival in turn, the smallest rm is always excluded
from compatibility. Targeting the smallest rival with incompatibility either magnies
existing asymmetries in market shares or introduces them when small rms are a priori
symmetric. Incentives for compatibility will only be enhanced if rms o¤er signicantly
di¤erentiated products or if perfect symmetry of market shares leads to an agreement
amongst equals. Although the fact of allowing rms to exchange cross-payments nor-
mally achieves full compatibility, smaller rms are net-givers, i.e. they pay the large
rms for compatibility. Interestingly, if asymmetries are very large, rms will have an
incentive to pay rivals to remain incompatible. An important policy recommendation
is therefore to support small market participants and especially entrants in establish-
ing themselves in the industry as they are otherwise targeted with incompatibility. In
this environment an open, mandatory standard might be appealing. However, such
an open, mandatory standard also has its adverse e¤ects, especially when considering
rms(long-run) investment incentives in technology as Chapter 2 shows.
Chapter 2 a joint piece of work with Klaus M. Schmidt compares two forms
of standardization processes in information technology markets that we observe em-
pirically: cooperative and competitive standard setting. Under competitive standard
setting rms refuse to make their products compatible because of the tendency towards
monopolization in network industries. One of two rms expects to dominate the market
eventually and thereby brings about a de facto standard. In contrast, some standards
are established early on through a cooperation agreement or a formal standardization
process. This may be a very simple agreement that only establishes compatibility be-
tween rmsproducts. Alternatively, it may be more complex, potentially governing
large investments in new technologies through an exchange of intellectual property
rights, royalty payments, and technology sharing. Despite the empirical observation
that some standards are brought about through competition and others through co-
operation, the theoretical literature lacks work that aims to understand the relative
performance of these standardization processes. Our model allows this comparison
by deriving their implications for pricing, technology investment and market structure
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of the network industry. In doing so, we account for important components of such
agreements, in particular royalties and technology sharing.
In our model we show that simple agreements that establish compatibility only ex
post, i.e. after technology investments have taken place, reduce price competition but
have no direct e¤ect on the incentives to invest. If rms can write more complex, ex
ante contracts on compatibility containing enforceable agreements on linear royalties
and technology sharing, they will choose higher prices but invest less in technology.
Surprisingly, we nd that rms invest even less if the government imposes a royalty-free
licensing rule. A recent collaboration agreement between Microsoft and Novell serves as
a good example to illustrate some of the points made in this chapter. In 2006, the rms
have agreed on a common standard establishing compatibility between their operating
systems. Our model suggests that they should always do so, if Microsoft expects that
Novell will be a long-term competitor with its Linux technology in the market. As a
consequence of the agreement, our model predicts that consumers will certainly gain
from the increased compatibility and associated network e¤ects. However, Chapter
2 also points out that they may su¤er from higher prices and decreased technology
investments in the future.
Finally, Chapter 3 investigates the interplay between market structure and in-
frastructure investments in network utilities, such as the rail industry. To this end,
we compare two conceivable vertical structures vertical integration and vertical sep-
aration. Under vertical integration the monopolistic infrastructure is provided by a
rm that is also active in the downstream services segment. In contrast, under verti-
cal separation, the upstream infrastructure is operated by an independent infrastruc-
ture rm. A regulator handles the familiar conict between allowing rms to recover
their large sunk infrastructure investments and protecting consumersinterest in low
prices. Despite the importance of the infrastructures quality and cost-e¤ectiveness
for the e¢ cient provision of utilities, only few studies have explored the incentives
for executing the investments behind it. We contribute to this by explaining how in-
vestment incentives change with the regulated access price. Moreover, we investigate
which vertical structure provides the best infrastructure investment incentives, for both
quality-increasing and cost-reducing investments.
We illustrate that increasing the regulated access price stimulates investments into
infrastructure quality but simultaneously reduces investments into cost-reduction, un-
der both vertical integration and vertical separation. In addition, the model predicts
that a vertically integrated structure provides stronger incentives for infrastructure
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investment, both in quality-increases and cost-reduction. Because investments under
both vertical structures fall short of the socially optimal levels, our analysis suggests
that despite the advantages related to fostering competition that a vertically sepa-
rated structure may have vertical integration may be the superior industry structure,
especially if infrastructure investments matter more than competition. These results
contribute to the policy debate on restructuring network utilities, such as the rail and
energy sector: policy makers should not only assess the consequences for competition,
but also investigate the likely impact of di¤erent vertical structures on infrastructure
investments.
The following three chapters are all self-contained and have their own introduction
and appendix. Each chapter can thus be read independently of the other two.
Chapter 1
Compatibility Incentives within an
Oligopoly with Asymmetric Firms
1.1 Introduction
In industries displaying network e¤ects1 compatibility decisions are an important de-
terminant of e¢ ciency. To reach a compatibility agreement, some form of coordination
among competitors is required. Nevertheless, rms remain rivals on the nal prod-
uct market. They therefore use compatibility decisions to strategically inuence their
competitive position on the nal goods market. In this chapter we investigate the in-
centives to deny and/or grant compatibility within an oligopolistic industry structure
when rms are asymmetric with respect to their installed network bases.
When forming a compatibility alliance rms trade o¤ two basic e¤ects. Denying
compatibility causes a demand reduction because customersvaluation for the product
su¤ers from unrealized network e¤ects. At the same time, rms can  by denying
perfect compatibility retain a vertical di¤erentiation relative to their rivals. While
the rst e¤ect is negative for all rms and calls in favor of compatibility, the second
e¤ect is positive only for larger rms. If it is strong enough, it then causes large
rms to deny compatibility to smaller rms. In our analysis we show that, in the
interior equilibrium where all rms serve the market, the largest rm generically has
an incentive to target some rivals with incompatibility.
Oligopolistic market structures with signicant asymmetries of market shares are
1Network e¤ects prevail if a consumers valuation of a good is increasing in the number of other
consumers buying the same product.
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frequently observed in network industries. The operating systems and the o¢ ce soft-
ware market, both subject to direct network e¤ects, are dominated by Microsoft which
competes only against a few small rivals.2 The market for video game consoles where
network e¤ects arise indirectly due to larger availability of complementary goods (i.e.
gaming software) and services, is shared by three players with asymmetric market
shares.3 Similarly, there are normally only three or four wireless telecommunication
providers that share a national market. Here, tari¤-mediated network e¤ects stem from
di¤erential pricing for on-net and o¤-net calls.4
The formal model considers an industry of three potentially asymmetric rms that
rst decide on compatibility and then compete à la Cournot in an economic environ-
ment characterized by network e¤ects. Each rms compatibility decision consists of
a costless, zero/one compatibility choice towards each of the two rivals. Firms must
mutually agree on compatibility. Thus, compatibility strategies of the rms can be
non-uniform but cannot be unilaterally enforced.5 Moreover, we assume transitivity of
compatibility, meaning that if a rm is compatible with both rivals, then these rivals
are also compatible with each other.6 In our analysis the compatibility decision only
a¤ects the network size and does neither lead to di¤erences in cost nor in performance.
We show that, if network e¤ects are strong, there exist multiple fullled-
expectations equilibria where tipping in the quantity competition stage may occur
under all perceivable compatibility regimes except for full compatibility.7 The reason
why there is no tipping equilibrium under full compatibility is that rmsproducts
are perfect substitutes with identical network size. Therefore, in equilibrium, either
all rms remain in the market or none. We then establish that an increase in a rms
own installed-base increases the area where tipping to this rm is an equilibrium and
decreases the area where tipping away from it occurs. However, because there exist
multiple expectation-dependent equilibria in the quantity competition stage, little can
2In markets with direct network e¤ects, the main concern of potential buyers of a product is the
user base of the same product, e.g. because of le-sharing possibilities.
3Nintendo Wii (47%), Sony Xbox360 (30%) and MS Playstation 3 (23%); percentage of total sales
for past 12 months as of September 16, 2008; see www.vgchartz.com which publishes recent sales data.
4See Cabral (2008) for the argument and Bender (2004) for evidence on European market shares.
5We do not consider converters or adapters. In this chapter unilateral compatibility would always
be desirable for the rms.
6This assumption can be justied in a variety of settings but is particularly intuitive when com-
patibility concerns the technical specication of a product, a code and/or the exchange of IP rights.
7Tipping describes the equilibrium property that the market structure "tips" (meaning turns)
into one where only a subgroup of rms or a single rm serves the market. Self-fullling expectations
may then drive which equilibrium actually comes about. The equilibrium concept itself requires that
expectations are fullled.
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be said about the compatibility choice of rms when network e¤ects are very strong.8
If network e¤ects are weak, there exists a unique interior equilibrium under each
compatibility regime in which all rms add new customers in the quantity competition
stage. By comparing prots under each compatibility regime for each of the three rivals,
we then deduce the equilibrium compatibility regime. We conrm the result by Crémer
et al. (2000) that the largest rm takes the decisive role in determining equilibrium
compatibility and that this rm has the weakest desire for compatibility. The reason is
that it has most to lose and least to win in terms of both, vertical di¤erentiation and
demand e¤ects. However, the largest rm cannot always enforce its preferred compati-
bility regime. For example, if the largest rms market share is very high, it desires no
compatibility among rms. But because smaller rivals would then have an incentive
to form a compatibility alliance, the market leader in fact o¤ers some compatibility
to prevent the rivalsalliance. This shows that asymmetry of market shares crucially
impacts equilibrium compatibility. We show that, in equilibrium, the two largest rms
jointly target the smallest rm with incompatibility even if compatibility is costless in
our model and thus full compatibility socially desirable.
Our analysis therefore strongly supports the restrictive view of competition author-
ities. Recently, network industries have faced increased scrutiny of both regulators
and antitrust authorities. US and European competition authorities were concerned
that a large rm may have incentives to deny compatibility and agitated for blocking
any mergers that would further corroborate these fears. Prominent cases discussing
the impact of compatibility decisions for competition and market structure are the
WorldCom/Sprint merger case and the AOL/Time Warner case.9
We then investigate the e¤ects of horizontal product di¤erentiation. We show that
strong product di¤erentiation leads to a reduction in the set of possible tipping equilib-
ria. Tipping can only occur if di¤erentiated consumer groups remain being served. In
this sense, horizontal di¤erentiation, similarly to a larger installed base, serves as a safe
harbor against tipping away. Moreover, horizontal di¤erentiation fosters compatibility
incentives as competitive e¤ects from the loss in vertical di¤erentiation are weaker.
This makes the largest rm become more inclined to grant compatibility.
Finally, we explore the consequences of xed cross-payments for compatibility. We
8This would require further assumptions on the expectations-formation process (compare Farrell
and Klemperer (2007)). This is, however, beyond the scope of our study.
9As outlined in Malueg and Schwartz (2006) and European Commission (1998, 2000), US Depart-
ment of Justice (2000) and Faulhaber (2002) and for Microsoft in Bresnahan (2002).
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show that, because joint prots under independent pricing are highest under full com-
patibility, full compatibility can often be achieved.10 However, the two larger rms
both forego the higher prots of their preferred compatibility regime. Thus, they need
to be compensated by the smaller rm through xed cross-payments to agree to grant
full compatibility. Hence, it is crucial that complete, contingent contracts specifying
the compensation can be written and enforced.
There is a vast literature on the economics of network industries and compatibility
choice.11 Our model builds upon and is closely related to the work by Crémer, Rey
and Tirole (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006).
Crémer et al. (2000) adopt the Katz and Shapiro (1985) framework12 and incorpo-
rate old customers that form an installed base. They analyze compatibility strategies
of a dominant rm in a duopoly and show that a larger rm prefers less compatibility
than its smaller rival. They also explore one very stylized example of targeted incom-
patibility where they show that a dominant rm may prefer compatibility to just one
out of two rivals if these are symmetric. However, in their analysis they do not derive
compatibility incentives of the rms explicitly and are not able to formally explain the
impact of asymmetry on compatibility.
Our model extends the analysis of Malueg and Schwartz (2002, 2006). Malueg
and Schwartz (2006) explore compatibility incentives of a large rm facing multiple,
symmetric rivals that are themselves compatible. They also nd that under strong net-
work e¤ects and incompatibility of the largest rm to the rivals, tipping to or tipping
away from the largest rm may occur in equilibrium. They then illustrate that the
multiple symmetric rivals are subject to an "intra-network competition e¤ect". Con-
sumers anticipate that this more competitive network will set lower prices and they
therefore penetrate this network more. However, Malueg and Schwartz (2006) do not
analyze targeted degradation strategies as they assume uniform compatibility policies.
They retain the assumption of compatibility among rivals throughout their analysis
10For intermediate network e¤ects sub-coalitions may also have highest joint prots.
11For an overview see Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and Koski and Kretschmer (2004); for books
see Shy (2001) and Shapiro and Varian (1999).
12Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) compare the private and social incentives to achieve compatibility
in a Cournot model. They show that compatibility can be socially excessive or insu¢ cient under costly
compatibility. Moreover, they stress the importance of expectations and expectations formation for
the set of equilibria. Both these aspects are outside of our analysis. They then show that rms
(private) decisions will depend crucially on whether they can act unilaterally or whether consensus
is required and on the feasibility of side-payments (e.g. royalties). This chapter substantiates these
results. Note, however, that because compatibility is assumed costless we are unable to derive welfare
implications.
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and therefore only compare the regime of full compatibility with that of autarky of the
dominant rm. In contrast, we extend their analysis in the following directions: We
allow for rivals to be asymmetric and evaluate and explicitly relax their assumption of
uniform compatibility policies.13 We thus do not assume that smaller rivals are com-
patible among each other but derive compatibility incentives within an oligopoly from
rst principles. We show that relaxing these assumptions has important implications
for the equilibrium compatibility outcome. Targeting is the predominant equilibrium
outcome and splintering among rivals is frequently observed.14 Finally, we also allow
for the possibility of cross-payments or royalties in exchange for compatibility.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the model and illustrates
the feasible compatibility regimes. We then solve the model by backward induction in
Section 1.3. We rst explore possible types of equilibria in the quantity stage. We then
derive the equilibrium compatibility regimes for weak network e¤ects and illustrate the
associated comparative statics. In Section 1.4 we allow for cross-payments and explore
their implications for equilibrium. We discuss how this instrument may be able to
achieve the e¢ cient outcome and when it fails to do so. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
To analyze the competitive e¤ects of mixed compatibility regimes we adapt the frame-
work of Crémer et al. (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006). In our model, three
rms rst decide on compatibility and then compete à la Cournot in an industry that
is subject to network e¤ects. In this section we introduce the model in its simplest
form and illustrate basic implications of di¤erent compatibility regimes.15
13Malueg and Schwartz (2006) admit themselves that in reality uniform compatibility among rivals
is hardly observed. In addition to the evidence given at the outset of this chapter, theoretical work
predicts the emergence of asymmetric market structures in network industries (e.g. Cabral (2008)).
Recently, the importance of learning more about the incentives for compatibility in asymmetric settings
has therefore been stressed.
14Following Kretschmer (2008) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007) splintering describes that the
competitive landscape becomes fragmented, e.g. it typically describes the existence of incompatible
software systems.
15We introduce horizontal product di¤erentiation in Section 1.3.3 and in Appendix, Section 1.6.1.
The case of homogeneous products discussed here is nested within that more general framework.
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1.2.1 Setup
Demand
The three rms di¤er only in their locked-in, installed bases of customers. These
customers are bound to previously signed contracts that are outside the scope of the
model and the terms of these cannot be changed.16 Each rm i has an installed base
of i of these passive customers.
17 The total installed base is the sum of rm-specic
installed bases and assumed to equal unity:  =
P3
i=1 i = 1. This normalization
implies that the individual shares may also be interpreted as the respective rms
market share. For ease of notation and without loss of generality we label the largest
rm with installed base 1 rm 1. Firm 2 holds an installed base of 2 with 1 > 2 >
3. To save on parameters we write 2 = x(1   1) and 3 = (1   x)(1   1) with
x 2 [1
2
; 1). Besides pinning down the mere size of the installed bases 2 and 3, the
parameter x also characterizes the asymmetry between rms 2 and 3.
The competition between the three rms is for new consumers. In the basic frame-
work of our model, we borrow the linear inverse demand functions with network e¤ects
as derived in Crémer et al. (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006) so that each rm
faces18:
pi = + Li   
P3
k=1 qk (1.1)
where we assume throughout the chapter that  = 1 ;  = 1 and we restrict the
strength of network e¤ects  to 0 <  < 1 to ensure downward-sloping demand.19
The parameter  thus measures the importance of network e¤ects for consumers and
therefore also governs the social desirability of compatibility between the products
supplied by the three rms. Li measures the size or quality of the compatibility network
of rm i and will be discussed at length in the next subsection. Given qi is the number
of new customers added by each rm i that adds customers in a consistent-expectations
equilibrium, the above prices satisfy market-clearing.
16This assumption is standard in the literature. Compare, for example, Crémer et al. (2000),
Malueg and Schwartz (2006) and Cabral (2008).
17Although passive, these consumers could be important for welfare e.g. if they su¤er from being
stranded when their provider does not serve the market for new consumers.
18Both, Crémer et al. (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006), provide an excellent discussion of
how these are derived from standard consumersutility functions. A consumer of type  receives a
net benet of  + Li   pi when buying the good. In equilibrium, network-quality-adjusted prices of
rms must be the same. Equation 1.1 must be satised in any consistent-expectations equilibrium.
19For simplicity, assume that pi  0 for now. We will discuss implications of pi < 0 at length
in Section 1.3.1. More general demand shifters and shapers ,  and  > 1 have less interesting
implications.
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Supply
There are three rms that supply the network good. Firms di¤er in their installed
bases of old customers, i, but are otherwise fully symmetric. They have identical
marginal costs of production that we normalize to zero.20 The asymmetry of installed-
bases can be interpreted as a quality or vertical di¤erentiation component.21
Timing
In stage zero each rm is endowed with an installed base i from competition in the
past. Neither competition in this stage nor the buying behavior of consumers that make
up the installed base are modeled explicitly. At stage 1/2 rms undergo compatibility
agreements and potentially bargain about the distribution of surplus achieved from
compatibility (xed cross-payments). The compatibility decision is based upon rms
and consumersbeliefs about stage 1 of the game. We elaborate on the details of the
compatibility formation process in the next subsection (Section 1.2.2). Finally, at stage
1, quantity competition determines rmsequilibrium prots and consumersutility.
The equilibrium outcome of stage 1 will critically depend on the expectations of rms
and consumers which we require to be consistent in equilibrium. Competition for new
consumers thus occurs after the compatibility regime is determined.
time
Compatibility
decision
Competition in the
past determines
firms’installed bases
Stage 0 Stage ½ Stage 1
Cournot competition,
consumers buy,
profits are realized
Figure 1.1: Time Structure of the Model
We solve the game by backward induction in Section 1.3. We consider stage 1 in
Section 1.3.1 of the chapter and the compatibility decision (stage 1/2) in Section 1.3.2.
20In fact, results would be qualitatively unchanged under positive and symmetric marginal costs c
as long as c < 1 (compare Malueg and Schwartz (2006)). For asymmetric costs, there are implications
for optimal pricing and thus the expected quantity of new consumers. However, as shown in Section
1.6.2 of the Appendix, it is not the cost asymmetry that matters for the largest rm when competing
à la Cournot but solely its e¤ect on installed bases and asymmetries therein.
21Firms may be asymmetric in their installed bases for di¤erent reasons. Alluding to the earlier
examples, asymmetries could stem from past technological leadership of one of the rms, e.g. pro-
tected through patents or secrecy. Similarly, successive entry, for example due to past regulatory or
government policy as in the auctioning of frequency bands in wireless telecommunications, or simply
di¤erences in historic competitive performance represent further reasons. In many of the above exam-
ples marginal costs nevertheless converge across competitors after this initial phase of competition.
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1.2.2 Network Sizes and Compatibility
The network quality or network size, Li, of each product is characterized by three com-
ponents. The rst component stems from the already installed number of consumers
i that are exogenously given. Secondly, the own new consumers, qi, join the network
as an outcome of quantity competition. Network quality is therefore only imperfectly
determined by installed-bases. In addition, each rm i can agree on compatibility with
rival j to expand its network further. If it does so, its customers enjoy the additional
benet from interacting perfectly with customers of rm j and vice versa. The compat-
ibility decisions and the compatibility regime are characterized by a number of binary
compatibility choice variables ij 2 f0; 1g. A value of ij = 1 implies that rms i and j
are compatible and that their customers enjoy equally good network access to respec-
tive customers of the other network. In contrast, ij = 0 means that rmsproducts
are incompatible and customers of rm i have no access to customers of rm j and
vice versa. The total network benet from buying a product from rm i, Li , is then
given by:
Li = i|{z}
installed base
+ qi|{z}
new consumers
+
P3
k 6=i ik(k + qk)| {z } .
compatibility
(1.2)
We make several assumptions on compatibility. First, we assume that compatibility
is either perfect or not at all (ij 2 f0; 1g). Further, these decisions for or against
compatibility are assumed to imply equal costs that we normalize to zero.22 Although
compatibility may in reality sometimes cause cost di¤erences, it is not a priori clear
whether compatibility or no compatibility is more costly.23 Moreover, we assume that
compatibility decisions cannot be achieved unilaterally but must be mutually agreed
upon (i.e. ij = ji). Furthermore, compatibility decisions are transitive in our model
which implies that if a rm is compatible with both of the rivals, then these rivals
must also be compatible with each other. For example, if 12 = 13 = 1, then (by
transitivity) it follows that: 23 = 1.24 This assumption is particularly intuitive when
22Crémer et al. (2000) show for a setting with two rms and continuous compatibility choice (i.e.
ij 2 [0; 1]) that if di¤erent levels of compatibility are of equal costs, then indeed compatibility choice
will involve either ij = 0 or ij = 1.
23Malueg and Schwartz (2006) reason that compatibility might involve adjustment costs but might
also be cheaper (when adopting a common, o¤-the shelf standard). Incompatibility might involve
no costs but could also be costly, e.g. if development of an own proprietary standard is necessary.
Because we omit costs of (in-)compatibility we are unable to make welfare statements. We thereby
also avoid possible hold-up problems associated with compatibility decisions.
24Due to mutual agreement we can also deduce that 21 = 31 = 32 = 1. Thus, here all rms are
compatible with each other.
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thinking about technical norms or standards that are required for interoperability of
products.
In contrast to Malueg and Schwartz (2006), we do not assume that compatibility
decisions must be uniform. Each rm can independently decide whether to grant
compatibility to just one rival, both rivals or none of them. We also do not assume
a priori that smaller rivals always o¤er compatibility. Under these assumptions there
exist ve feasible compatibility regimes:
1. Full Compatibility: 12 = 13 = 23 = 1
2. Full Autarky: 12 = 13 = 23 = 0
3. Coalition of the Small (Autarky by Firm 1): 12 = 13 = 0; 23 = 1
4. Targeting of Firm 2 (Autarky by Firm 2): 12 = 23 = 0; 13 = 1
5. Targeting of Firm 3 (Autarky by Firm 3): 13 = 23 = 0; 12 = 1
Under "Full Compatibility" all rms supply perfectly compatible products resem-
bling a scenario with a common industry standard. In fact, because all binary compati-
bility variables are equal to one the products are perfect substitutes. They are not only
homogeneous but also provide the same network benet. Full Compatibility requires all
rms agreeing to provide products compatible with both rivals. Absent pricing consid-
erations, this is the most desirable regime for consumers who seek to be compatible with
as many other users as possible. The size of the network under an agreement of case 1 is
the entire customer base, i.e. LFCi = i+qi+
P3
k 6=i(k+qk) = (1+2+3)+(q1+q2+q3).
In contrast, there is no compatibility under the "Full Autarky" regime. Here, the
vertical di¤erentiation between rms is strongest and network size only comprises of
own customers: i.e. LFAi = i + qi.
Besides these most extreme agreements of an all-or-nothing type, "mixed com-
patibility regimes" are possible. The "Coalition of the Small" involves compatibility
between rms 2 and 3 which implies that rm 1 remains autarkic. Note that this
agreement can arise for two fundamentally di¤erent reasons: either rm 1 denies rms
2 and 3 access to its customer base or each of rms 2 and 3 denies rm 1 compatibility
because they prefer a "Coalition of the Small". This logic translates similarly to the
cases of "Targeting of Firm 2" and "Targeting of Firm 3".
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To determine what agreement rms reach in equilibrium we employ the following
mechanism. Each rm determines its preferred complete order of compatibility regimes.
We then match the preferred choices so that they fulll the requirement of mutual
agreement. In addition, the compatibility strategy should be the best response to the
other rmsoptimal compatibility choice. This mechanism best resembles the di¤erent
ways that compatibility standards can come about in reality.25 Finally, note that
the compatibility decision has no further implications for product market competition
except for the adjustment in network sizes. Firms remain competitors no collusion
is allowed.26
Substituting the respective network size (equation (1.2)) into the inverse demand
(equation (1.1)), we obtain the following inverse demand function, which depends di-
rectly on the rms compatibility decisions and the strength of network e¤ects:
pi = 1 + (i + qi +
P3
k 6=i ik(k + qk)) 
P3
k=1 qk. (1.3)
1.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now analyze the game by backward induction. We rst derive equilibrium quan-
tities taking the compatibility regime as given and characterize the di¤erent types of
equilibria that may occur depending on the strength of network e¤ects in Section 1.3.1.
We then derive the equilibrium compatibility regimes in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1 Cournot Equilibria
We start by illustrating competition under Full Compatibility. With Full Compatibility,
rms have same network sizes. Each rm maximizes prots given the inverse demand
function. As there are no costs of producing the output, the prot function when
substituting the inverse demand equation (1.3) under Full Compatibility takes the
following form:
i = pi  qi = (1 + (
P3
k=1(k + qk)) 
P3
k=1 qk)  qi (1.4)
i = (1 +    (1  )
P3
k=1 qk)  qi.
25Chapter 2 discusses alternative standardization processes in detail.
26We maintain this assumption throughout this chapter, also in Section 1.4, where we explicitly
allow for xed payments between rms.
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The three rmsbest response functions are symmetric:
qi =
1 +    (1  )P3k 6=i qk
2(1  ) .
By solving the system of three equations simultaneously, we nd the following
equilibrium outputs under Full Compatibility:
qFC1 = q
FC
2 = q
FC
3 =
(1 + )
4 (1  ) . (1.5)
Note that, as one would expect, all rmsequilibrium outputs and the industry
output increase in the strength of network e¤ects:
@qFCi
@
=
1
2 (1  )2 > 0;
@QFC
@
=
3
2 (1  )2 > 0.
Under Full Compatibility products are perfect substitutes, network sizes (inde-
pendent of the split of actual production) are the same and thus rmsequilibrium
quantities are the same. Because there is no vertical di¤erentiation between products
in equilibrium, tipping  i.e. one or more rms being excluded from the market 
cannot be a consistent-expectations equilibrium under Full Compatibility. Either all
rms make positive prots and serve the market or no rm serves the market in equi-
librium. The symmetric interior equilibrium is thus indeed the unique equilibrium of
the quantity competition stage under Full Compatibility.27
That all rms remain in the market is benecial for consumers as the number of
rms and the intensity of competition tend to drive down equilibrium prices. Also, full
compatibility ensures that no consumers are left behind stranded. However, if there are
costs involved in setting up the compatibility or xed costs of supplying the market,
this may also be detrimental from a social point of view.
For compatibility regimes involving less than full compatibility, i.e. when network
e¤ects imply vertical di¤erentiation between products of the di¤erent rms, there are
indeed tipping equilibria possible for strong enough network e¤ects. In the following
section we derive the necessary parameter constellations for this to happen under each
of the other four compatibility regimes and illustrate their characteristics.
27As part of Proposition 1.1 we provide the formal argument behind the proof.
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Tipping Equilibria
In a tipping equilibrium new consumers expect that a particular rm or a group of
rms will not serve the market. For these expectations to be consistent in equilibrium,
this rm or group of rms must indeed nd it protable to provide zero output in
equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the su¢ cient condition for existence
of tipping equilibria under the possible compatibility regimes:
Proposition 1.1 Tipping equilibria exist under all feasible compatibility regimes ex-
cept for Full Compatibility i¤ network e¤ects are strong enough (  1p
2
). For strong
network e¤ects multiple equilibria exist under these compatibility regimes.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
Thus, the existence of tipping equilibria requires su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects.
In addition, expectations and the expectations-formation process play an important
role in determining the market outcome. These equilibria are typically not unique
so that that multiple equilibria exist. To make more exact predictions about equilib-
rium selection we would need a more detailed theory on the underlying expectations-
formation process.28 As this is, however, not the focus of our study we abstract from
further renements. To illustrate the derivation of conditions for existence of tipping
equilibria and to gain some general insights consider the following example:
Example 1 Suppose that Full Autarky is the compatibility regime agreed on at stage
1/2 of the game (i.e. Li = i + qi). Suppose further that each new consumer expects
all other new consumers to buy from rm 1. Then, given these expectations, rm 1
maximizes the prot expression:
1 = p1q1 = (1 + (1 + q1)  q1)q1
and adds the monopoly quantity of new consumers:
qFA1 (q2 = q3 = 0) =
1 + 1
2(1  ) .
28According to Farrell and Klemperer (2007) expectations may respond in various ways to price
or "quality" di¤erences. They could, for example, track quality or surplus but consumers could also
stubbornly favor one rm. Existence of tipping equilibria changes dramatically depending on the
underlying expectations formation process.
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Given rm 1 adds qFA1 (q2 = q3 = 0) it is indeed not protable for rms 2 and 3 to serve
the market if the following condition holds on price (inverse demand) p2 for all q2 > 0
(note that the corresponding condition of p3 < 0 is implied by p2 < 0):
p2 = 1 + 2  
1 + 1
2(1  ) < 0.
If this inequality holds, rms 2 and 3 do indeed not produce and thus there exists a tip-
ping equilibrium with rm 1 producing the monopoly output. The respective parameter
space is bounded by:
1 >
2(1  )(1 + x)  1
 + 2x(1  )
which implies a negatively-sloped boundary line in the (; 1)-space (as
@
@
(2(1 )(1+x) 1
+2x(1 ) ) =
 6x2+4x 2x 1
2(2x(1 )+1)2 < 0) with (RHS = 1) =  =
1
3
and
(RHS = 0) =  = x 1+
p
x2+1
2x
>  for x 2 [1
2
; 1). Thus, for large enough net-
work e¤ects  there exists a consistent-expectations equilibrium in which there is
tipping to rm 1 (q1 =
1+1
2(1 ) ; q2 = 0; q3 = 0). Note, that under Full Autarky other
types of tipping equilibria are also possible (see proof of Proposition 1.1 in Appendix
1.6.3). Tipping may be to rm 2 only, to rm 3 only or to subgroups of rms 1 and
2, rms 1 and 3 and rms 2 and 3 depending on expectations. For larger network
e¤ects multiple equilibria exist depending on the expectations that consumers have.
The above example reveals the following basic insights which can be generalized.
First, tipping may occur if network e¤ects are signicantly weaker than required in
Proposition 1.1. The parameter regions for existence di¤er depending on the compati-
bility regime chosen at stage 1/2 and the market structure (in particular the asymme-
tries in is). Second, the boundary in (; 1)-space of where these equilibria exist is
negatively sloped if it involves equilibria of tipping to rm 1 (i.e. a higher 1 implies
tipping also at lower levels of network e¤ects) and positively if it involves tipping from
rm 1. Third, under Full Autarky we may observe a variety of market structures in
equilibrium. With a higher degree of compatibility, i.e. a regime of a "Coalition of
the Small" or "Targeting of either Firm 2" or "Firm 3", multiplicity of tipping is re-
duced. In that case tipping can only occur to the compatibility alliance or away from
it.29 Finally, expectation-dependent multiple equilibria exist for a large region of the
parameter space.
29The intuition is similar to why there is no tipping under full compatibility. Products of the
coalition are perfect substitutes  so either both rms of the coalition serve the market or none of
them do so in equilibrium.
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The following corollary summarizes the general comparative statics results of tip-
ping equilibria:
Corollary 1.1 In any tipping equilibrium (a) an increase in a rms own installed
base increases ceteris paribus the parameter region where tipping to it is an equilibrium,
(b) an increase in a rms own installed base reduces ceteris paribus the parameter
region where tipping away from it is an equilibrium, (c) larger asymmetry of rivals acts
like an increase in the installed base of rm 2 and thus increases regions of tipping to
a coalition that includes rm 2 and reduces regions where tipping away from a coalition
that includes rm 2 is an equilibrium, (d) su¢ ciently strong network e¤ects are needed.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
Therefore, when compatibility regimes are of less than Full Compatibility, tipping
occurs for strong network e¤ects. Installed-bases then act as a safe-harbor against
tipping away or potentially make tipping to a rm an equilibrium. Imperfect compat-
ibility introduces a vertical di¤erentiation component which, if it has su¢ cient weight
in consumersutility functions through strong network e¤ects, leads to some rms not
producing in equilibrium.
The following gure summarizes the existence of tipping equilibria for di¤erent
compatibility regimes in (; 1)-space:
Figure 1.2: Possible Equilibria under Di¤erent Compatibility Regimes
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The horizontal axes capture the strength of network e¤ects, the vertical axes rm
1s market share 1. Note that market shares of rms 2 and 3 can also be deduced
from rm 1s market share. Firm 2s share is 2 = x  (1   1) and rm 3s share is
3 = (1  x)  (1  1) where for the above gure x is xed to x = 0:75.
The gure graphically conrms the prediction that tipping equilibria exist as net-
work e¤ects increase. Moreover, there are multiple equilibria under all compatibility
regimes for large network e¤ects (Area D as  ! 1). Picture a) reveals that out of
the di¤erent tipping equilibria those involving competition between two rms out of
which one is the market leader span the largest parameter region. In area B of graph
a), for example, rm 1 is largest, while it is rm 2 when rm 1s market share 1
becomes very small (as in area C of graph a)). Competition between the two rms
entails a competitive e¤ect similar to the "intra-network competition e¤ect" of Malueg
and Schwartz (2006). Compared to prices in a tipping equilibrium with just one rm,
competition reduces prices and increases adoption. Therefore tipping to two rms is
more likely than tipping to a monopoly. This is also the intuition behind gure b).
Area C is larger than area B in this gure because intra-network competition drives
prices down and makes tipping to the Coalition of the Small more likely. Figures c)
and d) show that targeting rms 2 or 3 protects rm 1 against tipping away for a
large region in parameter space. In particular, under Targeting of Firm 3 in graph d)
tipping to rms 1 and 2 is the unique equilibrium for area B. When expectations are
such that this equilibrium will obtain, rms 1 and 2 can exclude rm 3 from serving
the market.
Through its compatibility decision in stage 1/2 a rm can critically inuence
whether and what kind of tipping will be feasible in equilibrium. However, this decision
requires full insights into expectations of new consumers. Because of the multiplicity
of equilibria, it is di¢ cult to compare rmsincentives for compatibility. For compati-
bility incentives we therefore focus exclusively on the unique interior equilibria in the
quantity game that result under weaker network e¤ects. These equilibria exist under
every compatibility regime also under Full Compatibility which was not depicted in
Figure 1.2 and will be discussed next.
Interior Equilibrium
In an interior equilibrium all three rms are active in the industry and supply their
products to new consumers. As depicted in Figure 1.2 the interior equilibrium is
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the unique equilibrium under each compatibility regime for weak network e¤ects. A
su¢ cient condition for their existence is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2 For low strength of network e¤ects (  1
5
) there exists a unique
interior equilibrium under each compatibility regime in which all rms add new cus-
tomers.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
To derive conditions for existence of the interior equilibria we maximize rmsprot
functions given the compatibility regime and derive the optimal quantities (analogously
to the derivation for Full Compatibility in Section 1.3.1, equations (1.4) to (1.5)). We
must also ensure that prot expressions are non-negative. In the interior equilibria of
the subgame rmsprots are as given in the following table30:
Regime Firm 1 (1) Firm 2 (2) Firm 3 (3)
FC 1
16
(+1)
(1 )
1
16
(+1)
(1 )
1
16
(+1)
(1 )
FA 1 3+1(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)
1 3+x(1 1)(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)
1 3+(1 x)(1 1)(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)
CS/AF1 1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4
1 1(3 2) 22
62 12+4
1 1(3 2) 22
62 12+4
TF2 1 x(1 1)(3 2) 2
2
62 12+4
1+x(5 3)(1 1) 5
62 12+4
1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22
62 12+4
TF3 1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 2
2
62 12+4
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4
1+(5 3)(1 x)(1 1) 5
62 12+4
By comparing the expressions for prots we can deduce that a larger rm can
leverage the installed-base advantage into a higher number of new consumers for most
compatibility regimes. The reason is that customers perceive the larger network size
as a quality advantage and value the product more than that of competitors. As long
as compatibility is less than perfect, larger rms therefore benet from this relative
advantage in the quantity competition game and they can also leverage this compar-
ative advantage into compatibility decisions as we will see later. In contrast, smaller
competitors su¤er from the same e¤ect and for them compatibility becomes crucial to
diminish the relative disadvantage.
The analysis in conjunction with Figure 1.2 also shows that the unique interior equi-
librium may exist for values of network e¤ects which signicantly exceed the threshold
30Note that quantities in equilibrium can be deduced by dividing by (1   ) and then taking
the square root. Equilibrium price is given by multiplying the equilibrium quantity by (1   ).
We abbreviate as follows: FC=Full Compatibility; FA=Full Autarky; CS=Coalition of the Small;
TFi=Targeting of Firm i.
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for su¢ ciency (i.e. for  > 1
5
). In fact, for the Full Compatibility regime, the sym-
metric interior equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for the entire parameter space. In
the proof for uniqueness of Proposition 1.2 we show that tipping equilibria and interior
equilibrium are in fact mutually exclusive. When tipping is a possible equilibrium, the
interior equilibrium does not exist.
By focusing on interior equilibria only (  1
5
) and comparing prots across com-
patibility regimes, we can make predictions about the preferred compatibility regime
of rms as well as the equilibrium compatibility regime. It will be interesting to see
whether and when rm 1, the largest rm, has an incentive to share its installed base
with its competitors. The incentives to do so are reected in the rms equilibrium
prots under the di¤erent regimes and will be illuminated in the next section.
1.3.2 Compatibility Choice (  15)
The equilibrium compatibility regime results from rmsdesired compatibility choices
at stage 1/2 under the requirement of mutual agreement. As the number and form of
prot expressions in the above table already indicates, multiple compatibility regimes
are feasible. The following remark facilitates comparisons:
Remark 1 In any equilibrium tipping or interior prots of rm i are
i = (1  )(qi )2 (1.6)
where qi denotes the quantity of rm i in this equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
The above observation which is also valid in a standard Cournot model carries
over to the augmented versions with network e¤ects (and even horizontal product
di¤erentiation) considered here. It states that we can base equilibrium prot compar-
isons across compatibility regimes purely on the equilibrium quantities as there is a
simple mapping from quantities to prots (which is positive and monotone). As the
expressions for equilibrium quantities are a lot simpler, we thus usually argue using
equilibrium quantities even if intuition would suggest a comparison of prots. Until we
investigate cross-payments in Section 1.4 we make statements on quantities and prots
interchangeably.
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Let us rst understand rm 1s preferred compatibility policy by ranking compati-
bility regimes. Comparing equilibrium prots, one can easily observe that rm 1 always
prefers "Targeting of Firm 3" over "Targeting of Firm 2" if x > 1
2
. Clearly, the only
di¤erence for rm 1 between those two regimes lies in rm 2 bringing a larger installed
base into the coalition. Thus, rm 1 prefers rm 2 as a partner over rm 3. Moreover,
rm 1 always prefers "Full Autarky" over a "Coalition of the Small". Both regimes
leave rm 1 incompatible with rivals. Under this presumption rm 1 would opt for
competitors remaining incompatible as well, so that their networks are not merged to
a larger network. For the three compatibility regimes that are not directly revealed
preferred to by others, we can show that rm 1s compatibility choice looks like the
following for x = 0:75:
Figure 1.3: Firm 1s Preferred Compatibility Regimes
The left gure a) shows rm 1s preferred regimes. Firm 1 desires "Targeting of
Firm 3" for most of the parameter space. Only if its market share becomes extremely
large, rm 1 opts for Full Autarky and against sharing its installed base with its rivals.
The right gure b) discusses rm 1s ranking of compatibility regimes if regulation or
antitrust policies were to forbid targeting the smallest rm, rm 3. In that case, rm
1 would prefer "Targeting of Firm 2" for intermediate own market shares. For a high
market share, Full Autarky again yields the highest prots for rm 1. For low values
of 1, which may also imply that rm 1 is no longer the largest rm, rm 1 prefers Full
Compatibility.31 Figure 1.3 therefore highlights the relevance of mixed compatibility
31Firm 1 will be smaller than rm 2 if 1 < x(1   1) , 1 < x1+x  :43 for x = 0:75. However,
here we assume that 1  2  3.
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regimes. Firm 1 will generally seek just one partner so that one rm will not partake
in the sharing of network e¤ects.
However, rm 1 cannot set the compatibility agreement at own will. Firms must
mutually agree. Therefore, the compatibility incentives of rms 2 and 3 are important
which we determine by similar logic. Ranking the preferred compatibility regimes for
both rms we can rst show that rm 2 always prefers "Targeting of Firm 3" over the
"Coalition of the Small". Again the intuition is that when picking just one partner, rm
2 chooses the larger one. Also, rm 2 always prefers "Full Autarky" over "Targeting
of rm 2" where it would be left outside a rivalsalliance. Whether and when rm
2 favors the compatibility regimes of "Targeting of Firm 3", "Full Autarky" or "Full
Compatibility" depends on the distribution of market shares. In fact, one can show that
rm 2 prefers "Targeting of Firm 3" for the entire parameter space where 1  2  3
holds. Because both parties that need to sign the "Targeting of Firm 3" compatibility
agreement indeed have this as their preferred alliance, they will mutually agree on it.
Therefore, rm 3s compatibility choice is irrelevant (we show that this is similar in
logic to rm 2s).
Let us briey consider what happens for extremely large values of market shares
of rm 1. We have shown in Figure 1.3 that rm 1 would then desire Full Autarky.
However, this would require rms 2 and 3 not wanting to form an alliance. The
incentives of rms 2 and 3 are di¤erent they would form an alliance. Because rm 1
anticipates this, it will, for this parameter region, propose its second-best compatibility
regime, "Targeting of Firm 3". This is accepted by rm 2. We can summarize the
ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3 If 1 > 2 > 3 and   15 , the equilibrium compatibility choice
among the three rms is "Targeting of Firm 3" and thus involves less than full com-
patibility even if compatibility is costless. Firms produce the following quantities:
(qTF31 = q
TF3
2 ; q
TF3
3 ) = (
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4 ;
1+(5 3)(1 x)(1 1) 5
62 12+4 ).
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
The above result is based on the following basic insights. First, maintaining the
assumption that rm 1 is the largest rm, rms 2 and 3 seek alliances with rm 1.
They would therefore generally want to agree to proposals of compatibility made by
the market leader. Therefore, rm 1 de facto determines the equilibrium compatibility
of the industry. As long as rm 1 is the largest rm (so that we can exclude the area of
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small market shares of rm 1) rm 1 always nds its proposal accepted by the partner.
Only when rm 1 opts for Full Autarky for very large market shares the proposal is
rejected as rms 2 and 3 have an incentive to form an alliance. Anticipating this, rm
1 proposes its second best compatibility regime of "Targeting of Firm 3" to rm 2 as
this gives it higher prots than a "Coalition of the Small".
Because rm 1s decision is of highest importance in determining the equilibrium
compatibility regime we now explore the e¤ects that inuence rm 1s decision. Firm
1 trades o¤ the two e¤ects already noted in Crémer et al. (2000) which are also at the
heart of rm 2s and 3s decision:
 Demand e¤ect: Agreeing on compatibility with one or two partners increases
demand of all rms within that alliance as consumerswillingness to pay increases.
The larger the prospective partner, the more the rm seeks an alliance. Smaller
rms therefore generally seek compatibility strongest.
 Vertical Di¤erentiation e¤ect: Compatibility implies that the network quality of
partners is equalized. The larger rm will therefore lose its vertical di¤erentiation
advantage. If network qualities are very asymmetric and hence vertical di¤eren-
tiation plays an important role, this second e¤ect becomes decisive. It points in
favor of compatibility for small rms but is the reason why a large rm may opt
against compatibility.
This trade-o¤ implies that very symmetric rms have little to lose from compatibil-
ity as the vertical di¤erentiation e¤ect is small. However, for large rms, such as rm
1 in our model, agreeing on compatibility has a countervailing e¤ect. It loses its ver-
tical product di¤erentiation advantage. Incentives for full compatibility are therefore
reduced if signicant asymmetries exist. The same e¤ects also determine the incentives
of rm 2 towards compatibility with rm 3. Firm 2s incentives are always smaller than
rm 3s and when the market shares are very asymmetric, rm 2 might not want to
undergo compatibility with rm 3.
The above e¤ects also illustrate that one-sided compatibility through adapters or
converters which we have excluded by assumption are always desirable as there would
be no negative vertical di¤erentiation e¤ect but only the benecial demand e¤ect.
It is now interesting to examine the robustness of Proposition 1.3. In the following
proposition we examine rm 1s compatibility strategy if we add additional competitors
to the market. We can generalize the above result as follows.
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Proposition 1.4 Targeting by rm 1, i.e. excluding at least a positive fraction of
symmetric competitors from the compatibility agreement, is always protable for the
dominant rm, rm 1.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
To generalize the result of Proposition 1.3 we analyze a situation where rm 1 with
the installed base 1 faces n a priori identical and symmetric rivals. We then investigate
the compatibility incentives of rm 1. We assume that a compatibility o¤er of rm 1 is
never rejected (which we have shown to be true if rm 1 is the largest rm) so that rm
1 can essentially choose the number of rms to be compatible with. For the fraction of
rms that does not receive a compatibility o¤er of rm 1, we assume that they form
their own compatibility network.32 In the appendix we prove the above statement by
showing that rm 1 starting from Full Compatibility has an incentive to reduce
compatibility at the margin. The result would be further reinforced if market shares
of rivals were asymmetric and competitors were not to form their own compatibility
network.
In summary, this section has shown that under non-uniform compatibility choice
with asymmetric rivals mixed compatibility regimes are predominantly chosen. There-
fore, neither Full Compatibility nor Full Autarky result in equilibrium. Thus, if the
socially e¢ cient regime is indeed Full Compatibility regulatory intervention may be de-
sirable.33 In the next section we want to investigate the comparative statics of di¤erent
parameters on rm 1s compatibility incentives and on equilibrium. In Section 1.4 we
then ask whether and how it will be possible to achieve full compatibility using di¤er-
ent measures. For this purpose we investigate the possibility of xed cross-payments
between rms.
1.3.3 Comparative Statics
The aim of this section is to understand the e¤ects of changes in market structure
or the market environment on rm 1s compatibility incentives and the equilibrium
compatibility regime.
32This tends to bias results towards rm 1 o¤ering more compatibility. As it was our aim to show
that full compatibility is never achieved, this bias further reconrms our hypothesis. The same is
true for the symmetry of rivals. As long as rivals are symmetric they would indeed always form a
compatibility regime.
33This depends on the associated transaction and setup costs of compatibility or the costs of
incompatibility (e.g. in the case of quality degradation).
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Strength of network e¤ects ()
The strength of network e¤ects inuences rm 1s incentives to grant compatibility.
The demand and the vertical di¤erentiation e¤ect both increase in network e¤ects.
Therefore the overall e¤ect is ambiguous and depends on the relative size of the e¤ects
and the underlying market share of rm 1. As can be inferred from Figure 1.3a) stronger
network e¤ects generally result in an expanding parameter region for which "Targeting
of Firm 3" is desirable. The critical market share required for rm 1 to desire Full
Autarky is increased. Thus, the equilibrium compatibility regime of "Targeting of
Firm 3" remains the equilibrium compatibility regime as long as   1
5
. In addition,
as shown in Section 1.3.1, very strong network e¤ects cause tipping. In summary:
Corollary 1.2 With stronger network e¤ects, there may be tipping and multiplicity
of equilibria. Also, as the strength of network e¤ects increases, rm 1 seeks mixed
compatibility (Targeting of Firm 3) for a larger parameter region implying that prots
under this regime increase faster in network e¤ects than under Full Autarky. The
equilibrium compatibility regime remains unchanged.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
Dominance of the market leader (1)
The distribution of market shares plays the predominant role in determining equilib-
rium compatibility. The market leader de facto determines equilibrium compatibility.
While rm 1 prefers "Targeting of Firm 3" as the compatibility regime, it can be seen
from Figure 1.3b) that rm 1s desire for compatibility hinges on the dominance the
market leader has over its rivals. A rm seeks less compatibility the larger its mar-
ket share. For very small shares it may desire Full Compatibility, for intermediate
shares it desires mixed compatibility regimes while for high market shares it desires
Full Autarky. The reason is that with increasing market share, the rms vertical
di¤erentiation advantage increases. If that is large enough, the rm wants to deny
compatibility. In equilibrium the compatibility regime is then generically targeting of
the smallest of the three rms.
Corollary 1.3 With increasing dominance (i.e. larger 1) the market leader, rm 1,
seeks less compatibility. The equilibrium compatibility regime is, however, not inu-
enced.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
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The equilibrium compatibility regime is thus robust to changes in both network
e¤ects and installed base shares of the market leader (as reected in Figure 1.3).
Asymmetry of rivalsmarket shares (x)
Previous research has either focused on all rivals being fully symmetric or on very
special cases of asymmetry.34 Our framework allows to formally analyze the impact
of asymmetries of installed bases on the equilibrium compatibility regime as well as
equilibrium quantities. Besides varying the market share of rm 1 (relative to the sum
of rms 2 and 3), we can introduce di¤erent degrees of asymmetries between rivals
by changing the parameter of asymmetry x. The following gure shows how rm
1s compatibility incentives change if asymmetry between rivals increases from perfect
symmetry (i.e. x = 0:5) to signicant asymmetry (x = 0:75):
Figure 1.4: Comparative Statics in Asymmetry of Rivals
Proposition 1.5 With increasing asymmetry between rivals market shares, rm 1
seeks mixed compatibility for a larger parameter space. The equilibrium compatibility
regime remains unchanged unless all rms are symmetric (1 =
1
3
, x = 1
2
); in that case
Full Compatibility obtains.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
34Both, Malueg and Schwartz (2006) and Crémer et al. (2000) assume symmetric rivals.
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Again, the intuition can be traced back to the interplay between demand and ver-
tical di¤erentiation e¤ects. If all rms are very symmetric (consider e.g. i =
1
3
8i),
no rm wants to opt for incompatibility Full Compatibility obtains. The reason is
that a rm that opts for incompatibility with an equally-sized rm will not gain a
competitive advantage over this rm and the quality or network size of it relative to
the other two rms even deteriorates. However, as soon as there is one rm with a
larger market share Full Compatibility does not result in equilibrium. With increasing
asymmetry the vertical di¤erentiation e¤ect gains increasing importance. Firms deny
compatibility to safeguard their vertical di¤erentiation advantage.
Consider now the compatibility choice of rm 1. From Figure 1.4 we can deduce
that with greater symmetry of rivalsshares rm 1 seeks less compatibility for a larger
parameter region. Consider, for example, the "Targeting of Firm 3" versus "Full Au-
tarky" choice that rm 1 faces for high own market shares. The "Full Autarky" regime
has the same attractiveness, no matter whether rivals are symmetric or asymmetric
as long as their joint market share is unchanged. However, the "Targeting of Firm 3"
regime becomes more attractive the larger the asymmetry in rivals, i.e. the larger x.
While a rival in a standard Cournot model without network e¤ects does not care
about asymmetries of rivals, asymmetries in this model do play an important role for
equilibrium. As we show in Appendix, Section 1.6.2, a rm designs its quantity choice
in a regular Cournot model only by accounting for the average cost e¢ ciency of rivals
(i.e. optimal quantities depend on the sum of marginal costs). Cost asymmetries have
no direct e¤ect on the shape of the reaction function. However, when asymmetries
in marginal costs lead to rms building di¤erent installed-bases, this has important
implications for equilibrium compatibility.
Horizontal Di¤erentiation
We now generalize the model to capture horizontal product di¤erentiation in addition.
We introduce horizontal product di¤erentiation of rm 1 vis-à-vis its rivals and assume
that there are two equally-sized groups of consumers and each group prefers ceteris
paribus one of two varieties on the market. We further assume that variety a is o¤ered
by rm 1 only and variety b is provided by rms 2 and 3 in competition.35 As the
price of the preferred variety increases, more and more consumers switch to buy the
35Though the industry structure is stylized it is most important here to understand rm 1s incen-
tives of compatibility depending on horizontal di¤erentiation. Results can be readily transferred to a
setting were all rms are di¤erentiated.
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less preferred variety at a cheaper price.36 The industry structure therefore looks as
follows:
Figure 1.5: Industry Conguration with Horizontal Product Di¤erentiation
From the utility functions we derive linear inverse demand functions that are very
similar to the ones under homogeneous products:
p1 = a+ L1   q1   q2   q3 (1.7)
p2 = a+ L2   q1   q2   q3 (1.8)
p3 = a+ L3   q1   q2   q3 (1.9)
where 0      37 and:
Li = i + qi +
3P
j 6=i
ij  (j + qj). (1.10)
These expressions have, abstracting from the term stemming from network benets,
similarity to the linear inverse demand functions as used in Bowley (1924) or Spence
(1976) and Dixit (1979). We again ensure that inverse demand functions are downward
sloping in own quantity by restricting  > . Product varieties a and b are imperfect
substitutes as long as the product di¤erentiation parameter, , takes a value of 0 <
 < . Thus, the other varietys price and quantity matter for a rms own inverse
demand, its prot maximization and its compatibility choice. The strength of the
e¤ect through product competition is, as in any other model of horizontal product
36A specication of utility functions and a detailed derivation of the general demand system is
given in the Appendix, Section 1.6.1.
37We again assume for exposition that  =  = 1 when stating our results.
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di¤erentiation, governed by the parameter measuring the substitutability of product
varieties, . Note that as  !  products become perfect substitutes. As  ! 0
varieties become less and less substitutable and nally when  = 0, demands of the
two product varieties are independent. We assume that   0 and thereby exclude the
analysis of complementary variety demands.38
Observe that the homogeneous products case is completely nested in the above
demand system. By setting  =  we are back to the demand system considered in
Section 1.2. Note that we assume that network e¤ects are not inuenced through
horizontal di¤erentiation, i.e. the desire for compatibility remains, even if products
become more and more di¤erentiated. In addition the network e¤ects are modeled to be
rm-specic so that even if rms 2 and 3 produce homogeneous products network e¤ects
only accrue at a product, not at the variety level. We do so because neither homogeneity
nor heterogeneity of products governs the technical compatibility and interoperability.
Firms can therefore independently decide on compatibility as in previous sections.
To compare compatibility incentives we proceed as in Section 1.3 by again making
use of the equivalence of equilibrium quantities and prots (Remark 1 also holds for
di¤erentiated products). We can summarize the impact of product di¤erentiation in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1.6 With a higher degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation between
rm 1 and its rivals, rm 1 desires more compatibility. In the extreme, where product
demands are almost independent, Full Compatibility is rm 1s preferred compatibility
regime. At the same time product di¤erentiation reduces the set of feasible tipping
equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
The gure on the next page summarizes the results graphically by comparing the
case of homogeneous products ( =  = 1) with that of signicant horizontal di¤eren-
tiation ( = 0:5) for x = 0:75.
38In fact "complementarities" could also arise through the existence of network e¤ects, resembling
the idea of indirect network e¤ects. Because we assume that     0, the potentially positive
demand-boosting e¤ect under compatibility through network e¤ects is always o¤set through the com-
petitive e¤ect in our model.
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Figure 1.6: Comparative Statics in Degree of Product Di¤erentiation
The above gure shows that with increasing product di¤erentiation, rm 1 prefers
more compatibility. In particular, the region where full compatibility is optimal for
rm 1 expands signicantly whereas the region of Full Autarky contracts fully. As hor-
izontal product di¤erentiation becomes very strong ( ! 0) rm 1 always opts for Full
Compatibility because sharing the vertical di¤erentiation advantage loses importance
with increasing product di¤erentiation whereas the demand e¤ect remains. However,
when rms 2 and 3 are su¢ ciently asymmetric it may now be rm 2 that refuses full
compatibility. The reason is that this rm still trades o¤ the demand e¤ect against the
deterioration of relative quality advantages with respect to rm 3.
An application where product di¤erentiation and compatibility are jointly impor-
tant is the software applications and the operating systems market. Whereas Microsoft
and Linux are imperfect substitutes their compatibility is of great importance for users.
Some authors have even argued that operating systems could also be complements to
some degree.39 This discussion only shows that understanding the impact of horizontal
product di¤erentiation on compatibility choice is relevant. The result that compat-
ibility typically increases towards those products that are weaker substitutes is not
only intuitive but also observed in reality. Microsoft has just launched a new "com-
patibility initiative" in 2007 which aims at establishing compatibility with many other
products. This initiative is targeted at imperfect substitutes that do not truly threaten
Microsofts demand but rather foster benets through realization of network e¤ects.
39For an empirical study investigating this, see Kretschmer (2004).
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Some nancial analysts, for example, argue that Microsoft is in fact fostering compati-
bility to increase own demand through virtualization allowing a broader set of services
and software to interact.
Besides the above results which hold for interior equilibria, there are also important
implications of horizontal product di¤erentiation for the set of possible tipping equi-
libria. In fact, the set of possible equilibria reduces. Because there are two consumer
groups with preferences for one of the varieties, both of these have to be served in equi-
librium as horizontal di¤erentiation becomes strong. Thus, those tipping equilibria
that do not allow serving both customer groups no longer exist.
Example 2 Suppose that Full Autarky is again the compatibility regime agreed on
at stage 1/2 of the game (as in Section 1.3.1). We now again derive the equivalent
condition required for rm 1 to indeed supply the market as a monopoly (i.e. prots of
rms 2 and 3 being negative):
p2 = 1 + 2   (   )
1 + 1
2(1  ) < 0.
Although the inequality may hold for values of  close to , it no longer holds for low
values of . Converting the rst inequality by isolating :
 >
 (1 + 1) + 2 (1 + 2) (1  )
1 + 1
,
it is readily observed that as  ! 0 the inequality fails to hold. Thus, this tipping
equilibrium no longer exists for strong horizontal di¤erentiation. The set of tipping
equilibria for strong network e¤ects reduces to tipping to rms 1&3 and tipping to
rms 1&2 only.
1.4 E¢ cient Bargaining
When compatibility decisions are costless, Full Compatibility is the socially desirable
regime. However, the analysis of Section 1.3 has shown that, except for the case where
there is symmetry among competitors and/or su¢ cient product di¤erentiation in the
market, full compatibility is not achieved. In this section we investigate whether cross-
payments may serve as an instrument to establish full compatibility as the equilibrium
outcome.
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We now assume that rms can draw up a contract that species xed cross-
payments between the rms in addition to the compatibility agreement. The terms
of the contract are observable and veriable in court so that renegotiation, hold-up
and incompleteness do not play a role here. The bargaining process on royalties may
take di¤erent forms. However, because there are three parties involved and the threat
points are endogenously determined the usual economic approaches of Nash Bargaining
and the Shapley value are di¢ cult to apply here.40 To approach the problem, we rst
derive expressions for the sum of prots of the three rms under the di¤erent compat-
ibility regimes. We assume that rms may agree on the type of compatibility regime
jointly but are not allowed to collude on prices. The following proposition summarizes
the results:
Proposition 1.7 Joint prots are highest under Full Compatibility for small network
e¤ects. However, for intermediate network e¤ects prots are higher under mixed com-
patibility regimes if market shares are very asymmetric.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 1.6.3.
Figure 1.7: Compatibility Regimes with Highest Joint Prots
When comparing the above gure (again x = 0:75) against that of equilibrium com-
patibility regimes as discussed in Section 1.3, it becomes apparent that it is possible
40Under Shapley values the rms are paid their respective marginal contributions to the coalition.
For that one would need a clearly dened "non-cooperative" regime. Similarly, it is di¢ cult to dene
one threat point needed to calculated outcomes under Nash Bargaining. Compare Thomson (1994)
and Winter (2002).
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to use xed cross-payments between rms to achieve a higher degree of compatibility.
Because the outcome without bargaining would involve "Targeting of Firm 3", achiev-
ing full compatibility with cross-payments must imply granting rms 1 and 2 at least
the prots that they would make under their outside option of "Targeting of Firm 3".
Clearly, therefore, they must be net-receivers in the bargaining game. Firm 3 will have
to compensate rms 1 and 2 and pay for compatibility. Cross-payments which achieve
this outcome exist because joint prots are higher under Full Compatibility than under
"Targeting of Firm 3".
Nevertheless, there are also insights from the above gure that should make us cau-
tious. For intermediate network e¤ects, full compatibility cannot be achieved through
xed cross-payments because joint prots are higher under mixed compatibility regimes
if market shares are very asymmetric. Consider, for example, a large rm 1 and su¢ -
ciently strong network e¤ects. "Targeting of Firm 3" is then the regime with highest
joint prots. Firm 3s prots are so small that rms 1 and 2 in fact almost act as a
duopoly because their vertical di¤erentiation advantage relative to rm 3 is so large.
Therefore, this regime is more protable for su¢ ciently large asymmetries in market
shares, i.e. for very small 3. Firms 1 and 2 can mutually agree on it.
41
Even in an environment where all rms must jointly agree on compatibility, no
full compatibility would be achieved. Firms 1 and 2 would be willing to pay rm
3 to not become compatible. There exists a payment that is so large that rm 3
would agree to the mixed compatibility regime although it would not be part of the
compatibility network. In equilibrium it can therefore happen that rms are paid to
remain incompatible.
Note that looking at xed cross-payments implies that there is no additional mar-
ginal e¤ect on prices except for that resulting from the network expansion due to a
change in the equilibrium compatibility regime. If rms were allowed to apply linear
royalties to achieve compatibility, they would have an incentive to use these so as to
set monopoly prices and sustain a collusionary outcome.42
In summary, we would expect that with xed cross-payments full compatibility is
achieved for weak network e¤ects. In any such agreement, the smallest rm will need
to bribe the larger rms to provide compatibility. In essence, the small rm has to buy
41For small market shares of rm 1 autarky by rm 1 (u Coalition of the Small) has highest prots.
We term it "Autarky by Firm 1" because for that range rm 1 is no longer the large rm, making the
term "coalition of the small" odd.
42Compare, for example, Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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itself into receiving the benets of the larger installed base. The idea reinforces the
importance of installed base customers for protability in a network industry and at
the same time the importance that switching costs play to secure rents, especially in
durable goods markets. At the same time, the importance of market share asymmetries
and mixed compatibility regimes is further reinforced as they may obtain in equilibrium
for intermediate network e¤ects even if xed cross-payments are allowed.
1.5 Conclusions
We have used a model of quantity competition in the spirit of Crémer et al. (2000) and
Malueg and Schwartz (2006) to analyze compatibility choice in an industry exhibiting
network e¤ects. To consider non-uniform compatibility choices of asymmetric rivals,
we have focused on an oligopoly consisting of three rms with potentially asymmetric
market shares. We have shown that for strong network e¤ects there are multiple
expectation-dependent equilibria in the quantity game. A tipping equilibrium, however,
requires signicant asymmetries in network sizes. Thus, under Full Compatibility, when
products are perfect substitutes, no tipping can occur. Similarly, when an imperfect
compatibility alliance is formed tipping is either to or away from both members of the
alliance. We establish that an increase in a rms own installed-base increases the area
where tipping to this rm is an equilibrium and decreases the area where tipping away
from it occurs. However, because there exist multiple expectation-dependent equilibria,
little can be said about the compatibility choice of rms when network e¤ects are very
strong.
When network e¤ects are weak, there exists a unique interior equilibrium in the
quantity subgame under each compatibility regime. All three rms serve the market.
Deriving the equilibrium compatibility regime by comparing prot expressions for each
rm and analyzing the ranking of preferred compatibility choices, reveals that full
compatibility is generically not achieved. Despite Full Compatibility being the socially
desirable outcome as compatibility decisions are costless in our model, the equilibrium
compatibility regime involves targeting of the smallest rm for the entire parameter
space as long as there are some asymmetries in installed bases. Therefore, our model
also provides an explanation for why splintering of smaller rivals competing against
a large dominant rm can result in equilibrium. Our nding is further reinforced
as rivals become more asymmetric. However, when introducing horizontal product
di¤erentiation, incentives for full compatibility are increased.
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Last, we explored the impact of allowing xed cross-payments between rms. We
have shown that full compatibility can be achieved for low network e¤ects because joint
prots are highest under Full Compatibility. The smallest rm will then have to com-
pensate its rivals with xed payments. However, for intermediate network e¤ects rms
may again have an incentive to agree on compatibility regimes that involve imperfect
compatibility.
In our model there are no costs of (in-)compatibility. Absent pricing considerations,
full compatibility is therefore the socially e¢ cient regime. In such an economic envi-
ronment, the government should enforce a mandatory and/or open standard to achieve
full compatibility. However, there are some caveats as to this conclusion. First, costs of
(in-)compatibility may render this result obsolete. Also, as we will discuss in the next
chapter of this dissertation, such an open standard may have negative implications
for (long-run) investment incentives. Only if there is no strong negative feedback of
full compatibility on technology investments and/or if compatibility is not excessively
costly, full compatibility will indeed be socially e¢ cient.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Derivation of Demand System in General Form
Following Martin (2002), we assume that there are two product varieties l o¤ered on
the market, variety a and variety b. Furthermore, there are two equally-sized groups
of consumers, with group A and B each consisting of a mass of z consumers. The
consumers are uniformly distributed over a [0; 1] interval. Consumers in group A regard
variety a as being of higher quality than variety b. At the same time, each consumer
purchasing a particular variety l, obtains additional utility frommore consumers buying
the same good. The exact form of network e¤ects Ll is introduced in the main part,
Section 1.2.1.43 A consumer of group A located at j 2 [0; 1] when purchasing variety l
gets utility
UAjl =
8><>:
e  fj + La   pa
g   j + Lb   pb
0
when buying variety a
when buying variety b
when not buying
(1.11)
where e > g, f > 1. Consumers in group B have preferences of the same functional
form as consumers of group A, but group B consumers regard variety b as being of
higher quality than variety a. Producers cannot price discriminate between members
of the two groups. Thus, as opposed to the model by Malueg and Schwartz (2006),
consumers have a binary stand-alone valuation of the product (either e or g). Never-
theless, the resulting linear inverse demand function of Malueg and Schwartz (2006)
is nested in the demand system that we subsequently derive from the above utility
specication.
Consider w.l.o.g. a consumer in group A. A consumer located close to j = 0 is likely
to buy a product of variety a as long as benets from network e¤ects or a relatively
large g or f are not favoring variety b. We can then derive a condition of indi¤erence
under which a consumer from group A is just indi¤erent between buying variety a or
b. Also, there exists a corresponding condition where a group A consumer would just
opt not to buy at all. As j increases, consumers of group A change buying behavior
in a monotonic fashion: for low values of j, consumers buy variety a. As j increases,
they then switch to buying variety b and as j increases further, they opt not to buy at
43We undertake the standard assumption that utility is increasing in the network size of the rm
that the consumer buys from and, in a complementary fashion, in network size of compatible networks.
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all, as the outside option of not buying (Ui = 0) gives more utility than buying any of
the two varieties at o¤er. By argument of symmetry, we get analogous expressions for
consumer behavior in group B, as long as network e¤ects are not solely determining
buyer behavior, consumer groups are similar in size and prices are roughly the same.
These points of indi¤erence are illustrated in the following gure:
Figure 1.8: Group A Consumer Buying Behavior
The full demand for variety a is thus derived as the sum of consumers from group
A and group B buying variety a:
qa = z  e  g + pb   pa + (La   Lb)
f   1 +z (g pa+La 
e  g + pa   pb + (Lb   La)
f   1 ).
Here, the rst term is the fraction of consumers from group A buying variety a and
the second term is contributed by consumers from group B. Note that there may well
be consumers that decide not to buy at all, namely all those for which the utility from
buying lies below their outside utility from not buying at all (Ui = 0). Similarly, we
nd for demand of variety b:
qb = z  e  g + pa   pb + (Lb   La)
f   1 +z (g pb+Lb 
e  g + pb   pa + (La   Lb)
f   1 ).
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The demand functions simplify to give the following expressions:
qa =
2z
f   1pb  
z(1 + f)
f   1 pa  
z(1  f)
f   1 g +
z(1 + f)
f   1 La  
2z
f   1Lb
qb =
2z
f   1pa  
z(1 + f)
f   1 pb  
z(1  f)
f   1 g +
z(1 + f)
f   1 Lb  
2z
f   1La.
Solving for inverse demand one gets:
pa = g + La   (1 + f)
z(3 + f)
qa   2
z(3 + f)
qb
pb = g + Lb   (1 + f)
z(3 + f)
qb   2
z(3 + f)
qa.
These expressions have abstracting from the term stemming from network benets
Ll the same form as the linear inverse demand functions used in Bowley (1924),
Spence (1976) or Dixit (1979). By reparameterizing we get:
pa = + La   qa   qb (1.12)
pb = + Lb   qb   qa
where  = g > 0,  = (1+f)
z(3+f)
> 0,  > 0 with  = (1+f)
z(3+f)
2
1+f
< . The model with
aspects of vertical product di¤erentiation between both consumer groups thus turns
into a model of horizontal product di¤erentiation at the aggregate level, also when
accounting for network e¤ects.
1.6.2 Competition in Semi-Di¤erentiated Cournot
Equations (1.12) from Appendix 1.6.1, simplify to the following inverse product variety
demands in absence of network e¤ects ( = 0):
Compatibility Incentives within an Oligopoly 41
pa =   qa   qb
pb =   qb   qa.
The following illustrates competition in a semi-di¤erentiated Cournot model, i.e. in
a set-up where the product varieties o¤ered by rms may be either homogeneous to
rivalsproducts or di¤erentiated horizontally. We consider the three rms framework
as proposed in Section 1.2. There is a duopoly o¤ering variety b (rms 2 and 3) and
a monopoly (rm 1) o¤ering product variety a. We assume positive and constant but
asymmetric marginal costs of production ci. The prot function of rm 1 producing
variety a is then:
1 = (p1   c1)q1 = (  c1   q1   q2   q3)q1,
leading to the standard best response functions for the three rms:
q1 =
  c1   q2   q3
2
q2 =
  c2   q3   q1
2
q3 =
  c3   q2   q1
2
.
The di¤erence in best responses stems from the shape of inverse demand functions.
Whereas the competitive e¤ect of a rival supplying a homogeneous product variety
with respect to ones own product can have a large e¤ect on own demand (), the
competitive e¤ect of a rival acting in the di¤erentiated market is weaker ( < ).
Thus, a rm active in the product variety market supplied by the duopoly faces ercer
competition and this is reected in the best responses as well as the equilibrium
demands of the rms. Combining the best response functions to nd the equilibrium
quantities, one gets:
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q1 =
(3   2)  3c1 + (c2 + c3)
2(32   2)
q2 =
(2   ) + c1   (42   2)c2 + (22   2)c3
2(32   2)
q3 =
(2   ) + c1   (42   2)c3 + (22   2)c2
2(32   2) .
It is then easy to show that if marginal costs are symmetric, variety b is provided in
larger quantity because of the ercer competition on that variety market. This result
vanishes as marginal costs of rm 1 become increasingly competitive compared to rivals
or as product di¤erentiation becomes smaller.
The important e¤ect that should be taken away from this analysis is that rm 1
does not care about the distribution of marginal costs and quantities between rms 2
and 3. As long as cost asymmetries are small, rm 1 only cares about the sum of the
marginal costs of rms 2 and 3. Thus, rm 1 cares only about the e¢ ciency with which
the rivalrous product variety is o¤ered. Hence, competitive e¤ects stemming from the
quantity competition between rms 2 and 3 a¤ect rm 1 only at the aggregate level.
Asymmetries in costs if not very large do not really matter for an outside competitor.
Hence, we assume symmetric costs between all rms and focus on di¤erences in network
size and their impact on competition in the main part of this chapter.
1.6.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1:
We consider each feasible compatibility regime in turn and derive conditions for exis-
tence of tipping equilibria.
Full Compatibility: Here, Li = i + qi +
P3
j=1 ij(j + qj) =
P3
j=1 j + qj which
implies equal installed bases and as a result equal quantities of the rms. Equal quan-
tities imply equal prots. Hence if qi > 0 all rms o¤er the same positive quantity and
make the same prots. In turn, if qi < 0 all rms make negative prots and would not
o¤er at all. Therefore tipping to a constellation where a subfraction of rms survives
is not feasible. Tipping cannot be an equilibrium under Full Compatibility.
Full Autarky: Under Full Autarky, network e¤ects are rm-specic. This leads to
di¤erent tipping equilibria depending on the parameter constellations. To derive the
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conditions, we follow the logic of Example 1 on page 17 of this dissertation. The
following types can occur for the stated parameter regions:
 Firm 1 supplies market (q1 > 0, q2 = q3 = 0):
if 1 >
2(1 )(1+x) 1
+2x(1 )
 Firm 2 supplies market (q2 > 0, q1 = q3 = 0):
if 1 <
2+x 1
2+x 22 for 1 >
1 x
2 x ; 1 <
1+x 2(1 )(1+ x)
2(1 )(x 1)+x for 1 <
1 x
2 x
 Firm 3 supplies market (q3 > 0, q1 = q2 = 0):
if 1 <
1+(1 x) 2(1 )
(1 x)+2(1 ) for 1 >
x
1+x
; 1 <
1+(1 x) 2(1 )(1+x)
(1 x) 2(1 )x for 1 <
x
1+x
 Firms 1 and 2 supply market (q1 > 0; q2 > 0, q3 = 0):
if 1 >
 4x 22+2x2+1
4 4x 22+2x2
 Firms 1 and 3 supply market (q1 > 0; q2 = 0; q3 > 0):
if 1 >
1 3+4x 2x2
4x 2x2
 Firms 2 and 3 supply market (q1 = 0; q2 > 0; q3 > 0):
if 1 <
3 1
4 22
Example 3 Firms 2 and 3 supply the market (q1 = 0; q

2 > 0; q

3 > 0): Assume that
consumers expect all new consumers to buy from rms 2 and 3 only. The optimal
quantities are then derived from a Cournot duopoly game with rm 1 providing nothing
and rms 2 and 3 providing the optimal quantity depending on their installed bases.
We then require:
p1 = 1 + 1   (1 2) 3+2(1 )23 8+42   (1 2) 2+2(1 )33 8+42 < 0
, p1 = 3 41+2
21 1
2 3 < 0
, 1 < 3 14 22
Existence of this tipping equilibrium requires a su¢ ciently low market share of rm 1
and strong enough network e¤ects. As 1 2 (0; 1), we can describe the RHS of the
inequality. The threshold values at boundary values 1 2 f0; 1g are as follows:
3 1
4 22 = 1 at  = 1 and
3 1
4 22 = 0 at  =
1
3
with @
@
( 3 1
4 22 ) =
32 2+2
22( 2)2 > 0 if 3
2   2 + 2 > 0.
This holds for  2 [0; 1); the tipping equilibrium condition is thus increasing in network
e¤ects. This also pins down the minimum level of network e¤ects required:  = 1
3
.
Compatibility Incentives within an Oligopoly 44
Autarky by Firm 1:
 Firm 1 supplies market (q1 > 0, q2 = 0, q3 = 0):
if 1 >
1 22
3 22
 Firms 2 and 3 supply market (q1 = 0, q2 > 0, q3 > 0):
if 1 <
5 1
5 32
Targeting of Firm 2:
 Firm 2 supplies market (q1 = 0, q2 > 0, q3 = 0):
if 1 <
3x+22 2x2 1
3x 2x2
 Firms 1 and 3 supply market (q1 > 0, q2 = 0, q3 > 0):
if 1 >  5 5x+3x2 15x 3x2
Targeting of Firm 3:
 Firm 3 supplies market (q1 = 0, q2 = 0, q3 > 0):
if 1 <
3 3x+2x2 1
3 3x 22+2x2
 Firms 1 and 2 supply market (q1 > 0, q2 > 0, q3 = 0):
if 1 >   5x+32 3x2 15 5x 32+3x2
For the above conditions to be fullled we require strong network e¤ects, . Gener-
ally multiple of these expectation-dependent equilibria exist. The toughest condition
for tipping to exist is the one under Targeting of Firm 3  tipping to rm 3. We
require the following strength of network e¤ects to guarantee tipping under all feasi-
ble compatibility regimes except Full Compatibility: 1 <
3 3x+2x2 1
3 3x 22+2x2 implying
j1=0 =  = 3x+
p 10x+9x2+9 3
4x
and j1=1 =  = 1p2  0:707.
Proof of Corollary 1.1:
(a) For each tipping equilibrium there exists a corresponding parameter restriction as
derived in Proposition 1.1. These conditions directly imply that an increase in a rms
installed base increases the region of tipping to this rm (for all tipping equilibria that
involve tipping to this rm). For illustration, consider the case of the compatibility
regime of Full Autarky and the parameter region for which tipping to rm 1 exists as
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an equilibrium:
1 >
2(1  )(1 + x)  1
 + 2x(1  ) .
Ceteris paribus, as 1 increases, the inequality is more likely to be satised implying
that the parameter region of where this equilibrium exists expands. Similar conditions
can be derived for all compatibility regimes, all types of tipping equilibria and all rms.
(b) Similarly to the argument in (a), the reverse argument holds for tipping equilibria
that imply tipping away from a rm. A larger installed base implies that the parameter
region for these equilibria reduces. For illustration, consider rm 1. An increase in rm
1s installed base implies that equilibria involving tipping to rms 2 and 3 or a subgroup
of these (i.e. tipping away from a subgroup involving rm 1) now only exist for a smaller
parameter set. Under Full Autarky, for example, tipping to rms 2 and 3 can occur if
1 <
3 1
4 22 . As 1 increases, this inequality is satised for a smaller parameter set.
(c) Increasing asymmetry x implies a larger installed base share of rm 2 and a smaller
one for rm 3 for any given 1. From (a) and (b) it thus follows that tipping to rm 2
or any coalition including rm 2 is more likely and tipping away from 2 or any coalition
containing rm 2 less likely. If a coalition includes both, rms 2 and 3, there is no e¤ect
through a change in x.
(d) This follows directly from the proof for Proposition 1.1. Tipping occurs only with
su¢ cient strength of network e¤ects. It is easily shown that when taking  ! 0 no
tipping can occur. With  ! 1 all tipping equilibria mentioned above exist.
Proof of Proposition 1.2:
The equilibrium quantities in an interior equilibrium under the di¤erent compatibility
regimes are given by:
Case Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
FC: 1
4
(+1)
(1 )
1
4
(+1)
(1 )
1
4
(+1)
(1 )
FA: 1 3+1(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)
1 3+x(1 1)(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)
1 3+(1 x)(1 1)(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)
AF1: 1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4
1 1(3 2) 22
62 12+4
1 1(3 2) 22
62 12+4
TF2: 1 x(1 1)(3 2) 2
2
62 12+4
1+x(5 3)(1 1) 5
62 12+4
1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22
62 12+4
TF3: 1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 2
2
62 12+4
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4
1+(5 3)(1 x)(1 1) 5
62 12+4
For the equilibrium to exist, we require non-negative outputs (and thus prots, see
Remark 1) for all rms in any interior equilibrium. We therefore get the following
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conditions under the compatibility regimes:
Full Compatibility: the interior equilibrium exists for any  < 1. There are no tip-
ping equilibria under Full Compatibility (compare Proposition 1.1) which makes the
interior equilibrium also the unique equilibrium.
Full Autarky: the interior equilibrium exists as long as the smallest competitor makes
non-negative prots. Normally this will be rm 3, but it may, for very small 1 also
be rm 1. Thus, non-negativity of prots requires:
1 3+(1 x)(1 1)(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1)  0 and 1 3+1(4 2)2( 2)(2 1)  0 which translate into 1 <
1 3+(2 4)(x 1)
(2 4)(x 1) and 1 >
3 1
4 22 . Note that these are equivalent to the conditions
on tipping derived in Proposition 1.1. Hence, if there exists an interior equilibrium, it
is indeed unique.
Autarky by Firm 1: Non-negativity constraints are given by:
1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4 > 0 ^ 1 1(3 2) 2
2
62 12+4 > 0 which again translate into the conditions
1 >
5 1
5 32 ^ 1 < 1 2
2
3 22 derived for tipping in Proposition 1.1. Thus, again unique-
ness upholds.
Targeting of Firm 2: Similarly, we nd the conditions 1 <
3x+22 2x2 1
3x 2x2 ^
1 >
5 5x+3x2 1
5x 3x2 : Thus, again uniqueness obtains for the region where the inte-
rior equilibrium exists.
Targeting of Firm 3: Similarly, we nd the conditions 1 >
3 3x+2x2 1
3 3x 22+2x2 ^ 1 <
  5x+32 3x2 1
5 5x 32+3x2 which again guarantee both existence and uniqueness of the interior
equilibrium.
To derive the condition that guarantees existence across all compatibility regimes,
we compare the above restrictions. In fact, the condition of protability on rm
3 under Targeting of Firm 3 is the one that determines existence across regimes:
1 >   5x+32 3x2 15 5x 32+3x2 ; thus, existence of the unique interior equilibrium is fullled
under all compatibility regimes if:
limx!1(j1=0) =
p
25x2 12x+12 5x
6(1 x) =
1
5
and j1=1 = 15 .
Proof of Remark 1:
Here we prove the equivalence of quantities and prots when deciding on the optimal
compatibility regime. We do so in the most general case, namely for the case with
horizontal product di¤erentiation (as considered in Section 1.3.3). The proof follows
the derivation of Malueg and Schwartz (2006) and can be replicated for other nested
Cournot models, for example the case without network e¤ects ( = 0) and the case of
homogeneous products ( = ).
Without loss of generality the proof below is for rm 1. The same statements follow
by similar argument for rms 2 and 3.
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Let A(12; 13) =  + (1 + 122 + 133)   (   12)q2   (   13)q3 and write
rm 1s inverse demand p1 = + L1  q1  q2  q3 as p1 = A(12; 13)  (  )q1.
Hence, prots are:
1 = (p1)q1 = (A(12; 13)   (   )q1)q1. In any equilibrium where rm 1s output is
positive, rm 1s output is given by the rst order condition:
0 = A(12; 13)   2(   )q1, implying (   )q1 = A(12; 13)   (   )q1 = p1.
Substituting p1 = (   )q1 gives:
1 = (   )(q1)2.
As explained, we can replicate the above argument for any other rm, such that we nd:
i = (   )(qi )2.
Clearly, @

1
@q1
> 0 as  >  conrming the intuition that larger equilibrium quantities
imply larger equilibrium prot.
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
We proceed as follows: First, we determine the preferred order of compatibility regimes
for each rm in turn (by comparing their prots under each regime). Second, we check
whether the preferred order can be matched to the mutual agreement criterion needed
for a compatibility agreement.
1) Firm 1s optimal compatibility regime:
(a) Full Compatibility is preferred to Full Autarky if:
1
4
(+1)
(1 ) >
1 3+1(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1) , i.e. if 1 <
 9+22+5
 12+42+8
(b) Full Compatibility is preferred to Autarky by Firm 1 if:
1
4
(+1)
(1 ) >
1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 <
 13+32+8
 16+62+10
(c) Full Compatibility is preferred to Targeting of Firm 2 if:
1
4
(+1)
(1 ) >
1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 <
6x+ 10x 2+4x2 2
6x 10x+4x2
(d) Full Compatibility is preferred to Targeting of Firm 3 if:
1
4
(+1)
(1 ) >
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 <
6x+9 10x 32+4x2 4
6x+10 10x 42+4x2 6
(e) Full Autarky is preferred over Autarky by Firm 1 if:
1 3+1(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1) >
1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 >
 6+2+3
 3+2+2 which holds for all relevant .
(f) Full Autarky is preferred over Targeting of Firm 2 if:
1 3+1(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1) >
1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 >
6x+23 19x 192+43+16x2 4x3 7
6x+28 19x 242+63+16x2 4x3 8
(g) Full Autarky is preferred over Targeting of Firm 3 if:
1 3+1(4 2)
2( 2)(2 1) >
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 >   6x 4 19x+3
2+16x2 4x3+1
 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2
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(h) Autarky by Firm 1 is preferred over Targeting of Firm 2 if:
1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4 >
1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 >
3x+2 2x 5
3x+3 2x 5 , never for 1 2 (0; 1).
(i) Autarky by Firm 1 is preferred over Targeting of Firm 3 if:
1+1(5 3) 5
62 12+4 >
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if 1 >   3x 2x+2 3x++2x 2 , never for 1 2 (0; 1).
(j) Targeting of Firm 2 is preferred over Targeting of Firm 3 if:
1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22
62 12+4 >
1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22
62 12+4 , i.e. if x <
1
2
; ) never by assumption.
We can then partition the relevant (; 1)-area into regions of preferred compatibility
regimes for rm 1.
Area 1: Full Autarky is preferred by rm 1 for high 1,
i.e. if 1 >   6x 4 19x+32+16x2 4x3+1 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2 .
Area 2: Targeting of Firm 3 is preferred by rm 1 for low and intermediate 1,
i.e. if 0 < 1 <   6x 4 19x+32+16x2 4x3+1 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2 .
Firm 2s optimal compatibility regime:
Proceeding similarly for rm 2, we nd that for the range of interest, i.e. for 1 >
2 > 3 rm 2 always prefers Targeting of Firm 3 over Full Compatibility. Only
when rm 1s market share becomes very small, i.e. smaller than that of rm 3, rm
2 will now prefer Autarky of Firm 1.44
Firm 3s optimal compatibility regime:
Firm 3 prefers Targeting of Firm 2 to any other compatibility regime for any 1 >
2 > 3. If rm 1 becomes smaller than rm 2 (for low 1) it will prefer Autarky of
Firm 1.
2) Equilibrium compatibility regime:
Firms have to mutually agree on the compatibility. As rm 1 is the most desired
partner in any alliance because of its large installed base (1 > 2 > 3), it will be
able to strongly inuence the equilibrium compatibility regime. The most preferred
regime of Targeting of Firm 3 can be implemented through rm 1s and 2s alliance (it
is the most preferred regime for both of them). However, the wish for Full Autarky
(for large 1) will be prevented as in the range where this is optimal, rms 2 and
3 would rather be compatible with each other than stay autarkic. Taking this into
consideration, rm 1 will also opt for Targeting of Firm 3 in this range as this is rm
1s second preference after Full Autarky in that parameter range. Therefore, rm 3
will always be excluded from the compatibility in equilibrium if 1 > 2 > 3.
44This would violate the original assumption of the size of installed bases. Nevertheless, for com-
pleteness, rm 1s share is smaller if 1 < (1  x)(1  1), i.e. if 1 < 1 x2 x .
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Proof of Proposition 1.4:
In this proposition we analyze rm 1s compatibility policy under the following
presumptions. Firm 1 faces n a priori symmetric competitors. We explore rm 1s
compatibility policy under the assumption that if a competitor i is not in the alliance of
rm 1, it will group its own alliance of competitors. Note that this will bias our result
towards rm 1 desiring more compatibility with the competitors as their alliance poses
a stronger competitive threat to it than if competitors were not to exhaustively form
a compatibility agreement. There are therefore two groups with compatible members:
the alliance of rm 1 and the alliance of those rms that rm 1 refuses to be compatible
with. We use the continuous choice variable y to characterize rm 1s desired degree
of compatibility:
y =
8><>:
0 under Autarky by Firm 1
y 2 (0; 1) if a fraction of y competitors is compatible with rm 1
1 under Full Compatibility
The proof of this proposition proceeds as follows:
1) We derive the equilibrium quantities of rm 1 and its n a priori symmetric com-
petitors by prot maximization conditional on y.
2)We examine the equilibrium quantity of rm 1 for di¤erent degrees of compatibility.
In particular, we show that
(a) the quantities at the extreme values y 2 f0; 1g correspond to the values derived in
Malueg and Schwartz (2006) for Autarky by Firm 1 and Full Compatibility.
(b) quantities (and thus prots) generally rise as we marginally increase the degree of
compatibility at the point of Autarky by Firm 1 (i.e. limy!0(
@q1
@y
) = @q1
@y
jy=0 > 0).
(c) quantities fall in the degree of compatibility (y) in the point of full compatibil-
ity, i.e. at y = 1, so that decreasing the degree of compatibility is protable (i.e.
limy!1(
@q1
@y
) = @q1
@y
jy=1 < 0).
We can therefore argue that there is at least one level of compatibility that is strictly
between 0 and 1 which delivers higher prots for rm 1 than one of the two extremes.
Therefore, mixed compatibility regimes, in the sense that a fraction will be compatible
with the dominant rm and a fraction will not be, are important!
1) Derivation of equilibrium quantities:
Best responses are given by:
q1 =
(1+(1+y( 1))) (1 y)n(qj)
(1 )(2+yn) and qj =
(1+(1 y)( 1)) (xn+1)q1
(1 )(1+(1 y)n) for each rival j not
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compatible with rm 1.
Thus: q1 =
(1+(1+y( 1)))(1 )+(1 y)n((1+(1+y( 1)))(1 ) (1+((1 y)( 1))))
(1 )2(2+yn)+(1 y)n((1 )2(2+yn) (1+yn))
2) (a) Equivalence to values of Malueg and Schwartz (2006):
limy!0(q1) =
1 (n+1)+(n+(n+1)(1 ))1 n
2(n+1)(1 )2 n
limy!1(q1) =
1+
(n+2)(1 )
Thus, expressions for y = 0 and y = 1 correspond to the expressions derived in Malueg
and Schwartz (2006).
(b) Marginal behavior at y = 0:
limy!1(
@q1
@y
) = (X + Y + Z)
where
X =
(7n 6+9n22 2n23+n32 19n+62 23+16n2 11n2 4n3 2n3+3n2+2)
(n 4 4n+22+2n2+2)2
Y =
1( 9n+6 15n22+4n23 4n32+n33+23n 62+23 19n2+16n2+5n3+4n3 4n2 2)
(n 4 4n+22+2n2+2)2
Z =
n(3n  5n+(n2+1)2 2n(n ))
(n 4 4n+22+2n2+2)2
and for small  and small n these terms as well as their common denominator are
always positive. Therefore, for small  and n, rm 1 would seek some compatibility
(i.e. y > 0) with competitors.
(c) Marginal behavior at y = 1:
limy!1(
@q1
@y
) =
( 1(1 )2(n+2) (n(1+n) 2+2(2 )) n n2)
(1 )3(n+2)2 < 0
Thus, reducing the degree of compatibility to values y < 1 will always be protable for
rm 1. Full compatibility is never optimal for rm 1. Thus, targeting of some form
will result in equilibrium which corroborates the importance of mixed compatibility
regimes.
Proof of Corollary 1.2:
Corollary 1.1 shows that stronger network e¤ects are needed for tipping. Proposition
1.1 shows that this may lead to multiplicity of equilibria. Firm 1s compatibility choice
depends on the inequality that states relative preference of the regimes Full Autarky
and Targeting of Firm 3: 1 >   6x 4 19x+32+16x2 4x3+1 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2 . This boundary is
increasing in network e¤ects for the relevant range. Thus, as network e¤ects increase
rm 1 relatively seeks Targeting of Firm 3 more as compared to Full Autarky.
Proof of Corollary 1.3:
From Proposition 1.3 we deduce that as the installed base of rm 1 increases, it desires
less compatibility. The condition for Targeting of Firm 3 is less likely to hold and
rm 1s desire for Full Autarky increases. Note that this result holds more generally.
The smaller the installed base of a rm the more compatibility it seeks and vice versa.
Although the smallest rm, rm 3, prefers mixed compatibility by means of Targeting
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of Firm 2 over Full Compatibility, it prefers any kind of compatibility over either Full
Autarky or Targeting of Firm 3 (i.e. staying autarkic). The formal proof proceeds by
comparing expressions as given in Proposition 1.3.
Proof of Proposition 1.5:
As we have shown in Proposition 1.3, the relevant threshold line is given by the follow-
ing expression:
Area 1: Full Autarky is preferred by F1 for high 1,
i.e. if 1 >   6x 4 19x+32+16x2 4x3+1 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2 .
Area 2: Targeting of rm 3 is preferred by F1 for low and intermediate 1,
i.e. if 0 < 1 <   6x 4 19x+32+16x2 4x3+1 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2 .
We can now show that as asymmetry x increases, this threshold line shifts up (for
relevant values of ):
@
@x
(  6x 4 19x+32+16x2 4x3+1 6x+9+19x 82+23 16x2+4x3 2) = 8
5 364+663 592+23 3
( 2)(3x 4 8x+22+4x2+1)2 > 0
Both, numerator and denominator are negative for  in the relevant range. Thus, asym-
metry reinforces the importance of mixed compatibility regimes for rm 1s preferred
regime. However, this has no inuence on the equilibrium compatibility regime.
Proof of Proposition 1.6:
1) Following the derivation of the general demand system in Section 1.6.1 of the Appen-
dix, we can derive the equilibrium quantities in the interior equilibrium straightaway.
Case Firm 1
FC: (+)(3 2 )
6( )2 2( )2
FA: (3 2 2)+1(3 2) (2+3)
2(32 2) 2(5 2)
AF1: (3 3 2)+3( )1 2(2+3)
6( )2 22
TF2: (2( +2) 7+3
2+22)+(1+3)(( +2)+22 6+32)+2(( +2) )
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
TF3: (2( +2) 7+3
2+22)+(1+2)(( +2)+22 6+32)+3(( +2) )
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
Case Firm 2
FC: (+)(2  )
6( )2 2( )2
FA: (( 2( ))( 2))+1( 2)+2((+2( ))( 2( )))+3(2( ) 
2)
2( 2)(2 32+5 22)
AF1: (2 2 ) 1+2( )(2+3)
6( )2 22
TF2: ((3 ) 7+2
2+32)+(1+3)(( +)+( 2))+2((2 )+32 8+42)
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
TF3: ( )(2( ) )+(1+2)(( +2 ) 6+4
2+22)+3(( +)+2( ))
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
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Case Firm 3
FC: (+)(2  )
6( )2 2( )2
FA: (( 2)+6 2
2 42)+1( 2)+2( 2 2+22)+3(2+8 42 42)
2( 2)(2 32+5 22)
AF1: (2 2 ) 1+2( )(2+3)
6( )2 22
TF2: ( )(2( ) )+(1+3)(( +2 )+2(
2 3+22))+2(( +)+2( ))
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
TF3: (( +3) 7+2
2+32)+(1+2)(( ++)+( 2))+3((2 )+32 8+42)
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
We now examine the comparative statics as we move away from a scenario of homo-
geneous products ( = ) to one where  < . From Proposition 1.3 we know that the
relevant threshold line for rm 1 is given by the change from Targeting of Firm 3 to Full
Autarky. In addition, we will now also consider the threshold line between Targeting
of Firm 3 and Full Compatibility (which becomes attractive for rm 1 for low values
of 1). As the expressions for di¤erentiated products nest the case of homogeneity
( = ), it su¢ ces to look at the comparative statics of the mentioned threshold lines
for the case of di¤erentiated products. We proceed as follows: First, we compare rm
1s prots under the two compatibility regimes and derive the threshold condition as
a restriction on 1. We then check the comparative statics in  of this condition.
qFC1 > q
TF3
1 if
(+)(3 2 )
6( )2 2( )2 >
(2( +2) 7+32+22)+(1+x(1 1))(( +2)+22 6+32)+(1 x)(1 1)(( +2) )
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32) which
can be solved for an upper bound on 1. Taking the derivative of this bound with
respect to  yields:
4( 2+1)+43(2 1)+2(123 292+12 1)+(24+63 482+62 18) 25+204 783+1372 102+24
(x 1)(22 5+3)( 2+2+22 6+3)2
Thus, lim!1(
@(RHS)
@
) =  (2
5 224+603 682+34 6)
(x 1)(22 4+2)2(22 5+3) which implies:
lim!0(lim!1(
@(RHS)
@
)) = 1
2(x 1) < 0.
Although we only prove the case where values of  are close to  = 1 and  is close
enough to zero, the result holds more generally. In particular, taking  ! 0 is not
necessary. We only require that v < 4   p13  0:39445. This is always the case for
the interior equilibria that we are focusing on. We have thus shown that as  falls (i.e.
product di¤erentiation increases), the RHS increases. This implies that the inequality
on 1 is more likely to be satised, i.e. Full Compatibility spans a larger parameter
region relative to Targeting of Firm 3. Thus, more product di¤erentiation is conducive
to more compatibility.
Similarly, we can show that the area of Targeting of Firm 3 expands up into the region
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where rm 1 nds Full Autarky to be optimal, i.e. becomes more attractive relative to
Full Autarky. We proceed similarly:
qFA1 > q
TF3
1 if
(3 2 2)+1(3 2) (2+3)
2(32 2) 2(5 2) >
(2( +2) 7+32+22)+(1+x(1 1))(( +2)+22 6+32)+(1 x)(1 1)(( +2) )
2( )( 2)+2( )(32 8+32)
Thus, if 1 >
   9x+11+30x 122+43 37x2+20x3 4x4 3+( 2+22+3x+2x2 5x)+(3 6+32 3)
9x 9 30x+182 113+24+37x2 20x3+4x4+3(2 1)+2(5x 42 3x+4 2x2)+(3 8+32+3)
The comparative statics of the RHS around  = 1 are:
lim!1(
@(RHS)
@
) =   1
 1
 12x+15+59x 472+763 584+195 26 112x2+124x3 72x4+16x5 2
( 2)2(3x 4 8x+22+4x2+1)2
which implies:
lim!0(lim!1(
@(RHS)
@
)) =   1
4(3x+1)2
(12x+ 2) < 0:
As  falls with greater horizontal product di¤erentiation, the threshold therefore in-
creases. This holds not only for  ! 0 but more generally in the interior equilibria that
we compare as long as v < 1
4x+2

4x p2p(2x+ 1) (x+ 1) + 2. Again this holds for
the interior equilibria and the parameter space that we consider here.
2) A second important implication of increasing horizontal product di¤erentiation is
that it may reduce the multiplicity of tipping equilibria. Firm 1 which is the only rm
o¤ering product variety a may even be fully protected against tipping away from it.
Example 4 This can be seen from the condition that would need to be satised under
tipping, e.g. tipping to rms 2 and 3 under Full Autarky:
p1 = + 1    ( 2) 3+2( )232 8+42   
( 2) 2+2( )3
32 8+42 < 0
However, with  ! 0, we have p1 = + 1 < 0 which never holds.
Thus, tipping away from rm 1 cannot occur. Therefore, for  ! 0 the intuitive result
obtains. At least one rm o¤ering each variety must be present in the market.
Hence, only the following tipping equilibria are possible:
Full Compatibility: no tipping can occur
Full Autarky: Tipping to rms 1 and 2; tipping to rms 2 and 3
Coalition of the Small: no tipping can occur
Targeting of Firm 2: tipping to rms 1 and 3 only
Targeting of Firm 3: tipping to rms 1 and 2 only
This result may also hold for intermediate levels of horizontal product di¤erentiation.
Firms may take this into account when network e¤ects are so strong that tipping may
occur. Hence, compatibility for rm 1 becomes particularly desirable not only be-
cause strong horizontal product di¤erentiation weakens competition and compatibility
increases protability through the realization of network e¤ects but also because the
set of tipping equilibria is inuenced.
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Proof of Proposition 1.7:
Case Joint Prots
FC: 3
16
(+1)2
(1 )
FA: (1 )f[1 3+1(4 2)]
2+[1 3+x(1 1)(4 2)]2+[1 3+(1 x)(1 1)(4 2)]2g
[2( 2)(2 1)]2
CS/AF1: (1 )f[1+1(5 3) 5]
2+[1 1(3 2) 22]2+[1 1(3 2) 22]2g
[62 12+4]2
TF2: (1 )f[1 x(1 1)(3 2) 2
2]2+[1+x(5 3)(1 1) 5]2+[1 x(1 1)(3 2) 22]2g
[62 12+4]2
TF3: (1 )f[1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 2
2]2+[1 (3 2)(1 1)(1 x) 22]2+[1+(5 3)(1 x)(1 1) 5]2g
[62 12+4]2
Comparing the prot expressions, we can dene areas in the parameter space where
the joint protability of a particular compatibility regime is highest. In fact, Full Com-
patibility has highest joint prots for weak network e¤ects. However, when network
e¤ects are stronger and the installed base share 1 of rm 1 is very small 
AF1
joint > 
FC
joint.
Similarly, for very large values of 1 
TF3
joint > 
FC
joint if network e¤ects are strong enough.
For low values of network e¤ects ( < 1
5
), we can partition the parameter space into
the following areas that each implicitly dene values of 1 depicted in the gure 1.7 in
Section 1.4 of the chapter45:
Area 1: Targeting of Firm 3 is most protable: TF3joint > 
FC
joint
Area 2: Full Compatibility is most protable: FCjoint > 
TF3
joint ^ FCjoint > AF1joint
Area 3: Autarky of Firm 1 is most protable: AF1joint > 
FC
joint
Note that when Targeting of Firm 3 is not allowed (e.g. for competitive reasons)
there is a corresponding area where Targeting of Firm 2 gives highest joint prots if
TF2joint > 
FC
joint.
45The explicit expressions are lengthy and thus omitted here for clarity of exposition. Unfortunately,
because of Jensens inequality and squaring using binomials, Remark 1 does not hold when comparing
joint prots.
Chapter 2
Cooperative versus Competitive
Standard Setting
2.1 Introduction
In many industries compatibility standards are important for consumers to reap the
benets of direct or indirect network externalities. In some cases rms refuse to make
their products compatible because at least one of them hopes to eventually dominate
the market and establish a de facto standard. In other cases rms cooperate and
agree to a joint standard. This may be a very simple agreement, just making sure
that both rms adhere to the same technical norms. Or it may be more complex,
involving an exchange of intellectual property rights, royalty payments, and potentially
large investments in new technologies that are going to be jointly used. What are the
incentives to form such agreements and what are the implications for competition,
investments and market structure?
A prominent recent case is the agreement of Microsoft and Novell to make the Win-
dows and Linux operating systems interoperable. This agreement came as a surprise
to many industry observers. For years Microsoft and Novell had sued each other for
the violation of intellectual property rights rendering any attempt to make the two
operating systems compatible impossible. According to the new agreement Microsoft
and Novell will work together to provide virtualizationand document format com-
patibility allowing customers to run Linux applications on Windows and Windows
applications on Linux. Furthermore, they provide patent coverage for each others
This chapter is joint work with Klaus M. Schmidt from the University of Munich.
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customers so that patent infringements are no longer an issue.
Compatibility standards benet consumers either directly because there are more
people they can interact with or indirectly because there is a larger market for com-
plementary products and services. However, a compatibility standard also a¤ects how
rms compete and it may alter their incentives to invest in the quality of their goods.
We show that a compatibility standard reduces price competition. If rms agree to the
standard after their products are fully developed and their investment costs are sunk,
the expectation of a standard does not a¤ect investment incentives. But if rms can
agree to compatibility ex ante, i.e. before investing in the quality of their goods and the
potential standard, and if they can contract on royalties and technology sharing, there
is a strong e¤ect on investments. We show that rms can use linear royalties and tech-
nology sharing agreements to reduce their investment incentives and to further curb
price competition. In this case imposing a royalty-free licensing rule makes matters
worse because it further reduces investment incentives. However, it may be optimal to
forbid ex ante agreements on compatibility and technology sharing altogether. Finally,
we analyze the incentives to agree on compatibility and show that a common standard
is more likely if horizontal product di¤erentiation is large, if investment costs are high
and if the investment process is risky.
To better understand the intuition behind these results consider two rms that can
form a common standard at no cost if both of them agree to do so. We model com-
petition between these rms by a simple Hotelling model with horizontal and vertical
product di¤erentiation and network externalities. If network e¤ects are so strong that
without compatibility the market will eventually tip and only one rm will serve the
entire market as a monopolist a compatibility standard will not be formed. Each rm
will try to become the monopolist in which case it can prevent market entry more
e¤ectively if other rms cannot o¤er compatible products. However, if network e¤ects
are less strong so that even without a compatibility standard both rms will survive
and serve the market, the rms are better o¤ with a common standard. The reason is
that if the two goods are compatible rms do not have to increase their customer base
to raise the willingness to pay of their consumers. Therefore, with a common standard
they will compete less aggressively and charge higher prices in equilibrium.
These e¤ects may explain why Microsoft and Novell changed their minds. As long
as at least one rm was hoping to be able to drive the other rm out of the market, there
was no incentive to form a joint compatibility standard. However, when it became clear
that both operating systems are going to stay, a common standard was more protable.
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Then we consider an extended model in which rms may sign a more elaborate
compatibility agreement at an ex ante stage, i.e. before they take their investment
decisions. Firms may agree to adopt the superior product as the standard, they may
agree to xed and/or linear royalties, and they may agree to share technologies, in which
case investments increase not only the quality of their own good but also the quality
of their competitors product. For example, in the Microsoft/Novell case the standard
may allow users of one operating system to use superior features or applications of the
other system. We assume that both parties invest individually and non-cooperatively
in the development of such a standard and that the standards are substitutes, i.e. only
one standard will be adopted.
We show that rms are more likely to make their products compatible if the degree
of horizontal product di¤erentiation is large and if investment costs are high. Further-
more, an ex ante compatibility agreement with technology sharing and linear royalties
becomes more attractive the more uncertainty there is in the investment process. If
the uncertainty about the outcome of the R&D process is large, for example because
the technology to be developed is very innovative, the parties will not agree to share
their technologies. Instead, each rm wants to vertically di¤erentiate itself by striving
for higher quality. If, however, the development of the technology is fairly predictable
and the uncertainty involved is small, the parties will agree on full technology sharing.
In this case they set a strictly positive linear royalty to be paid by the rm with the
inferior standard to the rm with the superior standard and a xed royalty equal to
zero. The linear royalty increases the perceived marginal cost of each rm and thus
raises the output price. If this was the only e¤ect, the parties would use the linear
royalty to implement the monopoly price. On the other hand, however, the linear roy-
alty induces rms to invest too much (from the perspective of joint prots), because
they strive to receive rather than to pay royalties by developing the superior standard.
The optimal royalty trades o¤ these two e¤ects. From a social welfare point of view
the optimal royalty rate will be set too low and induce too little investment. This im-
plies that the government should not impose a free licensing rule on a standard setting
agreement. However, it may be optimal to forbid ex ante agreements on compatibility
and technology sharing altogether.
In this chapter we restrict attention to the case where technologies are substitutes,
i.e. only one of the technologies is required for the standard. This is not to say that
cases where complementary patents are owned by di¤erent rms are not important to
the contrary. But complementary patents raise a di¤erent set of issues that are not dealt
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with here. If patents are complements, each rm that controls an essential patent has
monopoly power because it can block the other rms from using the standard. Thus,
if all rms charge royalties independently, total royalties will induce an output price
that is higher than the monopoly price. In this case cooperation in a patent pool is
socially desirable because it reduces total royalties.46
Furthermore, we do not consider possible ine¢ ciencies that may arise due to the
dynamic process of standard setting.47 Again, these problems are important, but they
are orthogonal to the main questions addressed in this chapter. Therefore we abstract
from these problems by assuming that the process of standard setting is instantaneous
and e¢ cient and that all rms are ex ante symmetric.
The formal literature on standard setting started in the 1980s.48 In a seminal
paper, Katz and Shapiro (1985) compare the private and social incentives to achieve
compatibility in a Cournot model with network externalities. In their model the private
incentives to achieve compatibility are always too low. In a companion paper, Katz and
Shapiro (1986) consider a dynamic model in which rms may choose compatibility too
often in order to reduce the degree of competition early on. Farrell and Saloner (1986)
also show that standardization may be excessive because it may reduce the variety of
products on the market. However, none of these papers considers the incentives to
invest in the standard, and they take the number of rms in the market as exogenously
given.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the competitive process to establish
a standard in the market. Farrell (1996) and Bulow and Klemperer (1999) model
this as a war of attrition between standards and show that the better standard
will be selected, but that delay is a function of the vested interests of the technology-
sponsoring parties. In Farrell and Saloner (1988) standard setting organizations (SSOs)
outperform markets with respect to the quality of the standard, but markets reach a
decision more quickly. Simcoe (2005) models the conicts of interest within a standard
setting organization and shows that there may be delay in reaching an agreement even
if all parties are symmetrically informed. He uses this model to explain the slowdown
of the standards production of the Internet Engineering Task Force in the 1990s. Other
46See Lerner and Tirole (2004) and Schmidt (2006).
47If standards compete with each other it may happen that some consumers get stranded if another
technology becomes the industry standard. Similarly, it may happen that a dominant rm manages
to establish its technology as the industry standard even though this technology is inferior (see Farrell
and Klemperer (2007)).
48An extensive overview is provided in Farrell and Klemperer (2007).
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interesting case studies of the standard setting process are provided in DeLacey et al.
(2006).
Finally, this chapter is related to Lerner and Tirole (2004, 2006). Their rst paper
considers the e¤ects of patent pools on competition. It is more general than our
approach in that it is not restricted to patents that are substitutes. However, they do
not consider investment incentives. Lerner and Tirole (2006) study SSOs, but focus on
the role of standards to certify quality while we are interested in their role to achieve
compatibility.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the basic
model. Section 2.3 analyzes the impact of an ex post compatibility standard on price
competition and on the incentives of the parties to invest in the quality of their prod-
ucts, and compares the private and social incentives to form a standard. In Section
2.4 we develop an extended model in which parties invest in the quality of the tech-
nology/standard and may share technological improvements. Furthermore, they may
agree on royalties. We show how the parties will use these instruments to a¤ect product
market competition and the incentives to innovate. Section 2.5 compares the private
and social incentives to form an ex ante compatibility agreement and discusses some
policy instruments to improve social welfare. Section 2.6 discusses possible extensions
of our model and concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix, Section 2.7.
2.2 The Model
We need a model that captures horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation, com-
patibility choices and network e¤ects, that allows rms to invest in the quality of their
products, to share their technologies, and to agree to xed and/or linear royalties. The
following Hotelling model is the simplest model that does the job. There is a contin-
uum of consumers with mass one, distributed uniformly on [0; 1]. Two rms, A and B,
are located at the end points of the unit interval. They o¤er products of quality i and
compete in prices pi, i 2 fA;Bg. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good.
A consumer located at point x 2 [0; 1] who buys from rm i receives utility
U(x; i) =
(
 + A   t  x+   nA   pA if i = A
 + B   t  (1  x) +   nB   pB if i = B.
To avoid uninteresting case distinctions we assume that the base utility  is su¢ -
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ciently high that each consumer always buys one unit of the good. Goods are vertically
di¤erentiated because of the potentially di¤erent quality levels A and B that are de-
termined up to a random element at the rst stage of the game. Horizontal product
di¤erentiation is captured by a transportationcost that is linear in the distance be-
tween each consumers most preferred point x and the location of the rm he buys from.
The degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation is reected by the parameter t > 0.
Furthermore, consumers benet from direct and/or indirect network externalities that
arise if their good is compatible with the goods purchased by other consumers. For
simplicity, this e¤ect is assumed to be linear in the number of customers ni using a
good that is compatible with good i. Note that if goods A and B are not compatible,
then nA and nB are simply the market shares of rms A and B with nA + nB = 1.
However, if the two rms agreed to a compatibility standard, then nA = nB = 1 is the
sum of the market shares of A and B. We assume that network e¤ects are weak as
compared to the degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation, i.e. 0 <  < t 49. Firms
produce with constant and identical marginal costs that are normalized to 0.
Throughout this chapter we assume that a rm cannot unilaterally make its product
compatible with the product of the other rm. If this was possible it would be a
dominant strategy for each rm to achieve compatibility. We assume that both rms
have to agree to make their products compatible, either because each rm can block
compatibility by technical means or by refusing to reveal trade secrets or to license
intellectual property rights that are required for compatibility.
The time structure of the model is as follows:
 At date 1 the two rms may collaborate in a standard setting organization and
agree to a common standard that makes their products compatible with each
other. Furthermore, they may agree to share technologies that improve the qual-
ities of both of their products and they may agree to xed and/or linear royalty
payments. This will be explained in more detail in Section 2.4.
 At date 2 each rm i, i 2 fA;Bg, can make an investment i at cost K2 
2
i that
improves the expected quality of its good. The nal quality of each good is
stochastic and given by i = i+ e where fi 2 [ ;] is uniformly distributed
with mean 0, variance 2 and covariance cov(A;B) = 0. To avoid complex
case distinctions we assume that the uncertainty in the investment process is not
49If network e¤ects are strong, i.e.  > t, there are two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in each
of which only one rm supplies the entire market. In this case a de facto standard always prevails.
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too large in the sense that < 3
2
(t ). The realized quality levels are commonly
observed by both rms before date 3.
 At date 3 rms may agree to make their products compatible if they did not
agree to a common standard ex ante, i.e. at date 1, already.
 At date 4 rms choose their prices pi, i 2 fA;Bg, simultaneously, consumers
decide which rm to buy from, and payo¤s are realized.
Standard Setting
(ex ante)
Date 1 Date 2 Date 3 Date 4
Investment
decisions
Firms observe
qualities
Compatibility choice
(ex post)
Price competition,
consumers buy,
payoffs are made
Figure 2.1: Time Structure of the Model
In the next two sections we solve the game by backward induction and focus on
symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria.
2.3 Ex Post Compatibility, Price Competition and
Investment Incentives
In this section we analyze the incentives of the rms to form a standard ex post, i.e.
after their investment decisions have been taken. Thus, we consider the model that
starts at date 2 with no ex ante standard in place. Furthermore, we assume that IP
rights are not required to achieve compatibility, so royalties are not an issue. Section
2.4 considers the e¤ects of ex ante standard setting, technology sharing and royalties.
2.3.1 Price Competition with and without Compatibility
Consider the subgame starting at date 4 when investment costs are sunk and the two
rms know the realized quality levels A and B. Before setting their prices they may
agree to make their products compatible with each other.50 Suppose that both rms
50We assume that there is no cost to achieve compatibility. Introducing such a cost would a¤ect
our results in a straightforward manner.
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have positive market shares. If products are not compatible the marginal customer x
who is just indi¤erent between buying good A or B satises:
 + A   t  x+   x  pA =  + B   t  (1  x) +   (1  x)  pB.
Similarly, if products are compatible, the marginal customer is characterized by
 + A   t  x+   pA =  + B   t  (1  x) +   pB.
Thus,
x =
1
2
+
A   B   pA + pB
2  bt with bt =
(
t if goods are compatible
t   if goods are not compatible
and the prot functions are given by
A = pA  x(A; B; pA; pB)  K
2

2
A and B = pB  (1  x(A; B; pA; pB)) 
K
2

2
B,
respectively.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose that bt >  A B
3
. Then there exists a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium of the pricing subgame with
pA =
A   B
3
+ bt and pB = B   A
3
+ bt.
The marginal consumer is given by x = 1
2
+ A B
6bt and rmsprots are
A =
(A   B + 3bt)2
18bt   K2 2A and B = (A   B + 3bt)218bt   K2 2B.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Note that the market sustains two rms if and only if
bt > A   B3
 .
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If this condition is violated the quality di¤erence between the two rms is so large that
only the rm with the superior product can make positive prots. Note also that this
condition implies that prots are strictly increasing in bt.
Proposition 2.1 If both rms serve the market, prices and prots are higher if rms
agreed on compatibility ( bt = t) than if they did not agree on compatibility (bt = t  ).
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
At rst glance this proposition may be surprising. One might have suspected that
if goods obey a common standard, they are closer substitutes and that, therefore, price
competition should be more intense. However, the exact opposite is the case. To see the
intuition for this result note that without a common standard (nA = x, nB = 1   x),
consumers are interested in buying a good that many other consumers buy as well.
Thus, in order to attract customers rms have to o¤er a large market share which
forces them to compete more aggressively. The larger the network benet  the more
important market share is for consumers and the more intense competition is. On the
other hand, if rms agree to a common standard (nA = nB = 1) each consumer gets
the full network benet  no matter which good he buys. Therefore, consumers do not
care about market shares, and rms will compete less aggressively.
A di¤erent way to see this is to look at the marginal customer x. He benets from
network externalities in proportion to the market share of rm i, but he also su¤ers
from transportation cost in proportion to the market share of rm i (because he is 
by denition the most distant customer of this rm). Therefore, without a common
standard a decrease of the network externality  has the same e¤ect as an increase of
the transportation cost t: they make the demand of each rm less price elastic and
reduce the degree of competition.51 If a common standard is introduced the network
externality no longer a¤ects the decision of the marginal customer where to buy. Thus,
introducing a common standard has the same e¤ect as an increase of transportation
cost by .
Consider now the case where bt <  A B
3
. In this case only one rm will serve the
market. We assume that consumers manage to coordinate to all buy from the rm with
the superior quality.52 Note that this rm is still constrained in its pricing decision by
51Navon et al. (1995) also show that an increase in the network externality  has a similar e¤ect on
competition as a reduction of transportation costs, but they do not consider compatibility standards.
52Thus, we abstract from a possible war of attrition that determines which rm monopolizes the
market as analyzed in detail already, see Farrell (1996), Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Simcoe (2005).
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the potential entry of the other rm. After all, the other rm is prepared to o¤er the
good at any price greater or equal to its marginal cost that we normalized to 0.
Lemma 2.2 If bt <  A B
3
 only the rm with the superior quality serves the market.
It will charge the limit price pi = jA   Bj   bt, serve all customers, and make a prot
of
i = jA   Bj   bt  K
2

2
i .
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Note that if only one rm serves the market price and prot are decreasing in bt.
Proposition 2.2 If only one rm serves the market the price and the prot of this
rm are higher if rms did not agree on compatibility (bt = t  ) than if they did not
agree on compatibility (bt = t).
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
The intuition for this result is that the rm with the superior product is constrained
in its pricing decision by the threat of entry of the other rm. If there is a common
standard and if products are compatible a consumer can switch to the inferior rm
and still enjoy the network externality. Without the standard, this consumer enjoys
the network benets only in proportion to the customer base of the rm he buys from.
Thus, if the entrant with the inferior product has no customers, it is much less attractive
to buy his product. Therefore, the constraint on the pricing decision of the superior
rm is relaxed.
To summarize, a common standard relaxes price competition if both rms have
positive market share, but it facilitates entry and makes the market more contestable
if only one rm serves the market.
2.3.2 Investments in Quality
At date 2 rms choose their quality levels simultaneously.
Proposition 2.3 If t  1
9K
there exists a unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
in which both rms invest in quality, each chooses A = B = 13K , rms agree to make
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their products compatible and both rms serve the market with probability one. In this
case expected prots are
E(A) = E(B) =
t
2
+
2
9t
  1
18K
.
If t < 1
9K
there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. However, there are two
asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in which only one rm invests in quality and chooses
 = 1
K
, while the other rm does not invest. There is no compatibility agreement in
this case and the rm that invested monopolizes the market with probability one. If the
rms play a correlated equilibrium such that rm A (B) invests and serves the market
while rm B (A) abstains with probability 0.5, then expected prots are
E(A) = E(B) =
1
4K
  t  
2
.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Proposition 2.3 allows for some simple comparative static results:
Corollary 2.1 The higher the degree of product di¤erentiation t and the larger the
investment cost parameter K, the more likely it is that both rms serve the market and
that a standard will be formed.
The intuition for these results is straightforward. The more the two goods are
horizontally di¤erentiated, the larger are duopoly prots and the smaller is the prot
of a monopolist. Thus, it is more likely that a duopoly can be sustained. Furthermore, a
high marginal cost of quality improvement K deters rms in a duopoly from investing
too much. Recall that in equilibrium both rms invest the same amount, so that
prices are independent of quality and rms do not gain from their investments. The
investment game is a prisoners dilemma: anything that reduces investment levels
makes the duopoly more protable. This is not the case for a monopolist who can
charge higher prices for higher quality. Thus, an increase of K makes the duopoly
more attractive as compared to the monopoly and thus makes a standard more likely.
Corollary 2.2 As long as the market structure is given, investments do neither depend
on the degree of product di¤erentiation nor on the degree of network e¤ects. Thus,
compatibility choices do not have a direct e¤ect on investments. However, switching
from a regime in which compatibility standards are possible to one in which they are
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illegal may have an indirect e¤ect on investments because it may change the market
structure.
To see the last point of the Corollary 2.2 suppose that 1
9K
< t < 1
9K
+ . If
compatibility standards are possible, the rst part of the inequality implies that there
is room for two rms each of which will invest 1
3K
. However, if such standards are
illegal, the relevant transportation costis t  and the second part of the inequality
implies that only one rm will invest 1
K
and serve the market. Thus, the feasibility
of compatibility standards may a¤ect the market structure and thereby investment
incentives.
2.3.3 Welfare Evaluation
We now compare the decisions of the rms to the decisions of a social planner who
wants to maximize social welfare, i.e. a weighted sum of consumer surplus and prots
of the two rms, weighted with a factor , 0   < 1. The factor  reects that the
social planner gives more weight to consumers than to producers, for example because
of distributional concerns or because the companies are (partially) owned by foreigners.
Note that if  = 1, prices are a pure transfer that do not a¤ect social welfare. The social
planner wants to maximize this objective function by choosing quality investments and
then prices subject to the constraint that rms do not make losses. The social planner
can make lump-sum transfers A and B to the rms that have to be paid for by a tax
 = A + B on consumers. Note that transfers may be negative.
Consider rst the case where both rms serve the market. In this case the social
planner will always impose compatibility because consumers benet from the positive
network externality of the other good. Thus, the social planners problem once the
realized technology shocks A, B are observed is given by:
max
pA;pB ;x;A;B ;
8<:
xZ
0
( + A +A   tx  pA +   )dx
+
1Z
x
( + B +B   t(1  x)  pB +   )dx
+

pAx  K2 
2
A + A + pB(1  x)  K2 
2
B + B
o
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subject to:
pAx  K
2

2
A + A  0
pB(1  x)  K
2

2
B + B  0
A + B =  .
The rst two constraints reect that rms cannot be forced to participate and have
to make at least zero prots. The last condition requires a balanced budget. The social
planer faces a trade-o¤ between minimizing total transportation cost and allocating
consumers to the rm with the better technology. Because  < 1, the participation
constraints must be binding. Note that consumers and rms care only about the sum
of prices and transfers, so transfers and prices are not uniquely determined. Therefore,
we look for the lowest transfers that can be used to implement the e¢ cient allocation.
The solution to the planners problem is given by:
pA = pB = p =
K
2

2
A +
K
2

2
B
x =
1
2
+
A +A   B  B
2t
,
A = (1  x)K
2

2
A   x
K
2

2
B and B = x
K
2

2
B   (1  x)
K
2

2
A, with  = A + B = 0.
Note that it is optimal to charge the same price for both products that is indepen-
dent of actual quality. Substituting the optimal allocation in the social welfare function
and maximizing with respect to i implies:
A = B =
1
2K
and pA = pB =
1
4K
.
Thus, in the rst best expected total social welfare is given by:
EW =
1
4K
  1
4
t+ +  +
2
2t
.
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Consider now the possibility that only one rm, say rm A, serves the entire market.
In this case the social planner is indi¤erent whether to impose compatibility, because
all consumers buy from rm A anyway. Thus social welfare is given by:
W =
1Z
0
( + A +A   tx  pA + )dx+ 

pA   K
2

2
A

.
Again, if  < 1 the social planner will choose pA as low as possible subject to
the constraint that the rm breaks even. Substituting the break-even condition in
the expected welfare function and maximizing with respect to A yields the rst order
condition
@EW
@A
= 1 KA = 0
which implies
A =
1
K
and pA =
1
2K
.
Thus, expected social welfare is given by:
EW =
1
2K
  1
2
t+ + .
Comparing the social welfare expressions with one rm and two rms, respectively,
the social planner prefers to have both rms operating if and only if:
W FB(2 rms) = 1
4K
  1
4
t+ +  + 
2
2t
> 1
2K
  1
2
t+ +  = W FB(1 rm).
, 
2
2t|{z}
sampling
e¤ect
+
1
4
t|{z}
transportation
cost e¤ect
>
1
4K|{z}
investment
cost e¤ect
There are two advantages of having two rms. First, with two rms there are two
independent quality draws. Because more consumers buy the higher quality good, this
gives rise to a sampling e¤ect which becomes more valuable the smaller the transporta-
tion cost. Second, two rms increase variety and reduce the total transportation cost.
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On the other hand, the advantage of having only one rm is that the investment cost
has to be born only once, and so total investment is more e¢ cient.
Proposition 2.4 If  < 1
K
p
8
and 1 
p
1 8K22
2K
< t < 1+
p
1 8K22
2K
, it is more e¢ cient
that only one rm serves the market, invests 
FB
= 1
K
and charges pFB = 1
2K
, while
the other rm is inactive. Otherwise, the rst best e¢ cient outcome is that two rms
serve the market, each rm invests 
FB
A = 
FB
B =
1
2K
and charges pFBA = p
FB
B =
1
4K
and
the two goods use a common standard.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Comparing the rst best solution to the actual market outcome, we get:
Corollary 2.3 There are three potential ine¢ ciencies that may arise in equilibrium:
(a) Market prices are ine¢ ciently high and leave a rent to rms, in particular if only
one rm is sustained by the market.
(b) Investments are chosen ine¢ ciently low if there are two rms on the market (but
e¢ ciently if there is only one rm).
(c) The market structure may be ine¢ cient:
 if t < 1
9K
and 0 < t < 1 
p
1 8K22
2K
the market sustains only one rm, but it would be
socially optimal to have two rms using a common standard.
 if 1
9K
< t < 1+
p
1 8K22
2K
the market sustains two rms, but it would be more e¢ cient
to have only one rm.
Suppose that the only policy instrument available to the government is to either im-
pose a standard if rms dont choose one voluntarily or to forbid standards altogether.
At rst glance it may seem to be a good idea to make standards mandatory because
in the rst best the social planner would always impose a common standard. If only
one rm serves the market, this is indeed the case. Imposing a standard is optimal as
it shifts rents from the producer to consumers.
However, if two rms serve the market it may become optimal to make compati-
bility standards illegal. To see this suppose that t > 1
9K
+ . Without government
intervention the market would sustain a duopoly that opts for a compatibility stan-
dard. If compatibility standards are made illegal, competition would be more intense
and prices would fall from pA = pB = t to pA = pB = t  . Thus, in equilibrium each
consumer gains  due to lower prices and loses 
2
because of the reduced network ex-
ternality (his good is now compatible with only half of the market). Thus, the net gain
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of each consumer from this policy is 
2
. On the other hand, the two rms jointly lose
 because of the lower price. Therefore, if the weight of the rms in the social welfare
is su¢ ciently small, making a standard illegal may actually improve social welfare.
Proposition 2.5 In a second best world in which the government cannot directly con-
trol entry, investment and pricing decisions of rms,
(a) if t < 1
9K
imposing a mandatory standard for ex post compatibility strictly increases
social welfare
(b) for t > 1
9K
+ and  < 9t(t )
2(9t(t ) 22) forbidding a standard that the industry would
like to adopt strictly increases social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
2.4 Ex Ante Compatibility, Technology Sharing
and Royalties
So far we looked at standards that are set after investments have been sunk. We now
consider the situation where parties can commit to a compatibility standard before
they take their investment decisions. The parties may agree that the product with the
superior quality will be the basis of the standard and that the rm with the inferior
quality has to pay xed and/or variable royalties. Furthermore, we allow for the
possibility that the rmsinvestments not only improve the quality of their own good,
but may also have positive spillover e¤ects on the goods of their competitors. The
parties may agree to di¤erent forms of technology sharing in order to control these
spillovers in the initial contract.
2.4.1 Technology Sharing and Royalties
Suppose w.l.o.g. that A > B and that good A sets the joint standard. A consumer
located at x 2 [0; 1] who buys good i 2 fA;Bg enjoys utility:
U(x; i) =
(
 + A   tx+   pA if i = A
 + B + (A   B)  t(1  x) +   pB if i = B.
The parameter  2 [0; 1] measures the positive spillover e¤ects on the inferior good
if it can use the superior standard. If  = 1, inferior rm B completely adopts the
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superior technology of good A and both rms o¤er the same quality. If  = 0 there
are no spillovers, the standard merely allows for compatibility and does not a¤ect
the quality of the goods, and we are back to the model of the previous section. If
0 <  < 1 the adoption of the superior standard has some spillover e¤ects, but some
quality di¤erences remain. The parameter  may be a¤ected by the standard setting
agreement. The more comprehensive the standard and the more technology is shared
by the parties, the higher is .
Suppose that both rms serve the market. The consumer who is just indi¤erent
whether to buy product A or B is located at:
x =
1
2
+
(1  ) (A   B)  pA + pB
2t
.
The parties may agree on a xed royalty R and/or linear royalties r that have to
be paid by the rm with the inferior product to the rm that sets the standard. Thus,
the prot function of rm A is given by:
A =
(
pA  x(pA; pB) + r  (1  x(pA; pB)) +R  K2 
2
A if A  B
pA  x(pA; pB)  r  x(pA; pB) R  K2 
2
A if A < B.
In both cases the rst derivative of As prot function with respect to pA is the
same and yields the reaction function:
pA =
t+ r + (1  ) (A   B) + pB
2
.
This is the same condition as in Section 2.3 with bt replaced by t + r and A   B
replaced by (1  ) (A   B).
Lemma 2.3 Suppose that t >
 (1 )(A B)3 . Then there exists a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the pricing subgame with
pA =
(1  ) (A   B)
3
+ t+ r and pB =
(1  ) (B   A)
3
+ t+ r,
and the marginal consumer is given by x = 1
2
+ (1 )(A B)
6t
. Suppose w.l.o.g. that rm
A has the superior technology. Then rmsprots are given by
A =
[(1  ) (A   B) + 3t]2
18t
+r+R K
2

2
A, B =
[(1  ) (B   A) + 3t]2
18t
 R K
2

2
B.
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The proof is a simple extension of the proof of Lemma 2.1. Note that if we set
 = r = R = 0 Lemma 2.3 boils down to Lemma 2.1. In the following we will restrict
attention to the case where both rms expect that they are both going to serve the
market at date 4. Otherwise they would not be willing to agree to a common standard
ex ante.
Consider now the investment decisions at date 2.
Proposition 2.6 Suppose that the two rms agreed to a common standard and to
royalties r; R  0 at date 1. If t  (1 )2
9K
there exists a unique symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in which rms choose investment levels
A = B =
1  
3K
+
2R + r
2K
and expected equilibrium payo¤s are
E(A) = E(B) =
t+ r
2
+
(1  )22
9t
  (1  )
2
18K
  (1  )(2R + r)
6K
  (2R + r)
2
8K2
.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Note that if R and r increase, the incentives to invest go up because a higher prize
is gained if a rm manages to come up with the superior standard. On the other hand,
the incentives to invest decrease with K (because of higher investment cost), with 
(because more of the vertical product di¤erentiation is achieved by the uncertainty in
the investment process) and with  (because it is less protable to invest if a larger
share of the investment can be used by the competitor). Note also that expected
equilibrium prots are increasing in t (because of stronger product di¤erentiation), in
K (because of lower investments) and in  (because of lower investment incentives and
less ex post competition).
2.4.2 Optimal Royalties
Suppose that the parties can contract on linear and/or xed royalties before they take
their investment decisions. What royalties will they agree upon?
Proposition 2.7 If the parties agreed to a common standard they will choose:
R = 0 and r = max

2K2   2 (1  )
3
, 0

.
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The optimal linear royalty r is increasing in the spillover parameter  and the
marginal cost of investment K . It is strictly positive and increasing in  if and only
if  > 1 
3K
. Given the optimal royalties, rms choose:
A = B =
(
1 
3K
if  < 1 
3K
 if   1 
3K
.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
To see why the xed royalty R will be set to zero, note that it has no impact
on equilibrium prices but only a¤ects the investment incentives of the two parties.
The higher R, the higher is the reward for developing the superior standard and the
stronger are the incentives to invest. However, in equilibrium both parties make exactly
the same investment. While the investment benets consumers, it does not benet the
two rms. Both rms would be better o¤ if they could commit not to invest. By setting
R = 0, they eliminate any incentive to invest coming from the xed part of royalties.
The linear royalty r, however, may be positive. It trades o¤ two e¤ects. On the
one hand it is part of the marginal costs of both rms: It is a direct marginal cost for
the inferior rm that has to pay the royalty for each of its customers. It is a marginal
opportunity cost for the superior rm that loses the royalty income on each customer
that it gains. Therefore, the equilibrium price at date 4 increases one to one with r
which raises total prots by r. If this was the only e¤ect, the parties would use r to
implement the monopoly price. However, there is a second e¤ect. The linear royalty
induces the parties to invest more which is bad for total prots. Therefore r should not
become too large. The optimal linear royalty increases with the spillover parameter 
and the marginal cost of investment K. The larger these parameters, the lower is the
incentive to invest in quality which dampens the second e¤ect and makes it optimal to
raise r.
2.4.3 Incentives to Share Technology
So far we assumed that the parameter  is exogenously given. However, the parties
may be able to a¤ect  by agreeing to various forms of technology sharing in the ex
ante contract. Consider the case where they can freely set  2 [0; 1]. In this case, we
get the following result:
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Proposition 2.8 If the parties can freely choose the spillover parameter , they will
set  = 1 and r = 2K2. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium with pA = pB =
t+ 2K2, A = B =  and
E(A) = E(B) =
t
2
+
K2
2
.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
By setting  = 1 the parties commit to fully share their technologies which mini-
mizes their incentives to invest. However, they still have a positive incentive to invest
because they will set r > 0 in order to increase product market prices.
2.5 Private and Social Incentives to Adopt a Com-
mon Standard
The question remains whether cooperative or competitive standard setting will prevail.
Will the parties agree to a common standard or will each of them hope to be able to
monopolize the market? If the rms do not agree to a common standard ex ante we
are back to the analysis of Section 2.3. Clearly, if the parties expect that without an
ex ante standard they will still both invest and both serve the market, the ex ante
standard dominates by a simple revealed preference argument. After all, the parties
could have agreed to an ex ante standard with  = r = 0, but they chose not to do so.
If, however, without an ex ante standard only one rm would have invested and
monopolized the market, i.e. if t < 1
9K
, the parties may be better o¤ by not agreeing to
an ex ante standard. Without a standard their expected prots are given by the second
part of Proposition 2.3. Comparing them to the prots with an ex ante standard given
by Proposition 2.8 we get:
Proposition 2.9 Firms agree to form a standard with  = 1 and r = 2K2 if and
only if:
t > min

1
9K
;
1
4K
+

2
  K
2
2

.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Thus, cooperative standard setting with technology sharing is more likely if the
degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation is large (which makes a monopoly of one
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rm less attractive), if investment costs are high and if there is a lot of uncertainty in
the investment process (both of which induces rms to invest less). If rms cooperate
on standardization ex ante and fully share their technologies, they will invest A =
B = , while if they do not agree on a common standard, either both rms invest
A = B =
1
3K
or only one rm invests 1
K
while the other rm stays out of the market.
Thus, if royalties and technology sharing are feasible, standard setting may have a large
impact on investment behavior.
Let us now compare the private incentives to form a standard with technology
sharing and linear royalties to the social incentives. A social planner would always
impose a common standard and he would always use both rms to produce. He will
use both rms to invest if the sampling e¤ect of having two quality realizations is
su¢ ciently large as compared to the investment cost. Otherwise, only one rm invests
but shares its technology with the other rm.
Proposition 2.10 From a social welfare point of view it is always optimal to have a
standard with full technology sharing. If  > 3
4K
, it is optimal to make both rms
invest A = B = 12K , otherwise it is more e¢ cient if only one rm invests i =
1
K
.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
Thus, the market outcome generically fails to be e¢ cient: Either the two rms
agree on a common standard with  = 1 (which is e¢ cient), but in this case they will
not invest e¢ ciently (if  6= 1
2K
). Or they will not form a standard (which is always
ine¢ cient) and only one rm will enter the market which will then invest e¢ ciently.
If both rms serve the market and if  < 1
2K
, standard setting results in underin-
vestment. The reason is that the rms are unable to reap any of the benets of their
investments from consumers. Therefore, they have a joint incentive to restrict invest-
ments as much as possible, which is socially harmful53. If  is small, a cartel with little
investments can be sustained by using the instruments of a common standard, tech-
nology sharing and optimal linear royalties. Furthermore, rms use the linear royalty
to increase prices in the product market.
In order to restrict the collusive power of these standard setting agreements the
government might consider to impose a royalty-free licensing rule, i.e. it might require
rms to set r = R = 0. However, the next proposition shows that this reduces social
welfare if the noise in the investment process is not too large.
53Firms would also underinvest even if there was competition from an outside competitor although
this e¤ect would not be as strong.
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Proposition 2.11 Suppose that both rms want to agree to an ex ante standard with
full technology sharing and optimal royalties. If  < min
n
1
2K
;
q
t
2K
o
imposing a free
licensing rule (r = R = 0) aggravates the underinvestment problem and reduces social
welfare.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. On the one hand, if r = 0 rms
cannot use the royalty rate to inate prices on the product market. On the other hand,
with r = 0 there is no incentive to invest and rms will choose A = B = 0. The
proposition shows that the welfare gain due to lower prices is lower than the welfare
loss due to lower investments if  is small.
Note, however, that in our model the market size is xed. If an increase in the
quality of the goods induces new consumers to enter the market, rms would receive
some benets from their investments and therefore they would not want to eliminate
all incentives to invest. However, it would still be the case that they would not be able
to capture the entire increase in consumer surplus due to their investments and that
their joint incentives to invest would be too low from a social point of view. Therefore,
there is always an incentive to use a standard setting agreement ex ante to restrict
investment incentives.
Another policy option is to forbid ex ante agreements on technology sharing, com-
patibility and royalties altogether, but to allow for ex post standardization. We have
shown already that rms always prefer an ex ante agreement because they could have
opted for an ex ante agreement with  = 0 and a xed royalty R = r = 0, giving the
same investment incentives and the same expected prots as ex post standard setting,
but they prefer  = 1 and r = 2K2.
However, from a social welfare point of view it is less clear whether ex ante agree-
ments are desirable. On the one hand, an ex ante agreement will set  = 1 which
benets consumers but reduces the incentives to invest. Furthermore, rms will choose
r in order to increase prices on the product market which tends to increase investment
incentives. If  is small and thus the investment levels given by an ex ante agreement
are ine¢ ciently low, it may be a welfare improvement if the government does not allow
for ex ante standardization.
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Proposition 2.12 If  is small, ex post bargaining may be preferable from a social
welfare point of view because it does not allow the parties to collectively reduce their
investments.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 2.7.1.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyzed the implications of standards, technology sharing and roy-
alties on product market competition and investment incentives. We have shown that if
both rms expect to serve the market, they want to adopt a common standard because
it relaxes product market competition. However, if they anticipate that only one rm
will survive on the market, a common standard will not be chosen because it reduces
the limit price that the successful company can charge. If there is no technology shar-
ing and if there are no royalties, standards have no direct impact on investments. Even
though in a rst best world it is always optimal to have a common standard, forbidding
a standard can strictly increase welfare by increasing competition and lowering prices.
If rms can, prior to their investment decisions, contractually agree to compatibil-
ity, technology sharing and xed and/or linear royalties, this has a strong impact on
investments. Firms will use these instruments to jointly reduce their incentives to in-
vest and to increase the market price. Imposing a zero-royalty rate on standard setting
agreements does not mitigate this problem but rather makes it worse.
The recent collaboration agreement between Microsoft and Novell serves as a good
example to illustrate some of the points made in this chapter (See Appendix, Section
2.7.2). First, it seems that Microsoft has nally accepted that it will not succeed in
excluding Linux from the market for operating systems. As a consequence, our model
suggests that both rms should agree to a common standard. Consumers certainly
gain from the increased compatibility and associated network e¤ects. However, our
model indicates that they may su¤er from higher prices in the future.
Furthermore, our model predicts that under such an agreement rms will choose
wide technology sharing and low but positive linear royalties. Unfortunately, the exact
structure of royalty payments has not been publicized. However, the joint research
facility, as proposed in the agreement, will allow for signicant spillovers. This is
facilitated by the agreement not to sue each other for IP rights violations. Because
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the fruits of future investments will be shared, investment incentives may be reduced.
However, it has to be kept in mind that both rms are still competing against other
companies (e.g. Red Hat) which may render this e¤ect quantitatively less pronounced.
Our model restricts attention to the case where technologies are substitutes. If
technologies are complements and if several complementary patents owned by di¤erent
rms are required for the standard, di¤erent issues arise. In this case, the main purpose
of licensing agreements is to mitigate the complements problem and to prevent parties
from charging royalties that push the market price above the monopoly price (see
Lerner and Tirole (2004), Schmidt (2006)). It would be an interesting and important
topic for future research to extend the analysis of standard setting agreements and of
the rmsinvestment incentives to this case.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.1: If both rms are active, the best-
response functions of the pricing game are given by:
pA =
A   B + pB + bt
2
and pB =
B   A + pA + bt
2
.
Thus, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium with:
pA =
A   B
3
+ bt and pB = B   A
3
+ bt.
The marginal consumer and equilibrium prots are
x =
1
2
+
A   B
6bt and A = (A   B + 3bt)218bt  K2 2A and B = (B   A + 3bt)218bt  K2 2B.
Note that bt >  A B
3
 implies x 2 (0; 1) and (bt = t) > (bt = t  ). Thus, prots are
strictly higher if rms agree to a common standard.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.2: If bt <  A B
3
 there is no pure strategy
equilibrium with two rms on the market, because both rms would make losses.
However, there is an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which one rm serves
the entire market. Suppose w.l.o.g. that this is rm A and that rm B stays out of the
market but is ready to supply any customer at price pB = 0. Firm A will optimally
charge the limit price pA = A  B   bt at which the consumer located at x = 1 is just
indi¤erent between buying from A and B. Increasing the price even further reduces
prots because with bt <  A B
3
 a marginal price increase lowers revenues. Hence,
there is no incentive to deviate for rm A. It is straightforward to see that rm B has
no incentive to deviate either. Thus, this is indeed an equilibrium. Of course, the
mirror equilibrium in which rm B serves the market and A stays out also exists. In
this equilibrium:
i = ji   jj   bt  K
2

2
i and j = 0 where i 2 fA;Bg and j 6= i:
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Thus, (bt = t) < (bt = t ) and the rm prefers no standard (bt = t ) to a standard
(bt = t).
Proof of Proposition 2.3: Suppose that both rms expect to serve the market at
date 4 and therefore agree to compatibility at date 3. The expected prot of rm i is
then:
E(i) =
Z
i
Z
j
 
i +i   j  j

+ 3t
2
18t
1
2
dj
1
2
di   K
2

2
i
where i 2 fA;Bg and j 6= i. Di¤erentiating with respect to i and rearranging the
FOCs we get:
A =
3t  B
9tK   1 and B =
3t  A
9tK   1 .
Note that the SOC (t  1
9K
) implies that reaction functions are downward sloping. If
this is satised there exists a unique54 symmetric Nash equilibrium in quality levels
and with expected equilibrium prots of:
A = B =
1
3K
and E(A) = E(B) =
t
2
+
2
9t
  1
18K
.
If both rms invest the same, the maximum quality di¤erence is 2. By our assumption
that  < 3
2
(t   ) we have  A B
3
 < 2
3
< (t   ). Thus, if t  1
9K
both parties
will indeed serve the market with probability one, no matter whether they agree to
compatibility or not. But then it is a dominant strategy for each rm to agree on
compatibility and the above investment strategies are indeed an equilibrium.
If t < 1
9K
it is not an equilibrium that both rms invest the same (SOC not
satised). In this case there are two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in which only
one rm invests and serves the entire market. Suppose w.l.o.g. that this is rm A. At
date 4 it chooses the limit price pA = A+A B   t+: Thus, at date 2 it chooses
the quality level that maximizes:
54If t    > 29K this is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. If t     29K there are two
additional asymmetric equilibria in which one rm chooses a quality level of 0 and the other one a
quality level of 3(t )9K(t ) 1 , and rms do not agree to form a standard. Because of the symmetry of
the game, we focus on symmetric equilibria throughout.
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E(A) =
Z
A
Z
B
(A +A  B   t+ ) 1
2
dB
1
2
dA   K
2

2
A.
The optimal investment is A = 1K , while rm B invests B = 0 and stays out of the
market.
We still have to show that if A = 1K and B = 0 rm A will indeed monopolize
the market with probability one. This is the case if
 A+A B B3  > t    for all
realizations of A, B. Note that this is implied by 1K   2 > 3(t   ). Note further
that 3
2
t > 3
2
(t   ) >  implies 3(t   ) + 3t > 3(t   ) + 2. Also, 1
9K
> t implies
6 1
9K
  3 > 3(t   ) + 3t. Finally,   0 implies 1
K
> 2
3K
  3. Thus, we have
1
K
> 2
3K
  3 > 3(t   ) + 3t > 3(t   ) + 2 so the rm that invests will indeed
monopolize the market with probability one.
By symmetry, there is a mirror equilibrium in which rm B invests and rm A
stays out. Thus, there also exists a correlated equilibrium in which each of the two
pure strategy equilibria is played with probability 0.5. In this correlated equilibrium
expected prots are:
E(A) = E(B) =
1
2

1
2K
  t+ 

.
Proof of Proposition 2.4: Consider rst the case where the planner uses both rms
to invest and to produce. Note that he will always impose the common standard. For
any given realizations of qualities the social planners problem is:
max
pA,pB ,x, ,A
8<:
xZ
0
( + A +A   tx  pA +   )dx
+
1Z
x
( + B +B   t(1  x)  pB +   )dx
+

pAx  K
2

2
A + A + pB(1  x) 
K
2

2
B +    A

s.t.: pAx   K2 
2
A + A  0, pB(1   x)   K2 
2
B + B  0, x = 12 + A+A B B2t and
A + B =  :
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The FOCs imply:
A = pAx  K
2

2
A + A = 0 and B = pB(1  x) 
K
2

2
B +    A = 0
with pFBA = p
FB
B = p
FB = K
2

2
A +
K
2

2
B and x =
1
2
+ A+A B B
2t
.
The subsidies  i guarantee zero prots even with unfavorable investment quality real-
izations:
A = (1  x)K
2

2
A   x
K
2

2
B and B = x
K
2

2
B   (1  x)
K
2

2
A.
Given this solution the social planner maximizes expected welfare by choosing the
optimal investment levels:
max
A,B
Z
B
Z
B
8<:
xZ
0
( + A +A   tx  pA +   )dx
+
1Z
x
( + B +B   t(1  x)  pB +   )dx
+

pAx  K
2

2
A + A + pB(1  x) 
K
2

2
B + B

1
2
dB
1
2
dA.
The FOCs of this problem imply:


A = 

B =
1
2K
.
Substituting this result in the above expressions for optimal prices, market shares
and subsidies, we get pFB = 1
4K
and
EW FB(2 rms) =
1
4K
  1
4
t+ +  +
2
2t
:
Consider now the case where the planner uses only one rm to invest and to supply
Cooperative versus Competitive Standard Setting 83
the market, so
W =
1Z
0
( +  +  tx  p+ )dx+ 

p  K
2

2

Again, because  < 1, the rm must break-even ( = p   K
2

2
= 0 ) p = K2
2
).
From the maximization of expected social welfare we get the optimal investment level


= 1
K
. Thus, expected welfare with one active rm is given by
EW FB(1 rm) =
1
2K
+ +    1
2
t:
Comparing social welfare with one and two active rms we get
EW FB(2 rms) > EW FB(1 rm) if and only if t2   t
K
+ 22 > 0
Note that t2  t
K
+22 = 0 if t = 1
p
1 8K22
2K
: Thus, if 1 
p
1 8K22
2K
< t < 1+
p
1 8K22
2K
and  < 1
K
p
8
it is optimal to have one rm, otherwise two rms are more e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: If t < 1
9K
only one rm serves the market and no standard
will be chosen. Expected welfare is given by: EW =  + t
2
+ 
 
1
2K
  t+ . If the
government imposes a standard there is still only one rm, but price falls to the new
limit price, pA = A  t = 1K   t and expected welfare is EW = t2 + ++ 
 
1
2K
  t.
Thus, welfare improves because  > . This proves part (a).
Suppose now that t > 1
9K
+. In this case two rms serve the market and a standard
will be chosen. Welfare is given by: EW = 1
3K
  5 4
4
t+ +  +  2
2
9t
  
9K
. Suppose,
the government makes the standard illegal. Then we still have 2 rms, but prices fall
to pA = pB = t  and expected social welfare is EW = 13K   5 44 t+
 
3
2
  +  +
 2
2
9(t )   9K . Thus, welfare improves if  is small enough:  < 9t(t )2(9t(t ) 22) , e.g. as
2 ! 0 we need  < 1
2
. This proves part (b) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.6: Expected prots are given by:
E (A) =
Z
A
Z
B

(1  )  A +A   B  B+ 3t2
18t
1
2
dB
1
2
dA   K
2

2
A
+ Pr (A > B) (R + r)
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Note that Pr (A > B) = 12 +
(A B)
2
. Thus, we get (similarly for rm B):
E (A) =

(1  )  A   B+ 3t2
18t
+

1
2
+
A   B
2

r
+

A   B


R +
2 (1  )22
18t
  K
2

2
A.
At date 2 the rst order conditions for prot maximization give the reaction functions:
A =
 (1  )2B + 3 (1  ) t+ 9t2R+r2
9tK   (1  )2 and B =
 (1  )2A + 3 (1  ) t+ 9t2R+r2
9tK   (1  )2 .
Note that the second order condition requires: 9tK  (1 )2 > 0 . Investments in the
symmetric equilibrium are thus A =
(1 )
3K
+ 2R+r
2K
= B . Hence, expected prots are:
E (A) = E (B) =
t+ r
2
+
(1  )22
9t
  (1  )
2
18K
  (1  ) (2R + r)
6K
  (2R + r)
2
8K2
.
Proof of Proposition 2.7: Using the prot expression from Proposition 2.6 we have:
@E (A)
@R
=  2 (1  )
6K
  4 (2R + r)
6K2
< 0) R = 0
@E (A)
@r
=
1
2
  (1  )
6K
  (2R + r)
4K2
= 0) r = 2K2   2 (1  )
3
.
To exclude negative royalties, we have: r = max
n
2K2   2(1 )
3
; 0
o
. Note that
@r
@
 0, @r
@K
 0 and lim2!0 r = 0 . Note further that @r@ = 4K  2(1 )3  0 only if
  (1 )
6K
and positive if   (1 )
3K
. Substituting optimal royalties in the investment
levels of Proposition 2.6 gives the result in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.8: Substituting the optimal royalties of Proposition 2.7 into
the expected prots (assuming   (1 )
3K
, s.t. r > 0 ) and simplifying gives:
E (A) = E (B) =
t
2
+
K2
2
  (1  )
3
+
(1  )22
9t
:
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Note that expected prots are a convex function of 

@2E(A)
@2
= 2
2
9t
> 0

. Firms will
either go for  = 0 or  = 1 , and choose  = 1 i¤ E (A j  = 1) > E (A j  = 0),
i.e.  < 3t. Note that because of our assumption that  < 3
2
t, this condition always
holds. Thus, if   (1 )
3K
, r > 0 and  = 1. Substitution for the royalty, prices,
investments and prots gives r = 2K2 , pA = pB = t+ 2K2 , A = B =  and
E (A) = E (B) =
t
2
+
K2
2
.
Comparative statics are: @E(A)
@t
= 1
2
> 0 and @E(A)
@2
= K
2
> 0.
However, if  < (1 )
3K
, rms could also set  = 0 which implies that  < 1
3K
and
r = 0. In this case, expected prots are E (A) = E (B) = t2 +
2
9t
  1
18K
. Comparing
prot expressions shows that rms always prefer  = 1 and r = 2K2   2(1 )
3
> 0
which yields the prots above.
Proof of Proposition 2.9: Recall from Proposition 2.8 that prots with an ex ante
standard setting agreement are: E (A) = E (B) = t2 +
K2
2
:
 Assume rst that t < 1
9K
: If rms do not agree to an ex ante standard, a
monopoly without standard would obtain. Expected prots are given by Propo-
sition 2.3: E (i) = 14K   t + . Comparing this to expected prots with an ex
ante standard shows that the ex ante standard is preferred i¤:
t
2
+
K2
2
>
1
4K
  t  
2
, i.e. if t >
1
4K
+

2
  K
2
2
and t <
1
9K
holds.
 Assume now that t > 1
9K
. In this case rms will choose to make their products
compatible anyway. If they do not agree to a standard ex ante this is equivalent
to an ex ante standard with  = r = 0. However, by Proposition 2.8 we know
that an ex ante standard with  = 1 and r = 2K2 is strictly better.
Proof of Proposition 2.10: Note that a social planner will always impose the com-
mon standard and moreover use full technology sharing ( = 1). Thus, consumers
always get the quality of max fA; Bg, independent of whether they buy from rm A
or B. To minimize transportation costs, both rms will always sell and prices will be
equalized: p = pA = pB , x = 12 .
The expected social welfare maximization problem for the planner is:
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max
A;B
EW FB =  +   t
4
+
ZZ
AB

max fA; Bg   K
2

2
A  
K
2

2
B

1
2
dB
1
2
dA.
Assume that A   B < 2. Evaluating the inner integral over B and then
di¤erentiating this expression rst with respect to A gives the FOC of the problem as:Z
A

1
2

A   B +A +
 1
2
dA  KA = 0.
Evaluating this integral over A gives:
1
2

A   B +
 KA = 0
Similarly, we derive the condition with respect to B. Together these imply that
both rms invest: A = B = 12K and EW
FB(2 rms)=  + 1
4K
+ 
3
  t
4
+. Note that
A B < 2 is satised. To satisfy the zero prot condition (as  < 1), p = K2 
2
A+
K
2

2
B
and  = A = B = 0.
Suppose now that A   B > 2. Then the social planners problem simplies to:
EW FB =  +   t
4
+
Z
 

max

A +A; B +B
	 1
2
dB   K
2

2
A  
K
2

2
B.
Clearly, taking the derivative with respect to B directly yields B = 0. The FOC with
respect to A yields A = 1K . To satisfy this, rm As zero prot condition requires,
p = K
2

2
A and A =  B with A = K2 
2
A. Thus, expected social welfare is given
by: EW FB(1 rm)=  + 1
2K
  t
4
+ . Comparing the expressions yields EW FB(2
rms)> EW FB(1 rm) if and only if  > 3
4K
.
Proof of Proposition 2.11: If rms set a common standard with  = 1 and r =
2K2, social welfare is given by:
EW = 2 
1
2Z
0

+

3
  t  2K2 + +    tx

dx+ 2  

t
2
+
K2
2

=
4
3
  5  4
4
t  (2  )K2 + + .
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Suppose that the government imposes r = R = 0. If it does so, the expected prots of
rms that have a common standard reduce to:
E (A) = E (B) =
t
2
+
2 (1  )22
18t
  (1  )
2
18K
=
t
2
+ (1  )2

2K2   t
18Kt

.
Note that @E()
@
> 0 , 2 < t
2K
. Thus, if  <
q
t
2K
, rms will set  = 1 which is
e¢ cient, but then choose A = B = 0, because with r = 0 and  = 1 there is no
private incentive to invest. In this case expected social welfare is given by:
EW = 2
1
2Z
0
(E (max fA; Bg)  t+ +    tx) dx+2

1
2
t

=

3
++  t
4
 (1  ) t.
Thus, the government reduces social welfare with this policy if  < 1
(2 )K . This is
implied by  < 1
2K
. Thus, if rms underinvested if left alone, social welfare is reduced
by the policy.
Proof of Proposition 2.12: From the proof of Proposition 2.11 we have for the
welfare of the optimal ex ante standard setting agreement that:
EW =
4
3
  5  4
4
t  (2  )K2 + +  ) lim
2!0
EW =  5  4
4
t+ + .
The welfare from an ex post standard agreement is:
EW =
1
3K
  t+ +  + 
2
18t
  t
4
+ 2

t
2
  1
18K
+
2
9t

) lim
2!0
EW =
1
3K
  5  4
4
+ +    
9K
.
Thus, as 2 ! 0, welfare from an ex post standard agreement is greater as long as
1
3K
  
9K
> 0, i.e. 3   > 0 which is always true.
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2.7.2 Novell-Microsoft Agreement
The Novell-Microsoft Agreement of November 2, 2006.
The agreement covers distribution, development and legal indemnication. In sum-
mary, the following three parts to the agreement can be distinguished:
1. Business Collaboration Agreement (BCA): Microsoft has entered into a reseller
arrangement with Novell and committed to purchase and distribute 70000 SUSE
Linux Enterprise Server license coupons per year for ve years. The license
coupons entitle the customer to one year of maintenance and support and will
involve dedicated sales resources from Microsoft. The companies will also provide
joint marketing behind the resale arrangement.
2. Technical Collaboration Agreement (TCA): The two companies will form a joint
development e¤ort aligned around virtualization, management and document
format compatibility.
3. Patent Agreement (PA): The cooperative patent resolution provides customers
with assurance for patent infringement claims. Essentially, Microsoft will not
assert patent rights over IP that may be incorporated in the SUSE distribution.
The concern of patent infringement suits by Microsoft has acted as a barrier to
enterprise adoption of Linux. The PA applies only to the SUSE distribution of
Linux. It species that both companies will make upfront payments covering
IP protection with a net balancing payment to Novell, due to the volume of
Windows versus SUSE shipments. In return, Microsoft will receive royalty
payments from Novell tied to the companys Open Platform segment.
Source: JPMorgan Analyst Report on Novell on November 8, 2006 by Aaron M.
Schwartz, downloaded via Thomson Financial on December 12, 2006.
See http://www.novell.com/linux/microsoft/ for further details on the agreement.
Chapter 3
Vertical Structure, Investment and
Financing of Network Utilities
3.1 Introduction
Network utilities such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and rail provide services es-
sential for the functioning of todays economy and society. An e¤ective and reliable, yet
cost-e¢ cient network infrastructure is at the heart of these services and thus indispens-
able for a powerful, modern economy.55 To retain and further improve the capabilities
of infrastructure requires investments into its quality and cost-e¤ectiveness. In this
chapter we explore which vertical industry structure provides the best possible invest-
ment incentives into infrastructure.
A network utilitys vertical structure consists of an upstream infrastructure compo-
nent and downstream services o¤ered on this infrastructure. The upstream network is
capital-intensive, durable and immovable and involves large xed costs. These proper-
ties render it a natural monopoly. The downstream segment is potentially competitive
as it involves comparably low xed and higher marginal costs.
We compare two conceivable vertical structures. Under vertical integration the
infrastructure provider is also active in the downstream services segment through an
"a¢ liate" whereas under vertical separation he only operates the infrastructure. A
regulator handles the familiar conict between allowing rms to recover their large sunk
55Besides accounting for ~15% of GDP in developed economies (Newbery (2000)), utilities are
indispensable intermediate inputs to most production processes. Hence, growth and stability are
inextricably linked to a reliable, sustainable infrastructure of utilities  an uncertain supply would
paralyze the entire economy.
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investments and protecting consumersinterests of low prices. Here, we are particularly
interested in the consequences that access regulation and vertical structure have for
infrastructure investment incentives.
Over the past decades privatization and restructuring of network utilities have
launched a dispute on what the optimal structure for these industries may be. By-
and-by policy makers have come to realize the importance of infrastructure investment
incentives for economic e¢ ciency. The unsatisfactory experience with the rail privati-
zation in the UK is frequently cited as the prime example for insu¢ cient infrastructure
quality investments. The worry about underinvestment leading to power outages is
anxiously debated in the course of the EU Commissions proposal to separate owner-
ship of infrastructure and services in the electricity industry.
The formal model analyzes competition within a vertical industry structure where
the upstream infrastructure good is provided monopolistically. Downstream rms re-
quire access to the infrastructure to supply their services to consumers. These services
are o¤ered by an oligopoly that competes in quantities à la Cournot. The infrastruc-
ture owner whether vertically integrated with an a¢ liate on the downstream market
or fully independent (vertical separation)  invests into both, the quality and cost-
e¤ectiveness of the infrastructure. This investment decision is undertaken after a reg-
ulator has set the optimal linear access price to infrastructure but before rms supply
products competitively to consumers.
Both types of infrastructure investments increase e¢ ciency but have distinct eco-
nomic implications. Quality-increasing investments boost e¢ ciency through an increase
in the consumerswillingness to pay and enhance demand for the nal product pro-
vided upon the infrastructure. In the railroad example, demand-enhancing features of
infrastructure correspond to improved infrastructure facilities (e.g. tracks and stations)
a¤ecting variables such as maximum train speed, punctuality, safety, station quality
and track condition. In contrast, cost-reducing infrastructure investments lower the
marginal costs of infrastructure provision. For example, cost-reducing investments im-
prove the processing of tra¢ c through stations and on tracks. Thus, these investments
are critical to keep the infrastructure and the services of utilities a¤ordable. If invest-
ments result in lower access prices to infrastructure the customers and nally also the
consumers benet.
Our main results are the following. First, we show that with linear access prices in-
frastructure investment incentives into cost-reduction decrease in the regulatory access
price under both vertical integration and vertical separation. This is mainly due to
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an access margin e¤ect. Because we assume that access prices cannot be conditioned
on investments, cost-reducing investments increase the access margin for every unit of
infrastructure sold. However, with a larger access price, the demand for infrastructure
falls and thus also the access margin e¤ect decreases which lowers investment incen-
tives into cost-reduction. In contrast, infrastructure investments into quality rise with
the access price under both vertical integration and vertical separation. This result is
mainly driven by an access quantity e¤ect. An increase in the quality of infrastructure
increases the demand of consumers and thereby also the demand for infrastructure.
This increase in access quantity is the sole driver of investment incentives under verti-
cal separation and requires a positive access margin. The larger the access margin, the
more the infrastructure owner benets from investments and consequently, the more
the owner invests.
Second, we nd that for linear demand infrastructure investments under vertical
integration, whether in cost-reduction or quality-increases, exceed those under vertical
separation for any given access price. The presence of a downstream a¢ liate amplies
incentives for both investment types. With quality-increasing infrastructure invest-
ments, the a¢ liate benets directly from a demand expansion. Under cost-reducing
investments, the downstream a¢ liates competitive position is strengthened. He prots
directly from reduced infrastructure costs which represent his e¤ective marginal costs.
In contrast, its competitors still pay the unadjusted access price. Under both, quality-
increasing and cost-reducing investments, the infrastructure owner can thus capture
some gains through the downstream activity of its a¢ liate directly. In consequence,
investment incentives under vertical integration are larger. We also derive rst-best
investments. Neither investments under vertical separation nor those under integra-
tion achieve the rst-best there is underinvestment in quality and cost-e¤ectiveness
of infrastructure.
Third, we demonstrate that while investments into cost-reduction always increase
in the number of competitors because of an access quantity e¤ect, this is not generally
true for quality-increasing investments. Under vertical integration, quality investments
into infrastructure decrease in the number of downstream competitors as the market
share and prots of the downstream subsidiary are eroded. However, quality-increasing
infrastructure investments under vertical separation rise in the number of competitors if
the access margin is positive. Again this is driven by increased downstream competition
generating more demand for access.
The above results have signicant implications for policy. They justify an industry-
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specic institutional structure depending on the particularities of the network utility.
Whereas some industries, such as telecommunications, stand out for their innovative
and fast-moving business environments and demand infrastructure investments in qual-
ity, other network utilities have long-winded cycles of innovation.56 In industries where
infrastructure investments come frequently and at low cost, a vertically integrated
structure should perform better to indeed stimulate economic e¢ ciency through in-
vestments.
There is a large literature on the economics of vertical structures.57 Network utili-
ties, however, distinguish themselves from many other vertical structures as their up-
stream component is a natural monopoly. This requires access regulation or some form
of monitoring by policy makers.58 The special features of di¤erent network utilities
have resulted in a tendency towards an industry perspective.59 The problem discussed
in this chapter is, however, of general nature. Let us thus illustrate some results of the
literature which are generally applicable and related to this work.
In any vertical structure, as long as there is market power and some separation
of ownership in the upstream and the downstream markets, the problem of double
marginalization arises (rst identied by Spengler (1950)). In our model the regulator
cannot solve this problem with linear access prices if he must set an access price above
marginal cost to allow the infrastructure rm to recover the xed costs of infrastruc-
ture provision. For this reason, the vertically integrated structure has an e¢ ciency
advantage for any positive access margin.
Surprisingly, as Valletti (2003) points out, there has not been a lot of work on the
linkage between access prices and investment incentives that we focus on. Biglaiser and
Ma (1999) study investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent rm in a deregulation
process. In contrast to this study, they explore the impact of an unregulated rms en-
try during the deregulation process. The work by Buehler (2005), Buehler et al. (2004,
2006) addresses the issue of potential underinvestment in network infrastructures ex-
plicitly. Their papers show that, for reasonable assumptions on demand, investment
incentives into infrastructure quality are smaller under vertical separation as compared
56Although some innovation is specic to downstream services, these often necessitate prior in-
frastructure investments for downstream innovation to take place.
57For an overview see Motta (2004), chapter 6.
58A detailed survey on regulation is Armstrong and Sappington (2007). For work more related to
this chapter see Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) who analyze downstream integration of a bottleneck
input supplier and Gans (2001) who discusses informational issues of regulating private infrastructure
investments.
59Newbery (2000) describes several network utilities in detail.
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to vertical integration. In addition, we point out the diverging e¤ects that access
price changes have on the di¤erent types of infrastructure investments. Moreover, we
also show that the result can be extended to cost-reducing infrastructure investments.
Vareda (2007) analyzes investment incentives into both infrastructure quality and cost-
reduction of a vertically integrated rm under price competition. However, his paper
does not compare these against the performance of a vertically separated industry
structure and he can therefore not draw any conclusions on the optimal market struc-
ture for di¤erent network utilities depending on their characteristics. A new strand of
literature is the work on legal unbundling as an intermediate structure between vertical
integration and vertical separation. The papers by Cremer et al. (2006) and Hö­ er
and Kranz (2007) investigate in which situations legal unbundling can deliver a supe-
rior performance through combining the benets of both vertical structures but they
do not consider investments.
Recent papers have stressed the importance of non-price discrimination of the up-
stream input provider.60 Although, these actions harm economic e¢ ciency whereas
investments improve it, the underlying incentives resemble those considered in this
chapter.61 Methodologically akin is the work on the incentives of an integrated rm to
raise the costs of rivals on the downstream market or to sabotage the input good, for
example by degrading its quality when supplied to rivals. Sibley and Weisman (1998)
show that a regulated upstream monopolist may have incentives to raise rivalscosts
as this improves the competitiveness of the downstream a¢ liate of the integrated rm.
However, they also emphasize that there is a countervailing e¤ect: a higher downstream
market price will reduce demand for the intermediate product and thus reduces the
integrated rms prot. Whereas discriminatory actions are specic to vertical integra-
tion, infrastructure investment generically remains desirable under vertical separation
as well.
This chapter proceeds with the model setup in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 exam-
ines competition under vertical integration and the implications for infrastructure in-
60Economides (1998) analyzes a monopolists incentives to discriminate against downstream rivals
through degradation of quality. Similarly, the literature on sabotage investigates the incentives of a
vertically integrated supplier to sabotagethe activities of downstream rivals through cost-increases
or demand-reduction. Beard et al. (2001) and Mandy and Sappington (2007) show that cost-increasing
sabotage is typically protable for a vertically integrated rm. In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage
is often protable under Cournot competition, but less so under Bertrand competition.
61Those e¤ects are usually countervailing and orthogonal to those examined in this chapter. The
idea that a vertically integrated rm may use its market power in supplying the input in an anticom-
petitive way is not new and has been analyzed in the literature on vertical foreclosure. For a survey
see Rey and Tirole (2003).
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vestment incentives into both, cost-reduction and quality-increases. Section 3.4 then
explores a vertically separated infrastructure provider and compares the investment
incentives to those under vertical integration. Section 3.5 relates the above incentives
to a welfare benchmark. Here, we also discuss implications for policy. Section 3.6
investigates possible consequences of public infrastructure nancing and the impossi-
bility to commit to access prices. This section is largely orthogonal and can be read
independently of the rest of the chapter. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model Setup
We consider an industry that consists of an upstream infrastructure component and a
downstream services segment. The infrastructure good is provided by a monopolist,
rm I, and is an essential facility that is needed to produce the nal product down-
stream. Downstream rms require one unit of the infrastructure good to produce one
unit of the downstream good.62 The provision of the upstream infrastructure good
involves a xed cost F , which is incurred whenever there is a positive amount of in-
frastructure provided. In addition, each unit of infrastructure comes at a constant
marginal cost of cI . The upstream industry thus exhibits economies of scale which also
justies why it is provided monopolistically.
The infrastructure provider is bound to supply all units that are demanded at
the regulated, linear access price pI  cI .63 Regulation is necessary to avoid strong
anticompetitive e¤ects due to the monopolistic provision of the infrastructure good.
The assumption of linear access prices is crucial for the results of our study but also
realistic: the literature on regulation emphasizes that non-linear pricing schemes (e.g.
a two-part tari¤) have inferior properties with respect to demand risks. Two-part
tari¤s usually shift the risk on the downstream rms by imposing a xed charge.
This disadvantages smaller and thus nancially weaker downstream competitors. The
problem is aggravated in network industries where xed costs represent a particularly
large fraction of total infrastructure costs. Also, two-part tari¤s lend themselves better
to discrimination as tra¢ c-independent and rm-specic payments are more di¢ cult to
monitor for regulators. Discrimination favoring the incumbent operator could therefore
62For simplicity we normalize the factor of proportionality to one results generalize to other xed
proportions relationships.
63The access price is also non-discriminatory as the same price is charged to any downstream rm,
including the a¢ liate of a potentially integrated rm.
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be maintained.64 Besides considering only linear access prices, we assume that these
cannot be conditioned on investments, presuming that infrastructure quality and cost
characteristics cannot be contracted upon for reasons of veriability.65
There are n downstream rms, indexed j 2 f1; :::; ng that o¤er their services
directly to consumers but require the infrastructure as an input. The nal product
is homogeneous and rms compete in quantities, qj, à la Cournot. The downstream
industry thus captures oligopolistic competition where rms are endowed with some
market power.66 The marginal cost of providing the downstream service is symmetric
and normalized to zero so that the only cost that downstream producers incur, stems
from buying the infrastructure good at the per unit price pI . Downstream rms face
an inverse demand function p(Q), with Q =
Pn
j=1 qj. Throughout this chapter, we
assume conditions that ensure existence of a quantity Q > 0 such that P (Q) > 0 for
all Q < Q and P (Q) = 0 for all Q > Q. To guarantee existence and uniqueness in the
Cournot game we make use of the Hahn-Novshek assumptions which are equivalent
to assuming that outputs are strategic substitutes.67 Here, we restrict attention to a
linear demand specication for reasons of tractability. Although some results general-
ize to other types of demand functions, the linear case is needed to derive closed form
solutions. This allows us to better illustrate e¤ects at work and to investigate impli-
cations for welfare. The linear inverse demand function takes the following simple form:
p(Q) = a  bQ (3.1)
with a > pI being the maximum willingness to pay and b being the slope of the inverse
demand function which we normalize to b = 1.
In our model, investment into infrastructure is undertaken by the owner and can
take two distinct forms. First, the infrastructure owner can invest into cost-reduction,
h, to lower the marginal cost of providing the infrastructure from cI to cI  h. Second,
the infrastructure owner can invest k to enhance the quality of infrastructure. This
increases consumerswillingness to pay for every unit of the service from a to a + k.
64In fact, many countries have abolished two-part tari¤s as the access pricing scheme for this reason.
An example is the German rail sector. By contrast, regulators in the US and Canada have allowed rail
infrastructure operators to apply two-part tari¤s when charging for access. Compare Pittman (2003)
for a discussion.
65This is a standard assumption as, for example, in La¤ont and Tirole (1993), chapter 4.
66This could be modeled similarly within a framework of di¤erentiated goods price or quantity
competition. Compare Martin (2002) for a discussion.
67Although the assumptions mentioned are not restrictive in basic models, existence cannot be
taken for granted (compare e.g. Novshek (1985)).
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This type of investment implies a parallel shift out of the demand function. Note
that both types of investments are fully equivalent for quantity decisions in a Cournot
model without vertical structure.68 However, the vertical structure causes distinct
incentive e¤ects for each investment type: cost-reducing investments accrue directly
at the upstream level, a¤ecting the infrastructure providers cost function. They
benet downstream rms and consumers only indirectly if access prices are adjusted
downwards. In contrast, benets from quality-increasing investments accrue at the
downstream level by a¤ecting the demand of the nal product.69 We assume quadratic
cost functions for both types of investments where  and  are the respective marginal
cost parameters70.
The time structure of the game is as follows. At stage 1 the regulator chooses
and commits to a linear access price pI that every downstream rm pays for the
units of infrastructure demanded. At stage 2, the (upstream) infrastructure owner,
rm I, chooses the investment levels into infrastructure, k and h. In the third stage,
each downstream rm simultaneously chooses the quantity qj which determines the
total quantity produced, Q. Also, the nal goods price, p(Q), and the associated
infrastructure demand and prots result in stage 3.
Figure 3.1: Time Structure of the Model
68For a simplied graphical illustration see Appendix, Section 3.8.1.
69Note further that investments considered here are also di¤erent to those considered in the well-
known free-riding problem with respect to downstream services, as described in Motta (2004). There,
the downstream rms invest in quality and since the resulting increase in utility can be appropriated
by both, the investor as well as its competitors, underinvestment will obtain. Similarly, investments
in our model are also distinct to cost-reducing investments as in dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
Also, we do not model synergies and/or complementarities between up- and downstream investments.
70The quadratic cost functions (C(k); C(h)) fulll the desired and realistic properties that C(h =
0) = 0, C(k = 0) = 0, C 0(h = 0) = 0, C 0(k = 0) = 0 and C 00(k) > 0, C 00(h) > 0 for k > 0, h > 0.
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In a further step, one could also endogenize the choice of vertical structure by
introducing a stage 0 where the government institution decides on implementing either
of the vertical structures. In fact, this is the aim of our discussion using comparative
statics in Section 3.5. We now proceed by rst analyzing the equilibrium under vertical
integration (VI). Here, the infrastructure owner, rm I, is also active in the downstream
services sector through its downstream a¢ liate, rm i.
3.3 Vertical Integration
3.3.1 Cost-Reducing Investments
At stage 3, there are n   1 symmetric competitors and the a¢ liate of the vertically
integrated rm that compete in quantities on the downstream market. The prot
maximization problem of the vertically integrated rm is:
I = (pI   (cI   h))(Q I + qI) + (P (Q)  pI)qI   
2
h2   F (3.2)
whereQ I is the total quantity provided but excluding the a¢ liates output, qi  qI .
The rst term characterizes the access prots when paid in a non-discriminatory way
by all downstream rms. The second term constitutes the prots of the downstream
a¢ liate. Note that the access charges for the downstream a¢ liate of the integrated
rm cancel out in the prot function because they are a pure transfer. One can
therefore re-write the above prot function as:
I = (pI   (cI   h))(Q I) + (P (Q)  (cI   h))qI   
2
h2   F . (3.3)
This formalization shows that the vertically integrated rm faces an e¤ectively
lower marginal cost, (cI   h), of providing the service to consumers. It also reveals
that the double marginalization problem is solved for those units that are sold through
the downstream a¢ liate of the vertically integrated rm which improves e¢ ciency. It
facilitates recouping the infrastructure costs through access revenues and downstream
a¢ liates prots. The optimality condition with respect to quantity thus requires71:
71The FOC reveals that access revenues do not directly a¤ect the best response of the integrated
rm. This is intuitively surprising. After all, access revenues obtained through competitors seeking
infrastructure access represent a kind of opportunity cost. Combining the FOCs for equilibrium
quantities introduces this trade-o¤ indirectly.
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@I
@qI
= (P (Q)  (cI   h)) + @P (Q)
@qI
qI = 0.
For the case of linear demand, the best response calculates as:
qI =
a Q I   (cI   h)
2
: (3.4)
A representative rm j of the n  1 downstream competitors makes prots:
j = (a Q  pI)qj 8j 6= i:
The corresponding FOC after imposing symmetry on rivals is:
qj =
a  qI   pI
n
8j 6= i. (3.5)
Combining equations (3.4) and (3.5) yields the unique Nash equilibrium quantities:
qI =
a+ (n  1)pI   n(cI   h)
n+ 1
qj =
a+ (cI   h)  2pI
n+ 1
8j 6= i.
The total quantity provided is:
QCR;V I =
an  (n  1)pI   (cI   h)
n+ 1
(3.6)
and is therefore decreasing in the access price pI .72 As the access price and the mark-up
increase, the a¢ liates competitive advantage and its output increase (@qI
@pI
> 0). How-
ever, the competitors downscale ( @qj
@pI
< 0) by more and thus total output decreases.
Stronger downstream competition, n, in contrast, increases total quantity.73 The
72This also implies that an ine¢ cient (lax) regulator that allows a "too high" access price causes
to "too low" quantities. If there were di¤erences in e¢ ciency of regulation under vertical integration
and vertical separation, this would impact our comparison. We assume those e¤ects are absent.
73Quantity also decreases in marginal costs. It is a feature of the Cournot model that total quantity
depends only on the sum of marginal costs.
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associated equilibrium market price is:
pCR;V I =
a+ (cI   h) + (n  1)pI
n+ 1
(3.7)
and is increasing in marginal costs but decreasing in the amount of investment in
cost-reduction, h, and the intensity of competition downstream, n.74
At stage 2, the vertically integrated infrastructure provider decides on investment
into cost-reduction. The rm anticipates downstream demand and takes the access
price as given. The presence of the a¢ liate in the downstream market has important
implications for competition but also for investment incentives. The prot of the
infrastructure provider can be decomposed into an upstream prot contribution, a
downstream prot contribution and a cost component which jointly drive the incentives
to invest into cost-reduction:
I = (pI   (cI   h))(Q I + qI)| {z }
upstream prot contribution
+ (pCR;V I   pI)qI| {z }
downstream prot contribution
  
2
h2   F .| {z }
cost term
Re-writing illustrates that the e¤ective marginal cost of the a¢ liate is given by
cI   h:
I = (pI   (cI   h))(Q I) + (pCR;V I   (cI   h))qI   
2
h2   F .
The rst order condition shows that investment incentives into cost-reduction under
vertical integration are made up of the following four e¤ects:
@I
@h
= (QCR;V I I )| {z }
rivalsaccess margin e¤ect
+ (pI   (cI   h))(@Q I
@h
)| {z }
rivalsaccess quantity e¤ect
(3.8)
+(
@pCR;V I
@Q
@Q
@h
+ 1)qI| {z }
a¢ liate margin e¤ect
+ (pCR;V I   (cI   h))@qI
@h| {z }
a¢ liate quantity e¤ect
  h.
 rivalsaccess margin e¤ect: An increase in cost-reducing investments, increases
the e¤ective access margin per unit of output that the infrastructure owner re-
74As we assume away any downstream xed costs of production or other scale economies, there are
no economic costs of increasing the number of competitors downstream.
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ceives from its rivals. Revenues from investment into cost-reduction are larger,
the larger is this downstream demand, QCR;V I I .
 rivals access quantity e¤ect: Cost-reducing investments do not directly a¤ect
the cost function of downstream rivals and their supplied quantity. The rivals
marginal cost pI is exogenous to changes in costs of infrastructure provision as
long as the access price cannot be conditioned on investments. However, there
is an indirect, strategic e¤ect through competition. An increase in cost-reducing
investments lowers the a¢ liates e¤ective marginal cost and therefore alters not
only the optimal quantity of the a¢ liate but also through strategic interaction
the quantity o¤ered by rivals. This e¤ect is negative as upstream revenues from
access fall through the shift in production.
 a¢ liate margin e¤ect: The third e¤ect examines the overall impact on the mark-
up of the a¢ liate. There are two e¤ects: The price e¤ect which is always negative
the lower marginal cost reduces the market price through an increase in total
quantity provided. However, there is a second e¤ect. Investments also reduce
the marginal cost of the downstream a¢ liate which then tends to increase the
downstream mark-up of the a¢ liate. Hence, the overall e¤ect depends on the
relative size of the two e¤ects. The rst e¤ect is generically larger. For linear
demand, for example, the a¢ liate margin e¤ect is:   1
n+1
+ 1 > 0.
 a¢ liate quantity e¤ect: An increase in cost-reducing investments also increases
the quantity supplied by the downstream a¢ liate as its e¤ective marginal cost
is lowered. The increased output implies higher prots as not only the quantity
supplied increases but also the margin the a¢ liate receives on every unit (compare
a¢ liate margin e¤ect). This fourth e¤ect is hence unambiguously positive.
When considering how much to invest, the vertically integrated rm trades o¤
the e¤ects stemming from both, access and downstream prot contributions. A cost-
reducing investment increases the a¢ liates downstream revenues as the competitive
advantage over the rivals increases (the a¢ liate quantity and a¢ liate margin e¤ects).
Not only the a¢ liates output increases but also the total quantity provided to con-
sumers. On the upstream component, investments also cause a negative e¤ect, the
rivalsaccess quantity e¤ect. Due to the weakened position of the competitors they
supply less of the nal product and also demand less of the infrastructure good. This
e¤ect is countervailed as the rivalsaccess margin increases with investments for all
units of infrastructure sold to competitors. If the regulated access price cannot be
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made contingent on these investments, the benets of investments in cost-reduction
are specic to the integrated rm and do, in fact, harm competitors through more
competitive pressure from the a¢ liate.75 In sum, cost-reducing investments increase
total supply, result in lower prices for consumers and thus boost e¢ ciency.
For the reference case of linear demand, we obtain the following prot-maximizing
level of cost-reducing investments:
hCR;V I =
(n+ 1)2(a  pI)  2(a+ cI   2pI)
(n+ 1)2   2
Note that the SOC is fullled if  > 2
(n+1)2
which also guarantees that the denom-
inator of the above expression is positive.76 The comparative statics of interest are
with respect to the access price pI and the intensity of downstream competition, n.
We derive the following expression:
@hCR;V I
@pI
=   (n+ 1)
2   4
(n+ 1)2    2 < 0.
Corollary 3.1 Under vertical integration and with linear demand, optimal cost-
reducing investments are decreasing in the access price.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The intuition for this result is two-fold. On the one hand, the increase in the
access price makes competitors less e¢ cient. Consequently, the downstream a¢ liate
gains market share. This implies, however, that cost-reducing investments are less
e¤ective at winning additional downstream sales through investments. Moreover, the
demand for access to infrastructure decreases as the downstream competitors produce
less. Thus, incentive e¤ects through access revenues are also dampened, decreasing the
incentives to invest into cost-reduction.
We now examine the comparative statics with respect to the intensity of downstream
competition:
75In this respect, cost-reducing investments cause similar relative competitive changes as cost-
increasing sabotage. However, whereas the investments into cost-reduction increase e¢ ciency through
an e¤ectively lower marginal cost on the sales through the a¢ liate, cost-increasing sabotage increases
the costs of all rivals, harming e¢ ciency. With respect to upstream revenues, both forms of intervention
by the upstream rm cause a decrease in access demand of rivals.
76We further require that cost-reducing investments are not larger than ex ante marginal costs
(cI   h)  0 for e¤ective marginal costs to remain non-negative:  > (a pI)(n+1)
2 2(a 2pI)
cI(n+1)
2 .
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@hCR;V I
@n
= 4
(n+ 1) (pI   a+ (a+ cI   2pI))
((n+ 1)2   2)2 > 0.
Corollary 3.2 Under vertical integration and with linear demand, cost-reducing in-
vestments are increasing in the intensity of downstream competition, n.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
A higher number of downstream competitors reduces the margin of these rms,
increases total output and thus results in higher demand for infrastructure. As cost-
reducing investments increase the margin on these, investment becomes more desirable.
Also, as downstream competition becomes ercer and tends to erode the a¢ liates
market share, cost-reducing investments can re-establish a cost-di¤erence between the
a¢ liate and the symmetric competition downstream. Moreover, they increase access
revenues as the access price remains unchanged.77
We now turn to stage 1 in which the regulator sets the welfare-optimal access
price. The sustainability of the industry structure requires a positive access margin
to cover any upstream xed and investment costs and therefore inevitably introduces
competitive distortions. Only if the regulator were to set an access price pI that reects
the true marginal cost of infrastructure provision, pI = (cI h), competitive distortions
could be avoided.78 However, as the access price cannot be contracted upon investment
this is not feasible.79 Neither would this access price be able to recoup the xed costs.
Although the distortion is socially undesirable, it cannot be avoided here if there are
no other sources of nancing the costs associated with infrastructure provision.
With investment incentives into cost-reduction decreasing in the access price and
competitive distortions increasing, intuition suggests that the regulator should seek to
keep the access price at the lowest level feasible. When the objective function is social
welfare, this lowest value is mainly pinned down by the size of upstream xed costs
that need to be recouped to allow the integrated infrastructure provider to earn his
reservation prot.80 The social welfare measure for an access price pI is given by the
sum of producer and consumer surplus:
77The proof of the above corollary relies on the condition that  > a pIa+cI 2pI . This condition must
hold in equilibrium as it ensures that competitorsprots are non-negative. It establishes a bound
on the e¤ectiveness of investments. If investments were cheaper, the vertically integrated rm could
use them to drive competitors o¤ the market. Note that this condition is not fully exogenous. The
regulator can inuence the range of parameters for competitors being protable.
78Downstream rms would then be fully symmetric.
79We assume that the lowest access price that can be set is marginal cost cI .
80For the reservation prot there are two conceivable benchmarks. The rst is given by a zero-
prot condition. This would be the relevant benchmark if the infrastructure provider was (for historical
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WCR;V I = CS + I + (n  1)j
WCR;V I =
((n  1) (a  pI) +  (n+ 1) (n(a  pI) + pI   cI))2
2
 
 (n+ 1)2   22
+
(a  pI)2 (n2 + 2n  3) + 2((a+ cI   2pI)2 + (n+ 1)2 (pI   cI) (a  pI))
2
 
 (n+ 1)2   2
 F + (n  1) (n+ 1)2 ( a+ pI + (a+ cI   2pI))
2 
 (n+ 1)2   22 .
Proposition 3.1 Under vertical integration with cost-reducing investments and linear
demand, welfare is falling in the access price (if pI > cI). Thus, a welfare maximizing
regulator chooses the smallest mark-up and access price that guarantees the vertically
integrated rm its reservation prots.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The proof also reveals that the individual welfare components depict intuitive com-
parative statics. The integrated rms prot is generically increasing in the access price
and competitorsprots and consumer surplus falling in the access price.81 The above
proposition urges the regulator to choose a low access price as this is not only im-
portant for the competitive e¢ ciency of the vertical structure but also for investment
incentives into cost-reduction. The proposition thus reveals that there is no trade-o¤
between allocative and productive e¢ ciency for cost-reducing investments. This is par-
ticularly important when costs of the associated investments are rather low, i.e. when
 is small. In such an industry where cost-reducing investments into infrastructure are
cheap, i.e. an industry that is a¢ ne to cost-reduction, and where these are important
for its e¢ ciency, the regulator should be especially cautious not to increase the access
price excessively.
reasons) an incumbent provider and if there was no competition about who would be in charge of
running the infrastructure. The second feasible benchmark is the prot of the downstream competitors.
This would be relevant if there was a prior stage where rms could bid for being charged with the
infrastructure provision; we go with the second idea.
81The condition that guarantees that the prots of the vertically integrated rm are not increasing
in the access price, pI , is again given by the non-negativity condition for rivalsprots. Thus, it can
never be the case that investments in cost-reduction are so cheap that they overrule the e¤ect of an
increase in access price on the prot of the vertically integrated rm.
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3.3.2 Quality-Increasing Investments
We now examine the incentives of a vertically integrated rm to invest into quality-
enhancing technology for its infrastructure. We proceed along the lines of Section
3.3.1.
The prot function of the vertically integrated rm now takes the following form
for the general inverse demand function P (k;Q):
I = (pI   cI)(Q I + qI) + (P (k;Q)  pI)qI   
2
k2   F .
In contrast to cost-reducing investments which a¤ect the cost function of the in-
frastructure provider, quality-enhancing investments into infrastructure a¤ect the de-
mand by increasing the willingness to pay of consumers for a unit of the good or service.
As the access charges cannot be made contingent upon the amount invested into qual-
ity, the impact of investment emerges mainly at the downstream level. However, there
are add-on e¤ects for infrastructure demand. We re-write the above prot function as:
I = (pI   cI)(Q I) + (P (k;Q)  cI)qI   
2
k2   F .
The e¤ective marginal cost of the downstream a¢ liate now remains equal to the cost
of infrastructure provision, cI . Thus, quality-increasing investments do not translate
into a competitive advantage at the downstream level. The rst order condition is then
given by:
@I
@qI
= (P (k;Q)  cI) + @P (k;Q)
@qI
= 0.
Solving the FOC for the case of linear demand yields the following best response
function:
qI =
a+ k   cI   (n  1)qj
2
. (3.9)
A representative rm j out of the n  1 downstream competitors makes prots of:
j = (a+ k  Q  pI)qj 8j 6= i.
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Maximizing and imposing symmetry gives the corresponding best response:
qj =
a+ k   pI   qI
n
8j 6= i. (3.10)
Combining equations (3.9) and (3.10) yields the unique Nash equilibrium output levels
in terms of quality-increasing investments k:
qI =
a+ k + (n  1)pI   ncI
n+ 1
qj =
a+ k + cI   2pI
n+ 1
8j 6= i.
Under quality-increasing investments all rms increase the quantity supplied to
consumers in response to the quality-increase by the same amount, k
n+1
. The investor
is not able to exclude its rivals from beneting from the quality-increasing investments.
As all rms expand their output with higher investment into quality-increases, also the
total quantity supplied unambiguously increases as under cost-reducing investments.
The total quantity supplied is given by:
QQI;V I =
(a+ k)n  (n  1)pI   cI
n+ 1
.
The total quantity o¤ered also increases in the intensity of downstream competition,
n, and decreases in the sum of marginal costs for downstream rms like under cost-
reducing investments. In contrast to the market price under cost-reducing investments,
which was decreasing in the amount of infrastructure investment, the market price
under quality-increasing investments is ceteris paribus increasing in investments:
pQI;V I =
a+ k + cI + (n  1)pI
n+ 1
.
It is important to record that consumers do not only face higher prices but also
get a higher quality of what they buy. This is in line with the results of a simple,
non-vertical, competition model with cost-reducing and quality-increasing investments
as illustrated in Section 3.8.1 of the Appendix. In fact, the quality increase causes
more consumers to buy the good or service even though the price is higher compared
to the case without investments: QQI;V I(k > 0) > QQI;V I(k = 0). Consumer surplus
increases for the same reason when positive quality investments are undertaken.
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At stage 2, the vertically integrated infrastructure provider determines how much to
invest into the quality of the infrastructure. In contrast to cost-reducing investments,
the benets of quality-increasing investments into infrastructure are not rm-specic
to the investor but trigger a shift out of the demand function faced by all rms.82 As
the gains arise in the downstream sector, the benets from investment can only be
reaped indirectly by the investor or through the downstream subsidiary. Competitors
free-ride on the investment of the vertically integrated rm.
As before, the prot of the infrastructure provider can be decomposed into the up-
stream prot contribution, the downstream prot contribution and a cost component:
I = (pI   cI)(Q I + qI)| {z }
upstream prot contribution
+ (pQI;V I   pI)qI| {z }
downstream prot contribution
  
2
k2   F| {z }
cost term
I = (pI   cI)(Q I(k)) + (pQI;V I(k)  cI)qI(k)  
2
k2   F .
The general rst order condition shows that investment incentives under vertical
integration consist of three distinct components:
@I
@k
= (pI   cI)@Q I(k)
@k| {z }
rivalsaccess quantity e¤ect
(3.11)
+
@pQI;V I(k)
@k
qI(k)| {z }
a¢ liate margin e¤ect
+ (pQI;V I(k)  cI)@qI(k)
@k| {z }
a¢ liate quantity e¤ect
  k. (3.12)
The following can be said about the direction and intuition of these e¤ects:
 rivalsaccess quantity e¤ect: The higher quality induces higher output of com-
petitors which in turn increases the total demand for access to infrastructure.
This e¤ect considers only the impact on prots through higher output supplied
by competitors downstream. Increased revenues are made up of increased access
82Thus, e¤ects of quality-enhancing investment are distinct to those from quality-decreasing sab-
otage. There, the literature assumes that the worsened quality is specic to rivals. It thus gives
the acting rm a relative quality advantage. Under quality-enhancing investments a similar relative
advantage may also be introduced by a regulator if he distorts downstream competition by increasing
the access price over marginal cost. In so far as this is necessary to make the infrastructure quality
provision sustainable, it is again the vertically integrated rm that benets more.
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units (@Q I(k)
@k
) that each contribute the access margin. However, this e¤ect van-
ishes if the regulator sets an access charge equal to marginal cost. For a positive
access margin, the e¤ect is positive.
 a¢ liate margin e¤ect: The market price also increases in response to investments
in quality along with the consumerswillingness to pay. This e¤ect increases
revenues for every unit sold through the downstream a¢ liate of the vertically
integrated rm. The infrastructure investor only considers the e¤ect on own
prots and not on the rivals. Nevertheless, this e¤ect is positive and remains so
even for a zero access margin.
 a¢ liate quantity e¤ect: This last term examines the e¤ect of an increased quality
on the a¢ liates output. It is thus similar to the rst term, however, it carries a
higher "weight". While every other rm contributes the margin of (pI   cI) for
every unit produced downstream (through access revenues), the a¢ liate sells at
the higher margin of (pQI;V I(k) cI). Note also that the market price the a¢ liate
receives on every unit rises with increased quality investments as well. Thus, the
third e¤ect is positive as well.
Let us illustrate the combined e¤ects using the linear demand function. The prot-
maximizing level of quality-increasing investments is given by:
kQI;V I =
(pI   cI) (n+ 1)2 + 2(a+ cI   2pI)
 (n+ 1)2   2 .
Note that the SOC is fullled if  > 2
(n+1)2
.83 The SOC thus also guarantees non-
negativity of investments. In fact, there will always be positive investments into quality,
even if the access price equals marginal cost, i.e. pI = cI . The reason is the presence
of the a¢ liate in the downstream market. The a¢ liate quantity and a¢ liate margin
e¤ect remain positive even when there are no access revenues to be made. However,
the e¤ects can become rather small when the intensity of downstream competition
increases. With a positive access margin and a higher access price, the rivalsaccess
quantity e¤ect increases investments further.
Examining the comparative statics properties of quality-increasing investments with
respect to access price and intensity of downstream competition, we nd that both,
83If  < 2
(n+1)2
a quality-escalation strategy of the vertically integrated rm is protable and prots
are maximized for innite investments. We therefore restrict attention to  > 2
(n+1)2
.
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the marginal protability of quality-increasing investments and also the optimal level
of investments, increase in the regulated access price pI .84 The above hypothesis is
conrmed analytically:
@kQI;V I
@pI
=
(n+ 1)2   4
(n+ 1)2   2 > 0.
Corollary 3.3 Under vertical integration and with linear demand, quality-enhancing
investments are increasing in the regulatory access price pI .
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The infrastructure investor trades o¤ the above mentioned positive e¤ects against
the costs of investment. An increased access margin implies a stronger rivalsaccess
quantity e¤ect. Although the quantity of competitors decreases in the access price,
this is more than outweighed by the increase in the access margin (at least for small
access margins pI   cI). At the same time, the market share of the downstream a¢ l-
iate increases which implies that more of the benets from investment go directly to
the vertically integrated rm and consequently the rm will invest more (the a¢ liate
quantity e¤ect). With a high number of competitors, the rivalsaccess quantity e¤ect
is the main driver for investments. For a given intensity of competition, n, a higher ac-
cess price improves the competitive position of the a¢ liate on the downstream market
which dampens free-riding e¤ects and boosts investments further.
Corollary 3.4 Under vertical integration and with linear demand, quality-increasing
investments are decreasing in the intensity of downstream competition, n.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
@kQI;V I
@n
=  4(n+ 1) (pI   cI + (a+ cI   2pI))
((n+ 1)2   2)2 < 0
With more intense competition downstream, the a¢ liate prots less from any in-
vestment into quality-increases. The contribution of both, the a¢ liate margin and
the a¢ liate quantity e¤ect are marginalized with erce downstream competition, i.e.
with large n. The e¤ect of increased upstream infrastructure demand due to stronger
84This result holds for all values of the access prices up to the independent (upstream) monopoly
price pI = a+cI2 at which competitors would no longer produce positive output levels (Q I = 0).
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competition cannot overrule the weakened incentives due to ercer competition that
reduce investment incentives as the downstream margins shrink.85
The e¤ect of changes in the access price on welfare is not readily determined. On
the one hand, investments into quality-increases are enhanced with a higher access
price which improves welfare. On the other hand, a higher access price causes dou-
ble marginalization and the resulting competitive distortions lower welfare.86 We can
understand the overall e¤ect by exploring the social welfare function:
WQI;V I = CS + I + (n  1)j
WQI;V I =
((n+ 2) (n  1) (pI   cI) +  (n+ 1) (n(a  pI) + pI   cI))2
2
 
 (n+ 1)2   22
+
(pI   cI)2 (n+ 3) (n  1) + 2((a+ cI   2pI)2 + (n+ 1)2 (pI   cI) (a  pI))
2( (n+ 1)2   2)
 F + (n  1) (n+ 1)2 (pI   cI + (a+ cI   2pI))
2 
 (n+ 1)2   22 .
Proposition 3.2 Under vertical integration with quality-increasing investments and
linear demand, welfare may be increasing in the access price (if pI > cI). Thus, a
welfare maximizing regulator may choose a mark-up over marginal cost even if this is
not required to meet reservation prots of the integrated rm.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
Corollary 3.5 Under vertical integration with quality-increasing investments, con-
sumer surplus may be increasing in the access price (if pI > cI). Thus, a regulator
that maximizes consumer surplus may choose a positive mark-up over marginal cost
even if this is not required to meet reservation prots of the integrated rm.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
85Note that the comparative statics with respect to access price and number of competitors have
important joint implications for policy. A decrease in the regulated access price reduces quality
investments per se (as shown). In addition, lower access prices would cause more entry if entry was
endogenous (because prots to be gained are higher). More intense competition would then reinforce
the above e¤ect, weakening investment incentives further.
86In fact, by setting the access price to pI = cI , the regulator can ensure competition on equal
grounds and mitigate the double marginalization problem fully. However, as xed costs need to be
recouped this will generically not be sustainable.
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The intuition for the above results is straightforward. Increases in the access prices
may be undesirable under quite general conditions and without investments into quality
as they distort downstream competition and raise downstream prices that consumers
pay. However, with quality-increasing investments, higher access prices also stimu-
late quality investments. Thus, although consumers su¤er from increased downstream
prices, this is countervailed by an increase in the quality of the infrastructure and the
service that consumers get. In fact, even though the price of the intermediate input
is increased (the access price), which in turn increases downstream prices, consumers
are better o¤ due to investments. Therefore, positive access margins may be socially
desirable in an environment where quality-increasing investments are important for
e¢ ciency (e.g. if they are relatively cheap, i.e. if  is small enough). Of course, this is
important for policy and we will discuss consequences in Section 3.5.
3.4 Vertical Separation
We now investigate the performance of a vertically separated industry structure (VS)
and compare it against the vertically integrated structure examined in Section 3.3.
Here, the infrastructure provider invests but is independent and therefore not active on
the downstream market. Under vertical separation, we assume that the infrastructure
owner nances investment and infrastructure costs through access revenues only.
3.4.1 Cost-Reducing Investments
At stage 3, n symmetric rms compete downstream in quantities taking the investment
decision, h, and the access price, pI , as given. All downstream rms face symmetric
prot maximization problems of the form:
j = (P (Q)  pI)qj.
The rst order condition for a prot maximum requires
@j
@qj
= (p(Q)  pI) + @p
@Q
qj = 0.
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which each downstream rm produces a
quantity of qCR;V Sj and total output is given by Q = n  qCR;V Sj . In the case of linear
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demand (see equation (3.1)), we nd the symmetric Cournot quantities of:
qCR;V Sj =
a  pI
n+ 1
.
The total quantity provided is thus QCR;V S = n  a pI
n+1
and the market price is given
by:
pCR;V S=
a+ npI
n+ 1
.
Cost-reducing investments do not impact downstream competition as long as the
access price cannot be conditioned on h. Clearly, an increase in the access price is equiv-
alent to an increase in marginal costs and hence decreases total output and increases
the market price. In contrast, an increase in the number of downstream competitors,
n, increases total output and lowers downstream mark-ups and the market price. Note
that compared to total quantity and market price under vertical integration (equations
(3.6) and (3.7)) the market price is weakly higher under vertical separation and the
quantity weakly lower for any given access price pI . This is simply because of the better
e¢ ciency properties of vertical integration which avoids some of the double marginal-
ization. For this reason also the access price needed to recover xed costs upstream is
higher under vertical separation.
At stage 2 of the game, the upstream infrastructure provider chooses how much
to invest into cost-reduction. It takes the access price pI as given and anticipates the
above demand for stage 3. The upstream infrastructure provider maximizes:
I = (pI   (cI   h))QCR;V S   
2
h2   F .
where under linear demand QCR;V S = n a pI
n+1
. The FOC yields the following optimality
condition:
@I
@h
= QCR;V S   h = 0. (3.13)
 access margin e¤ect: Cost-reducing investments increase the margin on every
unit sold. The infrastructure provider raises revenues per unit of output by h on
QCR;V S units. The more units are sold downstream, i.e. the larger QCR;V S, the
more investments into cost-reduction pay o¤. Note that there is one di¤erence
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to the e¤ect under vertical integration. Whereas here, the infrastructure investor
considers the output of all downstream rms and weights them equally, the ef-
fect is weighted di¤erently under vertical integration due to the presence of the
a¢ liate in the downstream market. Under vertical integration the corresponding
counterpart is the rst term in equation (3.8).
Thus, under vertical separation, the infrastructure providers incentives to invest in
cost-reduction stem solely from an increased margin. Note that there is no additional
e¤ect of h inuencing the actual total quantity produced (@Q
CR;V S
@h
= 0) as the access
price is set by a regulator and it is set independently of the e¤ective marginal cost
resulting from cost-reducing investment.
For linear demand, the prot-maximizing level of cost-reducing investments is:
hCR;V S =
n
n+ 1
 a  pI

.
The SOC is thus fullled for any  > 0.87 The comparative statics properties of
cost-reducing investments are similar to those under vertical integration:
@hCR;V S
@pI
=   n
 (n+ 1)
< 0.
Corollary 3.6 Under vertical separation and with linear demand investments into
cost-reduction also decrease in the regulatory access price, pI .
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The intuition works through the access margin e¤ect.88 The strength of this e¤ect
depends only on the quantity demanded downstream. Thus, a decrease in the access
price spurs demand downstream and also the demand for infrastructure. Cost-reducing
investments thus exhibit a greater benet when downstream demand is strong. This
is also the intuition behind the comparative statics of cost-reducing investments with
respect to intensity of competition downstream:
@hCR;V S
@n
=
a  pI
 (n+ 1)2
> 0.
87To ensure that cost-reducing investments do not surpass marginal costs cI , we further need
 > nn+1
a pI
cI
.
88Because the access margin e¤ect stems solely from the positive downstream demand, the above
proposition holds for general demand functions that are not a function of h itself.
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Corollary 3.7 Under vertical separation and with linear demand investments into
cost-reduction also increase in the intensity of downstream competition, n.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
Although comparative statics are qualitatively the same as under vertical integra-
tion, they di¤er quantitatively. Some of the e¤ects under vertical integration (equation
(3.8)) are absent under vertical separation.89 Comparing the investment incentives into
cost-reduction under vertical separation with those under vertical integration, we nd:
Proposition 3.3 Infrastructure investment incentives for cost-reduction are stronger
under vertical integration than under vertical separation for any access price, pI , when
demand is linear.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
Whereas the investment incentives under vertical separation are solely due to the
access margin e¤ect there are additional e¤ects boosting the investment into cost-
reduction under vertical integration. Specically, cost-reducing investments improve
the competitive position of the downstream a¢ liate under vertical integration. Fur-
thermore, an additional e¤ect under vertical integration arises through avoiding double
marginalization which increases total output. Overall, investments into cost-reduction
are hence lower under vertical separation.
The regulator chooses the access price to maximize the following total welfare ex-
pression:
WCR;V S =
n (a  pI)
2
 2(a  cI) + n(a  pI) + n(a+ pI   2cI)
 (n+ 1)2
  F .
Proposition 3.4 Under vertical separation with cost-reducing investments and linear
demand, welfare is falling in the access price (if pI > cI). Thus, a welfare maximizing
regulator which can commit to access prices chooses the smallest mark-up and access
price that guarantees the infrastructure provider its reservation prots.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
89In particular, investments in cost-reduction decrease less with an increase in the access price
under vertical separation as compared to vertical integration.
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An increase in the access price is again socially undesirable for two reasons: it
increases the competitive distortion as the associated mark-up over marginal cost causes
double marginalization. In addition, it also lowers investment incentives into cost-
reduction. The regulator thus faces no trade-o¤ in the case of cost-reducing investments
as both, the investment incentives and e¢ cient production are stimulated through
an access price that is the lowest feasible. The regulator must only guarantee the
sustainability of infrastructure provision.90
3.4.2 Quality-Increasing Investments
We proceed analogously to the previous subsection to investigate the incentives for
quality-increasing investments under vertical separation. At stage 3, the symmetric
downstream rms compete in quantities, taking investments, k, and the access price,
pI , as given.
j = (p(Q; k)  pI)qj
The rst order condition for a prot maximum requires:
@j
@qj
= (p(k;Q)  pI) + @p
@Q
qj = 0.
In the unique Nash equilibrium each downstream rm produces a quantity of qQI;V Sj
and total output is given by QQI;V S = n  qQI;V Sj . An increase in the access price
decreases total output and increases the market price. However, an increase in the
number of downstream competitors, n, increases total output and lowers downstream
mark-ups and the market price. In the case of linear demand we nd:
qQI;V Sj =
a+ k   pI
n+ 1
.
Downstream demand thus depends directly on the investments of the infrastructure
provider. The total quantity is given by QQI;V S = na+k pI
n+1
and the market price is
pQI;V S = a+k+npI
n+1
.
90For the infrastructure providers prot to be non-decreasing in the access price we again require
investments to be su¢ ciently costly, i.e.  > n(a pI)(n+1)(a+cI 2pI) .
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At stage 2 of the game, the upstream infrastructure provider chooses how much to
invest in quality-enhancing technology taking the access price pI as given.
I = (pI   cI)QQI;V S   
2
k2   F
where QQI;V S = n  a+k pI
n+1
in case of linear demand. For optimality the FOC requires:
@I
@k
= (pI   cI)@Q
QI;V S
@k
  k = 0. (3.14)
Thus, under vertical separation, the infrastructure provider only invests if there is
a positive access margin that allows the investments to be recouped. The investment
incentives in quality-increases arise solely due to the following e¤ect:
 access quantity e¤ect: the infrastructure provider invests because for a given
positive access margin quality-enhancing investments lead to an expansion of
downstream quantity which, in turn, increases access demand. This e¤ect cor-
responds to the joint quantity e¤ects on a¢ liate and downstream rms under
vertical integration (compare equation (3.11)). However, under vertical integra-
tion the e¤ect working through competitors and a¢ liate had di¤erent weights,
i.e. margins, attached.
Again, quality-enhancing investments benet all downstream competitors through
higher prices. However, the investor cannot participate in these benets as the access
price does not respond to investments. Thus, e¤ects that stimulated additional invest-
ments through an increase in the margin downstream under vertical integration are no
longer present here.
For linear demand, the prot-maximizing level of quality-enhancing investments is:
kQI;V S =
n(pI   cI)
(n+ 1)
.
Note that the SOC is fullled for any  > 0 which also guarantees that investments
are not negative. The comparative statics with respect to the access price correspond
in direction to those under vertical integration:
@kQI;V S
@pI
=
n
 (n+ 1)
> 0.
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Corollary 3.8 Under vertical separation and with linear demand, quality-increasing
investments also increase in the regulatory access price, pI .
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The above e¤ect is, however, stronger under vertical integration. Thus, for every
marginal increase in the access price, investments in quality-enhancing technology in-
crease more under vertical integration than under vertical separation. In contrast to
quality investments under vertical integration, investments increase in the intensity of
downstream competition under vertical separation:
@kQI;V S
@n
=
pI   cI
 (n+ 1)2
> 0.
Corollary 3.9 Under vertical separation and with linear demand, quality-increasing
investments increase in the intensity of downstream competition, n.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
Under vertical separation, incentives to invest in quality of infrastructure are stim-
ulated solely because of the access quantity e¤ect which is enhanced by stronger down-
stream competition. In contrast, the incentives to invest in quality under vertical
integration arise primarily from the impact on the a¢ liates prot. This causes com-
parative statics to be diametrically opposed.
Overall, infrastructure investment incentives, also into quality, are weaker under
vertical separation than under vertical separation:
kQI;V I =
(pI   cI) (n+ 1)2 + 2(a+ cI   2pI)
 (n+ 1)2   2 >
n(pI   cI)
(n+ 1)
= kQI;V S.
Proposition 3.5 Infrastructure investment incentives for quality-increases are
stronger under vertical integration than under vertical separation for any given
access price pI , when demand is linear.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
Thus, as long as the downstream market under vertical integration is not perfectly
competitive, investment incentives are stronger under vertical integration.
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In stage 1, the regulator commits to an access price that maximizes the sum of
producer and consumer surplus. The welfare measure is:
WQI;V S =
n (pI   cI)
2
n(pI   cI) + 2(n+ 1)(a  pI)
 (n+ 1)2
+
n2 + 2n
2
(
n(pI   cI) + (n+ 1)(a  pI)
 (n+ 1)2
)2   F .
Proposition 3.6 Under vertical separation with quality-increasing investments, wel-
fare may be increasing in the access price (if pI > cI). Thus, a welfare maximizing
regulator may choose a mark-up over marginal cost even if this is not required to meet
reservation prots of the infrastructure provider.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The intuition for the result is similar to that under vertical integration. Whereas
the regulator wants to keep competitive distortions to a minimum by setting a low
access price, a higher access price stimulates investments into infrastructure quality.
Therefore, it may be socially desirable if investments are cheap enough to actually
increase the access price. An equivalent result holds for consumer surplus.
3.5 Welfare and Policy Implications
The above considerations illustrate that the regulator is left with a di¢ cult task. To
stimulate optimal competition and investment he can only deploy one policy instru-
ment, the (linear) access price pI . Clearly, it will therefore not be feasible to achieve
the rst-best outcome along all dimensions.
When considering competitive and investment e¢ ciency, the vertically integrated
structure performs better than the vertically separated one, especially if a positive
mark-up is necessary to recoup the xed costs of infrastructure provision.91 However,
even the vertically integrated structure does not achieve socially optimal infrastructure
investment levels:
91This result relies on the assumed absence of discriminatory action of the vertically integrated
rm and further assumes "e¢ cient" regulation.
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Proposition 3.7 Under vertical integration there is more infrastructure investment
into cost-reduction than under vertical separation. However, both fall short of the rst-
best investment levels (underinvestment).
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
At rst, this result may seem surprising. After all, the vertically integrated in-
frastructure provider does not only achieve the increased access margin through in-
vesting in cost-reduction but it also secures a competitive advantage of its a¢ liate over
downstream rivals. However, these incentives are surpassed by the social planners
incentives because he considers the impact on all downstream rmsprots and on the
consumers, in addition. In particular, a large social benet of investments is derived
from increased quantities being exchanged under the socially optimal price, p = cI h,
that is clearly lower than the competitive market price.92 In contrast, the vertically
integrated rm will not factor these benets in when investing but only considers the
impact on own prots. This result continues to hold for lower access prices despite the
fact that those stimulate investment incentives further (as shown in corollaries 3.1 and
3.6).
For quality-enhancing investments we derive an equivalent result:
Proposition 3.8 Under vertical integration there is more investment into infrastruc-
ture quality-increases than under vertical separation. However, both fall short of the
rst-best investment levels (underinvestment).
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The social planner again considers the full benets from increased quality invest-
ments on all market participants, including the integrated rms competitors and con-
sumers. Unlike the social planner, a vertically integrated infrastructure provider can
only recoup a fraction of these benets because competitors free-ride on infrastructure
quality investments. Therefore, it will underinvest. This result would collapse if the
vertically integrated rm was a monopolist and was allowed to perfectly price discrim-
inate at the downstream level. Only then, the investor could accrue all the social
benets of quality investments and would, in fact, invest optimally. Here, because we
assume linear access prices and competition downstream, the proposition continues to
92In fact, absent xed costs and investments, a social planner would set access prices below marginal
costs to counter the imperfect downstream competition in the Cournot model. Here, we assume that
the lowest feasible price is pI = cI   h, so that rm I still makes zero prots on each marginal unit.
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hold even for high access prices. Although a higher access price stimulates quality-
increasing investments under both vertical structures (recall corollaries 3.3 and 3.8), a
higher access price also implies that less consumers buy and hence gain from the in-
vestments. This, in turn, means that incentives must fall short of the social incentives
for infrastructure quality investments for all feasible access prices.
The above propositions show that it will, in general, be impossible to achieve rst-
best investment levels. This observation is aggravated if we consider markets where
both, cost-reducing investments and quality-increasing investments co-exist (compare
Section 3.8.2 of the Appendix). The regulator will then have to set an access price which
additionally reects the relative importance of each type of infrastructure investment.
When quality-increasing investments are "cheap" and desirable, there should be a
signicant positive access margin reecting this. When cost-reducing infrastructure
investments should be stimulated, this should be reected by rather low access prices.93
Thus, in equilibrium, industries where quality-increasing infrastructure investments are
important are likely to depict higher access margins relative to industries where cost-
reducing infrastructure investments are desirable.
If quality-increasing and cost-reducing investments matter in an industry, a ver-
tically integrated structure is likely to perform better. This nding is strengthened
further in Appendix, Section 3.8.2, where we show that the two types of infrastruc-
ture investments are strategic complements. In addition, vertical integration exhibits
stronger complementarities. Hence, co-existence of both investment types wind each
other up more and more, especially under integration. This further substantiates the
relevance of investigating which vertical structure achieves the best infrastructure in-
vestment incentives.
3.6 Excursion: Public Financing
The preceding analysis has shown that the vertically integrated structure performs bet-
ter in providing infrastructure investment incentives into quality and cost-reduction.
With xed costs of infrastructure investment vertical integration is also more e¢ cient
at recovering these through access revenues. The results are reinforced if one considers
93In our model these a¢ nities would show up in the cost function parameters  and . As, for
example,  !1 it becomes unattractive to invest in cost-reduction because increasing h by one unit
becomes very costly. In this industry, cost-reducing investments are unimportant. If  is rather small,
quality-increasing investments are important drivers for e¢ ciency of the industry.
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both types of investments jointly because they are strategic complements and the com-
plementarities are stronger under vertical integration than under vertical separation.
In reality, there are at least two important benets of vertical separation that the
model did not capture so far. Firstly, vertical separation has better properties to avoid
discriminatory behavior.94 Secondly, there is the abiding argument that vertical sepa-
ration lends itself better to continuous government nancing. The idea that nancing
may alter the optimal vertical structure is mentioned but not formalized in both, New-
bery (2004) and Hellwig (2006). Hellwig (2006) and Röller et al. (2005) as well as
practitioners have argued that government nancing in conjunction with vertical in-
tegration may su¤er from a soft budget constraint problem that seriously worsens its
performance. The work by Röller et al. (2005) delivers an explanation for why it may
not be desirable to publicly nance a vertically integrated structure. It analyzes the
incentives for e¢ cient production when a rm is obliged to provide a social good (in
our context the infrastructure) in addition to a private good (downstream services). In
this situation a soft budget constraint problem arises because providing the social good
is socially desirable but privately unprotable. Röller et al. (2005) show that it is then
better to separate the provision of the private and the social good. In the following,
we therefore investigate public nancing in conjunction with vertical separation and
compare its performance against a privately-nanced, vertically integrated structure
(as in Section 3.3) and we do so in a very simple and stylized way.95
We assume two implications of government nancing:
1. loss of commitment to access prices: Government nancing is prominent
in network utilities, partly because of the natural monopoly properties of in-
frastructure, partly because of their strategic importance for the functioning of
the economy as a whole.96 Regulatory institutions usually have to enforce ac-
cess price cuts against a strong lobby when the infrastructure provider is private.
94Price-, quality or other soft discrimination may stem from di¤erent sources. It could be a result
of sabotage or raising rivals costs(as discussed in Section 3.1 and footnotes on pages 101 and 106).
It could also be due to ine¢ cient regulation where socially too high access prices are granted, for
example, as a result of problems in coping with imperfect information on actual costs of providing the
infrastructure. These arguments are not considered in our model.
95Caillaud et al. (2004) also consider essential facilities nancing but focus on e¤ects of private
information. Else (1996) illustrates the importance of government nancing for the example of British
rail. Shleifer (1998) gives a good overview of potential pitfalls and benets of public ownership.
96Network utilities, such as water, electricity, telecoms and transportation build the basis for almost
all economic activities. The universal service proposition stresses the idea that it is in societys
interest that every individual has access to these services. In some countries this is written down in
constitutional law ("Daseinsfürsorge"u realization of precautions).
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Private owners require specied, long-run returns and thus guaranteed access con-
ditions for planning reliability. Arguably, this is less so for a public infrastructure
provider where funds are negotiable, especially in times of sudden but potentially
inevitable access price increases. We therefore believe that private nancing and
commitment to a positive access margin go hand in hand, whereas public nanc-
ing implies a loss of commitment power. We model the extreme case where there
is no commitment by the regulator.
2. government subsidies are costly: With growing budgets and the e¤orts of
governments to strive to reduce the size of public spending, government nanc-
ing comes at a social cost,  > 0.97 We assume that this cost is constant given
the probably rather small fraction that government funds for network utilities
contribute to the entire budget. However, depending on the economic environ-
ment, this cost parameter may be prohibitively high or rather low. Government
payments are capped to a maximum of s = F .
We now explore the consequences of public nancing for a vertically separated struc-
ture to later compare it against a privately-nanced, vertically integrated infrastruc-
ture. Note that the rst assumption has direct implications for the time structure of
the game. In contrast to our assumption in the previous sections, the investment deci-
sion is now undertaken before the access price is nally being determined.98 Therefore,
the timing is as follows.
In stage 1, the upstream infrastructure provider, rm I, chooses the investment
levels into infrastructure, k and h. We assume that the infrastructure provider con-
tinues to maximize prots as its objective function when deciding on investments.99
In stage 2 the regulator chooses a linear access price pI to maximize social welfare.
When doing so, he anticipates the welfare consequences of trading-o¤ social losses due
to higher access prices against those associated with supply of additional government
funds (in stage 3). Moreover, we assume that being the owner the government and
the regulator may now set the access price to e¤ective marginal costs, cI   h. In stage
97The social cost of public funds could be due to costs in obtaining the funds in the rst place (e.g.
through distortionary taxes) or they could be thought of as an opportunity cost for not being able
to fund other potentially socially desirable projects. Here, collection of $1 of funds (e.g. through tax
revenues) is associated with deadweight costs of $(1 + ) following Segal (1998).
98Any access price announcement made prior to investment is no longer credible. The investor
anticipates this.
99In general, public nancing may also imply that the government secures some power in deciding
on the structure, capacity and investment of infrastructure. We abstract from modeling this here.
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3 each downstream rm chooses the quantity qj which determines the total quantity
produced, Q, the nal goods price, p(Q), and the associated infrastructure demand
and prots. The government pays "subsidies" s to ensure the infrastructure provider
receives his reservation prots. Subsidies are modeled in the simplest form they are
a xed transfer and socially costly to raise.
Figure 3.2: Time Structure of the Model (No Commitment)
We now examine the implications of the change in timing for optimal investments
and social e¢ ciency. In the last stage of the game, the optimal quantity decisions of
downstream rms remain as in Section 3.4. The government pays a subsidy which
depends in size on how the regulator set the access charge in the previous stage:
s =
(
F if nF = 0
F   nF if nF > 0
where nF = (pI   (cI   h))Q(k; h)   C(k; h) with C(k; h) being the costs from
infrastructure investment and Q being the total quantity produced downstream which
also depends upon infrastructure investments.
For the regulators decision in stage 2 let us rst assume costless government -
nancing,  = 0. We then nd the following:
Remark 2 Under vertical separation, costless government nancing and no com-
mitment to access prices, the regulator sets the access price equal to marginal cost,
pI = (cI   h). This deters the infrastructure provider from undertaking any invest-
ments into infrastructure in the rst stage of the game.
Proof. See Appendix, Section 3.8.3.
The intuition for the result is simple. When government nancing does not involve
additional social costs, it is superior to private nancing through access charges which
involve a socially undesirable mark-up over marginal cost. In fact, given that invest-
ments have already taken place in stage 1, the regulator will always choose the lowest
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access price feasible. The fact that investments cannot be recouped through access
revenues will deter the infrastructure provider from undertaking investments in the
rst stage.100 This is to the detriment of social welfare, especially if investments are
important for welfare, but cannot be avoided if there is no commitment.
With a positive cost of social funds,  > 0, there will generally be a mixture
of nancing infrastructure through access revenues and government subsidies. The
reason is that the regulator will weigh the relative social losses from increasing the
access price and mark-up against the social loss associated with government funding
taking investments as given. For low xed costs to be covered, private funding will
usually perform better as distortions introduced are small. Therefore, when public
funding is very costly (i.e.  large), the access margin chosen is positive despite the
commitment problem. However, as shown in Appendix, Section 3.8.1, each additional
unit of access revenues introduces larger marginal distortions.101 In contrast to these
distortions under private funding which increase on the margin, marginal distortions
under public nancing are constant (). At the point where the distortion through an
additional increase in the access margin is greater than , the government will then
use subsidies in addition. This must be the case for very high xed costs.102
Remark 3 For high costs of infrastructure provision F , a publicly nanced infrastruc-
ture provider outperforms a privately-nanced infrastructure provider if social costs of
government funds, , are not too large.
To grasp the intuition of the remark, it is easiest to consider the most extreme
example. Whereas private funding can only support a structure that has xed costs
F that are below or equal to monopoly prots (F  M), public funding is able to
sustain infrastructures that are privately unprotable but socially desirable. This case
exists because a monopoly is unable to raise the entire social surplus with linear access
charges. Nevertheless, an (at least partially) publicly nanced infrastructure is feasible
if associated costs, , are not too large.
100Thus, once the investment has taken place, the bargaining power switches to the regulator the
costs of investment are sunk and need to be recovered (hold-up problem). Thus, the investor, if there
is no guarantee for him to recover his sunk costs, may be reluctant to invest in infrastructure. We
assume that the infrastructure provider does not invest in case of indi¤erence.
101The argument is that for an additional, marginal unit of nancing F , the access price has to
be increased. As the quantity base decreases with access price increases, the needed price increases
become larger on the margin distortions increase more than proportionately.
102Whether investments are stimulated through the positive access margin depends on whether the
resulting benets can be recouped by the investor. If subsidies are reduced as a result, investments
may still not occur in the rst place; this is assumed here.
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Section 3.5 demonstrated that under the assumptions of our model, the vertically
integrated market structure was superior under private nancing.103 However, when
we introduce the possibility of government nancing under vertical separation, this
result may reverse. In particular, we have shown that public nancing may sustain a
market structure which cannot be privately nanced through access revenues. Even if
there is a commitment problem associated with public nancing of the infrastructure,
the system may outperform a privately-nanced, vertically integrated structure if the
social cost of public nancing  is rather low and investment incentives are not too
important for the industry.
Within the framework of our model we are thus able to give recommendations on
the best-suited form of vertical structure, the desired way of nancing infrastructure
costs and the imperative features of sector-specic access regulation. These need to
be tailored to the economic environment characterized by the investment-a¢ nity of
infrastructure with respect to both quality and cost-e¤ectiveness, the size of xed
costs of its provision and the social costs of government nancing. If quality-increasing
and cost-reducing investments are important, a privately-nanced, vertically integrated
structure is likely to perform best. This is especially true for industries where a pos-
itive mark-up over marginal cost leads to signicant quality-increasing investments.
In contrast, if investments are expensive and thus not important drivers for e¢ ciency
of the industry, the vertically integrated structure is only preferable as long as xed
costs and associated distortions are not too large and public nancing is socially costly.
However, as xed costs increase and the private nancing of the infrastructure becomes
more ine¢ cient, choosing a vertically separated, publicly-nanced structure may well
be preferable.
Arguably the railroad industry could be considered a good example for depicting the
just described industry characteristics. Whereas infrastructure investments into quality
and cost-reduction are potentially important, the associated costs of infrastructure
provision, F , are very large and it has been argued that private nancing will not be
able to fully recoup these.104 If this is so, a publicly nanced but vertically separated
infrastructure should be advocated according to our model. However, our model also
warns that it is crucial to nd alternative incentive mechanisms that ensure su¢ cient
infrastructure investments as these may su¤er strongly under a vertically separated,
103This presumes that the regulator will set and commit to an access price pI that is high enough
to guarantee that the infrastructure costs can be recouped.
104Compare Nash et al. (2002) and Newbery (2004) who show that European railways have a
cost-recovery ratio that lies signicantly below 100%.
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publicly-nanced structure. Similar arguments are often made for the water industry.105
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we developed a framework to explore the performance of di¤erent ver-
tical structures for network industries. We paid special attention to questions related
to infrastructure investment into cost-e¤ectiveness and quality.
In our analysis we showed that infrastructure investments play an important role
in determining the optimal regulatory policy and in deciding on the optimal industry
structure. In particular, we highlighted that a vertically integrated structure if e¢ -
ciently regulated provides better incentives for infrastructure investment into both,
cost-reduction and quality-increases. Depending on the relative importance of cost-
reducing and quality-increasing investments, a positive access margin may be socially
desirable to stimulate quality-increasing investments even if this causes competitive
distortions. Moreover, we were able to show that downstream competition typically
stimulates infrastructure investments through increased demand for access to the in-
frastructure (for quality-increasing investments) or an increased access margin (for cost-
reducing investments). However, the opposite may be the case for quality-increasing
infrastructure investments under vertical integration as the increased intensity of com-
petition erodes downstream prots and thus investment incentives through free-riding
of competitors.
Although very stylized, our model does deliver important implications for policy.
Industries, in which infrastructure investments play a dominant role in determining the
e¢ ciency of the industry, demand a vertically integrated structure. Whereas quality-
increasing investments are enhanced through increased access prices, the opposite holds
for cost-reducing investments. Thus, considering cost-reducing and quality-increasing
investments jointly may leave the regulator indi¤erent between promoting a low quality,
low price environment through low access prices (cost-e¤ectiveness) or one of high
quality at high prices resulting from quality investments stimulated through high access
prices. The underlying heterogeneity in consumerspreferences and wealth would then
take the role of determining what the preferred scenario would be.
105However, experts note that technological complementarities and synergies between the upstream
and the downstream market are considerable for the water industry. These are not considered in our
model but would work in favor of vertical integration. For the German railroads case see Booz Allen
Hamilton (2006) for a discussion.
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Our model leaves out other important but largely orthogonal aspects that should be
taken into account when determining the vertical structure of a network industry. On
the one hand, vertical integration is prone to discrimination of various forms, whether
price, non-price (e.g. quality or cost) or soft discrimination. Especially in those in-
dustries where regulation has a di¢ cult task to detect those anticompetitive actions
or where regulation is less e¢ cient in determining the optimal access price, vertical
separation may ease the problems considerably. On the other hand, technological com-
plementarities, also with respect to upstream and downstream investments, or other
types of synergies may favor vertical integration as the better vertical industry struc-
ture. We deduce that vertically integrated industry structures may be optimal despite
the problems they cause related to discrimination.
Infrastructure investment incentives may be considerably altered through alterna-
tive forms of nancing. In particular, we argued that public nancing may be associated
with a commitment problem that seriously harms investment incentives. However, if
xed costs are extremely large, a publicly-nanced infrastructure could be the only
viable alternative.
An interesting topic for further research arises out of the interdependencies of up-
stream (infrastructure) and downstream (services) investments. At rst glance, one
would suspect that there are also strategic complementarities between these types of
investments, similar to those considered in Appendix 3.8.2. If that is conrmed, this
would further reinforce the relevance that infrastructure investments have for economic
e¢ ciency. More e¤ort should be devoted into highlighting these interrelations on the
one hand and the di¤erences of cost-reducing and quality-increasing investments on
the other.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Graphical Analysis of Investments in a Cournot Model
Cost-Reducing and Quality-Increasing Investments in a Cournot Model
In a standard, non-vertical Cournot model the e¤ects of cost-reducing and quality-
increasing investments are equivalent for quantities. In a symmetric Cournot model,
the equilibrium quantities are given by Q = n(a cI)
n+1
: Thus, whether quality-increasing
investments (which increase output to Q(k) = n(a cI+k)
n+1
) or cost-reducing investments
(which increase output to Q(h) = n(a cI+h)
n+1
), the e¤ect is exactly the same. Note, how-
ever, that quality-increasing investments cause equilibrium price to increase whereas
cost-reducing investments cause a decrease in equilibrium price with imperfect down-
stream competition.
Figure 3.3: Cost-Reducing and Quality-Increasing Investments
Illustration of Private and Public Financing of Infrastructure
The welfare loss under private nancing resembles the well-known deadweight-loss un-
der monopoly. The dotted triangle describes the welfare loss in the gure below. Note
that the maximum nancing the private infrastructure can raise is monopoly prot.
However, even if xed costs are larger than the monopoly prot, production may be
worthwhile. Therefore, private nancing may sometimes not be feasible and production
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breaks down although it would be socially desirable.
Under public nancing the associated welfare loss can be illustrated with the rec-
tangle in the gure below. The shaded rectangle describes the xed cost of production.
Social losses (under a constant social cost of public funds) are proportional to this
rectangle.
Ic
p
Q
DMR
AC
Mp
Mq
Figure 3.4: Public vs. Private Financing
Note that the deadweight loss under private nancing increases with every incre-
mental increase in the xed cost that needs to be recouped. For illustration, consider
a monopolys prot maximization problem with the following parameters:
Linear demand function: p = 10  q; no marginal costs. The monopolist therefore
maximizes prots by selling at (p = 5, q = 5) and earns a prot of  = 25. To achieve
the rst unit of these prots, the monopolist only has to raise the price slightly above
marginal cost to the level, , that fullls:
First Unit: (10  ) = 1 where the solution is given by  = 5 p24 and the associated
deadweight loss is 
2
2
= (5 
p
24)2
2
Second Unit: (10   ) = 2 where the solution is given by  = 5   p23 and the
associated deadweight loss is 
2
2
= (5 
p
23)2
2
The total deadweight loss, of course, increases in the number of units to be raised but
so does the marginal deadweight loss. The marginal deadweight loss of the rst unit is
(5 p24)2
2
, the one for the second is (5 
p
23)2
2
  (5 
p
24)2
2
> (5 
p
24)2
2
. The argument holds
for all units up until the last unit to be raised  the 25th unit. Thus, raising each
additional unit, for example to cover a xed cost F , becomes increasingly costly. This
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result holds for linear inverse demand functions but generalizes to other (e.g. convex)
functional forms.
3.8.2 Co-Existence of Both Investments
Clearly, both types of investments into infrastructure may co-exist. Implications will
be examined in the following two subsections.
Vertical Integration
The integrated rms and a representative rivals prot function are given by:
I = (pI   (cI   h))(Q (h; k)) + (a+ k  Q(h; k)  pI)qI   
2
h2   
2
k2   F
j = (a+ k  Q(k)  pI)qj.
In the unique Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game at stage 3 rms choose the
following quantities under linear demand:
qI =
a+ k + (n  1)pI   n(cI   h)
n+ 1
qj =
a+ k + (cI   h)  2pI
n+ 1
.
Thus, the total quantity is given by QV I = n(a+k pI)+pI (cI h)
n+1
and the market
price is pQI;V I = a+k+(cI h)+(n 1)pI
n+1
. In stage 2, the vertically integrated infrastructure
provider determines investments into cost-reduction and quality. The FOCs show that
investment incentives under vertical integration are made up of the following compo-
nents:
@I
@h
= (QV I I) + (pI   (cI   h))(
@Q I
@h
) + (
@pV I
@Q
@Q
@h
+ 1)qI + (p
V I   (cI   h))@qI
@h
  h
@I
@k
= (pI   (cI   h))@Q I
@k
+
@pV I
@Q
@Q
@k
qI(k) + (p
V I   (cI   h))@qI
@k
  k.
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Note that these e¤ects are, intuitively, the same as in Section 3.3. However, their
size may di¤er due to the interdependencies between investments. Testing for strategic
interdependencies, we nd for general demand:
@2I
@h@k
=
@QV I I
@k
+ (pI   (cI   h))(@
2Q I
@h@k
) + (
@2pV I
@h@k
)qI (3.15)
+(
@pV I
@h
+ 1)
@qI
@k
+
@pV I
@k
@qI
@h
+ (pV I   (cI   h)) @
2qI
@h@k
@2I
@k@h
=
@QV I I
@k
+ (pI   (cI   h))@
2Q I
@k@h
+
@2pV I
@k@h
qI (3.16)
+
@pV I
@k
@qI
@h
+ (
@pV I
@h
+ 1)
@qI
@k
+ (pV I   (cI   h)) @
2qI
@k@h
.
For the linear demand model, investments are strategic complements:
@2I
@h@k
=
@2I
@k@h
= 1  2
(n+ 1)2
> 0. (3.17)
Remark 4 Under vertical integration and linear demand, cost-reducing and quality-
increasing investments are strategic complements. If the infrastructure provider invests
more in one type of investment, this enhances the marginal protability of investing in
the other type of investment.
The optimal investment levels for linear demand are then given by:
k =
(n+ 1)2 (pI   cI) + 2(a+ cI   2pI)
 (n+ 1)2   2 +
(n+ 1)2   2
 (n+ 1)2   2h
h =
(n+ 1)2 (a  pI)  2(a+ cI   2pI)
 (n+ 1)2   2 +
(n+ 1)2   2
 (n+ 1)2   2k
and these are larger compared to investment levels without co-existence due to the
strategic complementarity.
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Vertical Separation
At stage 3 downstream rms compete in quantities and face a symmetric prot maxi-
mization problem of the form:
j = (p(Q)  pI)qj.
The rst order condition for a prot maximum requires:
@j
@qj
= (p(Q; k)  pI) + @p
@Q
qj = 0.
At stage 2 of the game, the upstream infrastructure provider chooses how much to
invest in both cost-reduction and quality by maximizing:
I = (pI   (cI   h))QV S(k)  
2
h2   
2
k2   F
where QV S(k) = n  a+k pI
n+1
. The FOCs give the following conditions for optimality:
@I
@h
= QV S(k)  h = 0 (3.18)
@I
@k
= (pI   (cI   h))@Q
V S
@k
  k = 0. (3.19)
Thus, the FOCs remind us of equations of rst order (3.13) and (3.14). Note,
however, that here investment incentives are stronger. QV S(k) in equation (3.18) is
larger than QV S(k = 0) and (pI   (cI   h)) in equation (3.19) is larger than pI   cI .
Thus, the co-existence of investments leads to higher incentives to invest. This is
conrmed by the following nding:
@2I
@h@k
=
@2I
@k@h
=
@QV S(k)
@k
> 0. (3.20)
For linear demand we nd:
@2I
@h@k
=
@2I
@k@h
=
n
n+ 1
> 0. (3.21)
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Remark 5 Under vertical separation cost-reducing and quality-increasing investments
are strategic complements. If the infrastructure provider invests more in one type of
investment, this enhances the marginal protability of investing in the other type of
investment.
Thus, investments are also strategic complements under vertical separation but the
complementarity is smaller. This implies the following optimal investment levels for
the case of linear demand which are again greater than in Section 3.4:
k =
n(pI   cI)
(n+ 1)
+
n
(n+ 1)
h
h =
n(a  pI)
(n+ 1)
+
n
(n+ 1)
k.
3.8.3 Proofs
Proof of Corollary 3.1:
To show that @h
CR;V I
@pI
=   (n+1)2 4
(n+1)2 2 is indeed negative, recall that the denominator is
greater zero by assumption ( > 2
(n+1)2
). This was required by the SOC for a maximum
when deriving hCR;V I . The numerator is also greater zero for all n > 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.2:
For @h
CR;V I
@n
= 4 (n+1)(pI a+(a+cI 2pI))
((n+1)2 2)2 to be positive, consider again numerator and
denominator in turn. The denominator is always positive (as in proof of Corollary
3.1). The numerator is also positive because for rivalsprots to be non-negative, we
require that (pI   a+ (a+ cI   2pI)) > 0, i.e.  > a pIa+cI 2pI which implies  > 1.
Note that all assumptions undertaken on  are such that we require to be greater than
a certain value. Therefore, the assumptions can hold jointly.
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
The welfare function is given by:
WCR;V I = CSCR;V I + I + (n  1)j
where by substitution of hCR;V I :
CSCR;V I = ((n 1)(a pI)+(n+1)(n(a pI)+pI cI))
2
2((n+1)2 2)2
I =
(a pI)2(n+3)(n 1)+2((a+cI 2pI)2+(n+1)2(pI cI)(a pI))
2((n+1)2 2)   F
(n  1)j = (n  1) (n+ 1)2 ( a+pI+(a+cI 2pI))
2
((n+1)2 2)2
Comparative statics with respect to pI take the expected signs:
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@
@pI
(CS) = (n 1)(+n+1)( (n 1)(a pI) (n+1)(n(a pI)+pI cI))
((n+1)2 2)2
< 0
@
@pI
(I) =
((n+1)2 4)((n+1)2 2)( a+pI+(a+cI 2pI))
((n+1)2 2)2 > 0
@
@pI
((n  1)j) =  2(2 1)(n 1)(n+1)
2( a+pI+(a+cI 2pI))
((n+1)2 2)2
< 0 as 2   1 > 0 by  > 2
(n+1)2
.
Summing the terms, we get the following expression:
  (n 1)(+n+1)((n 1)(a pI)+(n+1)(n(a pI)+pI cI))
((n+1)2 2)2
+
(n 1)2((n+1)2+2n+4)( a+pI+(a+cI 2pI))
((n+1)2 2)2
Our aim is to show that the above expression is indeed negative. Denominators are
positive, thus we require the sum of numerators to be negative. Gathering terms, we
get:
(n  1) f(5  n(3 + 2n))(a  pI)   Xg < 0
Note that this expression is negative if X > 0 where X is given by:
X = 2(a pI)(1 n)+3cI(1 n)+(n
2 3)pI(1 n)+n2(a cI)+n2(an cI)+Y
1
:
As Y = a  pI +n(2a  cI   pI)+n2(a  cI)+n3(pI   cI)+n2(pI   cI) > 0, we require:
2(a  pI)(1  n) + 3cI(1  n) + (n2   3)pI(1  n) + n2(a  cI) + n2(an  cI) > 0
, (2(a  pI) + 3cI + (n2   3)pI)(1  n) + n2(a(1 + n)  2cI) > 0
which is true if n2(a(1 + n)  2cI) > (n  1)(2(a  pI) + n2pI   3(pI   cI))
or n2(a(1 + n)  2cI) > (n  1)(2(a  pI) + n2pI);
i.e. if n2(an  2cI) > (n  1)(2(a  pI)) which is indeed the case.
The regulator will therefore set the lowest possible access price that makes the industry
viable. This requires the following reservation prots for the integrated rm:
(a) under assumption that reservation prot is given by the zero prot condition:
(a pI)2(n+3)(n 1)+2((a+cI 2pI)2+(n+1)2(pI cI)(a pI))
2((n+1)2 2)   F = 0
(b) under assumption that reservation prot is the rivalsprot:
(a pI)2(n+3)(n 1)+2((a+cI 2pI)2+(n+1)2(pI cI)(a pI))
2((n+1)2 2)   F = (n+ 1)
2 ( a+pI+(a+cI 2pI))2
((n+1)2 2)2
.
Proof of Corollary 3.3:
The expression @k
QI;V I
@pI
= (n+1)
2 4
(n+1)2 2 is positive as  >
2
(n+1)2
by assumption to guarantee
the SOC for a maximum on kQI;V I and (n+ 1)2 > 4 holds for all n > 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.4:
@kQI;V I
@n
=  4 (n+1)(pI cI+(a+cI 2pI))
((n+1)2 2)2 < 0 holds if pI   cI + (a + cI   2pI) > 0 which is
always the case.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
The welfare function is given by:
WQI;V I = CS + I + (n  1)j
where by substitution of kQI;V I :
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CSQI;V I = ((n+2)(n 1)(pI cI)+(n+1)(n(a pI)+pI cI))
2
2((n+1)2 2)2
I =
(pI cI)2(n+3)(n 1)+2((a+cI 2pI)2+(n+1)2(pI cI)(a pI))
2((n+1)2 2)   F
(n  1)j = (n  1) (n+ 1)2 (pI cI+(a+cI 2pI))
2
((n+1)2 2)2
When investments are costly, i.e.  is large, standard theory tells us that the lowest
feasible mark-up is welfare maximizing. This is conrmed by:
lim
!1
WQI;V I = n(n+2)(a cI)
2 2(pI cI)(n 1)(a cI) (n 1)2(pI cI)2
2(n+1)2
  F
for which @
@pI
( lim
!1
WQI) =   n 1(n+1)2 (a  pI + n(pI   cI)) < 0 holds.
To examine the comparative statics with investments around pI = cI , we dene the
mark-up as  = pI   cI and substitute:
WQI;V I(pI = cI + ) =
((n+2)(n 1)()+(n+1)(n(a cI )+))2
2((n+1)2 2)2
+ ()
2(n+3)(n 1)+2((a cI 2)2+(n+1)2()(a cI ))
2((n+1)2 2)   F + (n  1) (n+ 1)
2 (+(a cI 2))2
((n+1)2 2)2
If raising the access price above marginal cost is indeed welfare maximizing, we must
nd a positive value for  maximizing the above expression. The FOC requires:
@
@
(WQI;V I) =
  (n 1)((8 2n 11 5n
2 n3 2)+4a 4cI+a2 2cI+an22 4an)
((n+1)2 2)2
  (n 1)((2n(n2+n 1)+n(3+7n+n2)) n22cI+4ncI+n(a cI)(2 n2 5n))
((n+1)2 2)2
= 0
with the second order condition for a maximum given by:
  (n 1)
2((n+1)22+n2( 1)+(8n+11) 6n 8)
((n+1)2 2)2
< 0
This condition is fullled if  is large enough, i.e. investments su¢ ciently costly.
Otherwise welfare is maximized with innite investments. The optimal mark-up is
only positive and welfare maximizing for values where:
 2 ( (n+3)
p
18n+5n2+17 (n2+11+8n)
2(n+1)2
; 4n+5n
2+n3 4
2n+n2+1
):
While the SOC dictates the lower bound (to arrive at a stable solution  >
(n+3)
p
18n+5n2+17 (n2+11+8n)
2(n+1)2
), the FOC gives a condition for the upper bound as
otherwise investments are not important enough and the access margin should be
non-positive ( < 4n+5n
2+n3 4
2n+n2+1
).
Illustration with  = 1 solving the FOC for  and taking ! 1:
 = lim!1( (4a 4cI+a
2 2cI+an22 4an n22cI+4ncI+2an2 5an2 an3 2n2cI+5n2cI+n3cI)
 2n 11+n22+n32+3n 2 n2+7n2+n3 5n2 n3+8 )
=
(a cI)(2n+4n2+n3 5)
(n 1)(n+2)2 > 0
SOC: lim!1(  (n 1)
2(n22+n2 n2+2n2+8n 6n+2+11 8)
((n+1)2 2)2
)
=   (n  1)2 (n+2)2
(2n+n2 1)2 < 0
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The optimal mark-up  is then given by:
(a cI)(2n+4n2+n3 5)
(n 1)(n+2)2 > 0 for the illustrative
example of  = 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.5:
The consumer surplus expression is given by:
CSQI;V I = ((n+2)(n 1)(pI cI)+(n+1)(n(a pI)+pI cI))
2
2((n+1)2 2)2
@
@pI
(CSQI;V I) = (n  1) (n+2 (1+n))((n+2)(n 1)(pI cI)+(n+1)(n(a pI)+pI cI))
((n+1)2 2)2
> 0 if  < n+2
n+1
From the SOC of the Cournot game, we have that  > 2
(n+1)2
. Thus, if 0 < 2
(n+1)2
<
 < n+2
n+1
, CS indeed increases with pI due to the positive investment e¤ect, i.e. if
investments are not too costly to be unimportant and not too cheap so that quality-
escalation is excluded.
Proof of Corollary 3.6:
@hCR;V S
@pI
=   n
(n+1)
< 0 as clearly both numerator and denominator are positive.
Proof of Corollary 3.7:
@hCR;V S
@n
= a pI
(n+1)2
> 0. Again, both numerator and denominator are positive.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
hCR;V I = (n+1)
2(a pI) 2(a+cI 2pI)
(n+1)2 2 >
n
n+1
 a pI

= hCR;V S
Multiplying and dividing the term under hCR;V S with (n+ 1), we have:
n(n+1)(a pI)
(n+1)2
= hCR;V S
It then becomes clear that the denominator is larger than the one under VI but the
numerator is smaller (as 2(pI   cI) + (n   1)(a   pI) > 0). Hence the entire term is
smaller.
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
Substitution of hCR;V S yields:
WCR;V S = n(a pI)
2
 2(a cI)+n(a pI)+n(a+pI 2cI)
(n+1)2
  F
@
@pI
(WCR;V S) =  n(n(a pI)+(a cI)+n(pI cI))
(n+1)2
< 0 as the negative sign is multiplied with
a positive expression.
Proof of Corollary 3.8:
@kQI;V S
@pI
= n
(n+1)
> 0 as both, numerator and denominator are positive.
Proof of Corollary 3.9:
@kQI;V S
@n
= pI cI
(n+1)2
> 0 as both, numerator and denominator are positive.
Proof of Proposition 3.5:
kQI;V I = (pI cI)(n+1)
2+2(a+cI 2pI)
(n+1)2 2 >
n(pI cI)
(n+1)
= kQI;V S
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Multiplying and dividing kQI;V S by (n + 1) it is easy to see that the denominator
is smaller under VI. The numerator is larger under VI as (n+ 1)2 > n (n+ 1) and
2(a+ cI   2pI) > 0. Hence the term under VI is larger.
Proof of Proposition 3.6:
By substituting kQI;V S we have:
WQI;V S = n(pI cI)
2
n(pI cI)+2(n+1)(a pI)
(n+1)2
+ n
2+2n
2
(n(pI cI)+(n+1)(a pI)
(n+1)2
)2
@
@pI
(n(pI cI)
2
n(pI cI)+2(n+1)(a pI)
(n+1)2
) =
= n
(n+1)2
(n(pI   cI) + (n+ 1)(a+ cI   2pI)) > 0
@CSQI;V S
@pI
= @
@pI
(n
2+2n
2
(n(pI cI)+(n+1)(a pI)
(n+1)2
)2) =
=  n(n+2)( n+n)((n+1)(a pI)+n(pI cI))
2(n+1)4
> 0 if  < n
n+1
.
Thus, the result holds for both, welfare and CS if  < n
n+1
. In fact, welfare may also
increase for values slightly below this threshold.
Proof of Proposition 3.7:
We derive the socially optimal investment incentives for the access price pI = cI   h.
Although the socially optimal price lies below this (to counter Cournot mark-ups at
the downstream level), pI = cI   h is by assumption the lowest feasible access price:
WCR;V I = (a+(cI h) 2(cI h))
2+(n+1)2((cI h) (cI h))(a (cI h))
(n+1)2
+ (n  1)(a+(cI h) 2(cI h)
n+1
)2 + (n(a (cI h))+(cI h) (cI h))
2
2(n+1)2
  
2
h2   F
@
@h
(WCR;V I(pI = cI   h)) =
=  (h+2ncI an
2 hn2+n2cI 2an 2hn+2hn+hn2)
(n+1)2
= 0
h = n(n+2)(a cI)
(n+1)2 n(n+2) > h
CR;V I = (n+1)
2(a pI) 2(a+cI 2pI)
(n+1)2 2
as the numerator is larger and the denominator smaller under h. Note that as in-
centives for investment decrease in the access price, this result holds for all access
prices.
Proof of Proposition 3.8:
Here, we derive socially optimal investment incentives under the presumption of the
lowest feasible access price pI = cI :
WQI;V I = (n(a+k cI)+cI cI)
2
2(n+1)2
+
+ (a+k+cI 2cI)
2+(n+1)2(cI cI)(a+k cI)
(n+1)2
+ (n  1)(a+k+cI 2cI
n+1
)2   
2
k2   F
@
@k
(WQI;V I(pI = cI)) =
=  k+2ncI an2 kn2+n2cI 2an 2kn+2kn+kn2
(n+1)2
= 0 where we require  > n(n+2)
(n+1)2
for the
SOC to be fullled.
k = n(n+2)(a cI)
(n+1)2 n(n+2) > 0 as  >
n(n+2)
(n+1)2
by assumption.
k = n(n+2)(a cI)
(n+1)2 n(n+2) > k
QI;V I = (pI cI)(n+1)
2+2(a+cI 2pI)
(n+1)2 2
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As @k
QI;V I
@pI
> 0, we compare directly at highest possible access price under VI, i.e. the
monopoly price:
k   kQI;V I(pI = a+cI2 ) = n(n+2)(a cI)(n+1)2 n(n+2)  
(
a+cI
2
 cI)(n+1)2+2(a+cI 2a+cI2 )
(n+1)2 2 =
= 1
2
(a  cI) 4n2+4n3+n4+n2+4n3+n4 6n ((n+1)2 n(n+2))((n+1)2 2) > 0 as the denominator is greater zero from
 > n(n+2)
(n+1)2
and the numerator as well by n > 1.
Proof of Remark 2:
Without commitment and  = 0, welfare maximization takes the following form 
taking k; h as given:
WQI;V I = (n(a+k pI)+pI cI)
2
2(n+1)2
+ (a+k+cI 2pI)
2+(n+1)2(pI cI)(a+k pI)
(n+1)2
+(n  1)(a+k+cI 2pI
n+1
)2 

2
k2   F
@WQI;V I
@pI
=   n 1
(n+1)2
(a+ k   pI + n(pI   cI)) < 0
WQI;V S = (pI   cI)na+k pIn+1 + n(a+k pIn+1 )2 + n
2(a+k pI)2
2(n+1)2
  
2
k2   F
@WQI;V S
@pI
=   n
(n+1)2
(a+ k   cI + n(pI   cI)) < 0
WCR;V I = (a+(cI h) 2pI)
2+(n+1)2(pI (cI h))(a pI)
(n+1)2
+ (n   1)(a+(cI h) 2pI
n+1
)2 +
(n(a pI)+pI (cI h))2
2(n+1)2
  
2
h2   F
@WCR;V I
@pI
=   n 1
(n+1)2
(a  pI + n(pI   (cI   h))) < 0
WCR;V S = (pI   (cI   h))na pIn+1 + n(a pIn+1 )2 + n
2(a pI)2
2(n+1)2
  
2
h2   F
@WCR;V S
@pI
=   n
(n+1)2
(a  (cI   h) + n(pI   (cI   h))) < 0
Because all derivatives are negative throughout, the regulator chooses the lowest access
price feasible which is an access price equal to the true marginal cost.
In contrast, private nancing introduces a deadweight loss. Consider, for illustra-
tion, a perfectly competitive downstream industry with total output Q at marginal
cost cI . Then, to nance a xed cost of F , the access provider requires a mark-up that
satises: (pI cI)Q = F . Note that following standard theory, the mark-up (and hence
the associated deadweight loss) increases more than proportionately with an increase
in F ! Compare Section 3.8.1 of the Appendix.
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